Almaz S-300: China's "Offensive" Air Defense

Pointblank

Senior Member
If the fighter can pick up air-defense radar signal, (except for stealth), it means that the fighter is also picked-up by the radar. When the fighter launch the anti-radiation missiles, the air-defense unit will launch their SAM. It's still anybody's game. What do you think?

No, because the air-launched missile has more energy through the virtue it was launched from a fast moving launcher, imparting speed, and from a higher altitude. A SAM is launched from zero-zero; it starts not moving and on the ground and has to power its way up to gain speed and altitude, while the air-launched missile is just picking up speed through trading altitude for velocity, and gaining speed with a engine itself.
 

man overbored

Junior Member
Ok, several points to make. First there is still a misunderstanding about the difference between the data link used for TVM and how Aegis communicates mid course guidance. TVM uses a discrete channel for each missile. To guide S-300 to it's target, the missile senses the reflected energy off the target and relays this information to the fire control unit via a data link. The fire control unit takes this data and data on target course and speed from the fire control radar and computes the intercept solution, then relays steering commands back to the missile. Aegis does do this. Each SM-2 flies to coordinates loaded into it's INS by the Aegis system. It is not receiving continuous communication. Also you have to remember that each AN/SPY-1 panel scans at very close to the speed of light, allowing each panel to accomplish literally thousands of tasks per second. Each scan used can be shaped differently to accomplish different things, such as an air scan for the anti-air engagement, sensing both the incoming aircraft and the outgoing missiles followed by a differently shaped scan to find sea skimming missiles. All of this data is sensed and correlated into an integrated battle space picture. If the Aegis decides the outgoing SM-2 needs some mid course guidance correction the AN/SPY-1 antenna, not a data link, but the actual radar antenna, accomplishes the communication to the missile of the mid course correction mentioned in the Navy Factfile. This is not a data link in the traditional sense, it is a discrete burst of data sent to one missile, not a two way communication as in a TVM scheme or CLOS like HQ-7, Crotale or Barak. Since the AN/SPY-1 is so fast, it can perform many different scans and communicate mid course guidance commands to hundreds of outgoing missiles at one time, literally doing a thousand tasks each second. It is an amazing system that even after thirty years of service has no close analog anywhere else.
Whew, ok now on to SEAD missions. SEAD, now renamed DEAD for Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses does not go after the fire control radars. DEAD attacks the area search radars. Consider this, a fire control radar cannot find it's own target. If the search radar is take out, the missile battery is blind, it cannot find a target to illuminate. DEAD missions destroy search radars. Ergo, the comment that by the time the HARM senses the enemy radar the missile is on the way is invalid. The fire control radar is never in play. A DEAD mission with Wild Weasel strike aircraft and EW aircraft like the EA-6B will sense the emissions of an enemy search radar at some distance before the enemy radar senses the incoming strike. This is an unaviodable consequence of physics. The energy reaching the aircraft is always greater than the energy reflected back to the radar. A rough rule of thumb is that an aircraft will sense a radar with it's RWR at about a 50% greater range than the radar will detect the incoming aircraft. A DEAD mission exploits this. Once a radar is located we jam the crap out of it while the Wild Weasel aircraft goes in for the kill. By then it is too late for the radar because even if the radar operator senses the jamming and shuts down ( a common tactic as far back as the Vietnam war and used routinely by the Serbs ) the HARM already knows the location of the site and flies there. It is accurate enough that the big warhead on HARM does disabling damage to the search radar. Now, with the seach radar down other aircraft take out the missile battery and fire control system with more conventional oridinance. The EW aircraft is more than capable of dealing with any of the forms of frequency agility and spread spectrum schemes used by threat radars.
This brings up my last point. Our Elint and intel is so good we have for many decades built duplicates of threat systems and used these both for very high fidelity training and to test new systems and tactics out by our R&D people. I am going to show you a couple of web pages that describe Echo Range out a China Lake. Out here we have installed exact copies we built of the many threat systems we have faced over the decades. This is accomplished using high quality photos of threat systems, careful analysis of the emissions profiles of these systems from data obtained by careful Elint using the Rivet Joint, EP-3, submarines, satellites and some ground monitoring. Scientists can correlate this data and knowing the physics and engineering of radars can basically reverse engineer a copy of an enemy system. As far back as the early 1980's there was a ridge out at China Lake were we had exact duplicates of Soviet naval radars. This was not equipment stolen from the Egyptians as with SA-6, but our own back engineered copies. If you look closely at this photo, now in the public domain, you can see from right to left a Peel Group SA-N-1 fire control radar, a Head Lights ( facing away, you are seeing the back side ) SA-N-3 fire control radar , Bass Tilt fire control radar on a tall pedestal, and a Head Net C air search radar on the tripod. A little later we added a Top Steer to the collection, and you know we didn't swipe one from a Soviet cruiser, it is our own copy.

