Why has the PLAN neglected ASW? Submarines are nothing new to East Asia. I guess helicopters are in very short supply, but there's no excuse for having so few maritime patrol aircraft and submarine chasing patrol boats.
Well, I think the article Jeff linked does a fairly good analysis of the historical and practical reasons for this, with the most important factors being:
- The vast gulf in capabilities between the PLA and potential adversaries until as late as a few years ago. It is only in the last 5 or so years that the PLAAF has grown strong enough to have a realistic chance of holding off enemy air power far enough out, and for long enough to allow things like AWACS and MPAs to operate with any degree of security. As the article pointed out, what is the point in investing vast sums and resources in a large MPA fleet if said fleet will get shot down as soon as they tried to do their job?
- The PLAN puts a great deal of emphasis on creative mine warfare, and they may well see that as sufficient to reducing enemy sub operations to a manageable level.
- The new evidence brought up by that article suggests that the PLAN may well have been following the odd adage that the best hunter of a sub is another sub.
I feel that the article does not examine this aspect in as much detail as maybe it should. This may well be because they were looking at it from a US stand point instead of truly putting themselves in China's shoes.
If a major conflict does break out, and the only likely example would be Taiwan, the PLAN would have a very specific mission in a relatively small area.
In addition, it needs to be stressed that for China, even today, it's best defense against attack from a superior force like the USN is the economic co-dependancy between America and China. If hostilities does break out, it will be in everyone's interest to try and keep it as localized, contained and short-lived as possible.
This means that initially at least, the Americans would not be looking at trying to cut off China's Sea Lines of Communication (SLC) by attacking merchant shipping, especially since the majority of that shipping will carrying manufactured goods destined for American and European shops, or the raw materials to make said goods.
The PLAN has no hope of keeping China's sea lines open if the USN really wants to cut them off, so they don't even try to develop that capacity and instead make it such that America will be hurting itself as much as China if it went down that road.
Thus, the PLAN's ASW burden is massively reduced to where it only needs to be able to keep a relatively small section of the Chinese coast, namely the Taiwan Straits and it's immediate surrounding waters, free from enemy subs.
In this context, the PLAN's preferred tactic of mine warfare and using it's large SSK fleet as mobile screens to lay and wait would have a far greater chance of success.
The PLAN's subs were never intended to out to sweep all enemy subs away like their USN counterparts. As far as they are concerned, USN subs can go anywhere they like and do whatever they liked so long as they do not enter the Taiwan straits to threaten the PLA landing forces.
Something else to consider is that until the last decade or so, the PLAN actually did not really have many surface combatants worth sinking. Especially in the context of them operating in a heavily defended small stretch of water.
When the PLAN only have Jianweis and the few Luhus, I think they would have happily traded one or more of those for a USN LA/Virgina or Seawolf. As such, all the PLAN would need to do is set up a perimeter patrolled by their SSKs, use lots of small landing craft so none would make for a good target and escort them with Jianweis and Luhus to provide point defense against shore based AShMs.
Even if an enemy SSN does manage to slip past the SSK sentries, as soon as it opens fire it will expose it's position and be effectively bottled in and have very little chance of getting out again alive. Would a USN sub skipper give the order to sink one or two ships, when he knows it won't matter one bit on the grand scheme of things, and that doing so would almost certainly mean he and his ship gets sunk in return? There would be no doubt if this was an invasion fleet heading for America, but would he do it for Taiwan? I have my doubts. But the point is, even if he does fire, the trade off still favours the PLAN.
Now, that might seem cruel and callouss, and you would be right. But that is the price of fighting a technologically superior foe. That is something America has not had to do since WWII, and I really don't think Americans today can easily get into that mindset and think that way and make those kind of calls.
It is only recently, now that tensions with Taiwan has receded and the PLA is confident that they could take the island no matter what, that the PLAN has started to set it's sights beyond Taiwan. That is the main driving force behind the recent massive build up of it's surface fleet, the acquisition of LPDs and carriers and possible LHDs, and it is only with this extended scope that the PLAN is looking at ASW anew.
However, it should still be stressed that it is important to look at this build up in terms of what the PLAN plans to do with it's new fleet and who it is aimed at.
The hawks, defense contracts and military in America automatically assumes that the build up is aimed at challenging America, or tries to make it seem that way as a means to drum up a threat to justify America's frankly ridiculously over-sized defense budget. But they would be wrong.
The PLAN will not be in a position to challenge the USN for supremacy of the oceans for decades to come if ever, because China does not see the justification for such massive spending on the military. Even when China's GDP is the same as America's China's defense spending will still be smaller because China spends about half as much in terms of GDP as America on defense, and I do not see that as changing much any time soon.
China's new fleet is aimed at protecting China's interest in South East Asia and Africa. If the PLAN ever uses it's fleet in anger, it will be to protect Chinese interests on Africa, or to slap down land grabs in the South China Sea like the PLAN has done before. Against those kinds of foes, the PLAN's current and projected ASW assets are just about passable. It is still an area that needs major investment, and the PLAN does recognize this, and seems to be doing the right things to address this deficiency. But in the context of the kinds of foes the PLAN might realistically face, it's ASW is not as quite as inadequate as it would seem at first glance.