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Next up is a little early history of Echo Range just to give you a flavor of how we accomplish these things.

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You have no idea just how good we are at this. Oh, btw, since the Greek Army, a Nato allie own about two dozen Tor-1M batteries and the Cypriot Army has S-300 both of these systems must be considered thoroughly compromised. We know all of their properties by now.
 
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balance

Junior Member
Does the defending army just have one radar around the site? Suppose that the defender turn on one radar and it is destroyed by HARM, then you know that the enemy is within your territory. So, when the second radar is turned on, and searching the perimeter, chances are they will find something in return. Since the attacker use hardened method like electronic warfare craft and fighters, then the defender should have hardened defense, such as: anti-jamming radar, dummy SAM, multiple radars with not all of them turned on at the same time.
Do these hardened increase the survivability of the defender's air-defense equipments?
Anyway, in real battle situation, it's not just HARM vs SAM because you also add electronic counter-measure and other things. When you factor in these things, then our conversation becomes broader and more comprehensive, and it should spill into other areas of warfare as well.
 
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man overbored

Junior Member
In actual combat these tactics have not improved the surviveability of Russian built systems. Nato/US use heavy area wide jamming, so even if a previously secured radar is lit off it is of limited value to the defender. Some anti-radiation missiles and I won't say which can loiter and attack new emitters as they emerge. Jamming is not a problem, there are "home on jam" modes built in to allow the missile to home directly on the jamming emission ( the same has been true of certain air to air missiles as well ). The latest anti-radiation missiles carry multiple sensors to find and home on enemy radars. Anyway, it is not HARM or AARGM vs the SAM, it is HARM or AARGM vs the search radars. With the search radars silenced the SAM's are useless. The Serbs didn't loose every single search radar, but they lost so many they stopped using their remaining radars except in very brief and ineffective bursts. The reality was Nato was free to use all of the sky over Serbia above 12,000 ft ( out of the Manpad envelope ) and Nato lost only two aircraft during that campaign. That is a more than acceptable trade off.
 

man overbored

Junior Member
If the radar is on, HARM will find it. If it was on and is secured, HARM flies to the last spot the radar was detected. AARGM has seekers that allow it to find even a moving radar, secured or not. Most missiles have some feature to allow home on jam. As for enemy radars being immune from jamming, so far none has been developed. We or the Israeli's have been successful in jamming every radar we encounter. Keep in mind my earlier post on Echo Range. This is a big deal for the US military, being able to keep up on emerging threat systems. If you know the characteristics of a radar you can develop a jammer. If a previously unknown system emerges during combat it will not be able to be jammed for a period of time, usually only months however, as the scientists and engineers design and build the necessary jammers. Keep in mind that as soon as a radar is used, it can be studied by Elint. The only way to prevent a radar's properties from being collected by an Elint platform is to never use the radar. Back in the 1950's we used to fly aircraft right up to the edges of Soviet airspace to get them to light us up so we could study the emissions. The EP-3 that was bumped by the PLAAF fighter was observing the PLAN's new Sovremmeny and one must assume studying it's emissions to see if the PLAN received any interesting new equipment. This is part of how you confirm the equipment fit on an adversary's combat ship.
 

lilzz

Banned Idiot
I repeat, Aegis does not use a data link. The inertial nav is more than sufficient to get the missle close enough to the target for semi active terminal homing to work. .


inertial guidance without updating through datalink?? by the time your interceptor missile launched and traveled and reached the original point where your radar first spot the target, the target is long past that point already especially against hypersonic missiles like Brahmos. Man ,those puppies are traveling close to Mach4.


well, the space availability inside a small missile like SeaRAM is going small therefore all you can have is limited radar inside your missile.
/w such weak radar how you suppose to chase down a stealth missle?
 
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Scratch

Captain
well, the space availability inside a small missile like SeaRAM is going small therefore all you can have is limited radar inside your missile.
/w such weak radar how you suppose to chase down a stealth missle?

The RAM does not use an active radar seeker at all, (in SeaRAM it's cued by the radar that you also find on the Phalanx) so it does not need to have a big radar, since it doesn't have to emitt radar energy.
It only homes in on the radar signal of the AShMs seeker (I'm not sure if it can also home in on relfected signals from shipboard radars) or from block I on uses an additional IR seeker if the target is "silent".
 

balance

Junior Member
What is anyone's game is when ground search radars and SAM radars start to use LPI techniques like frequency agile spread spectrum and pulse compression on the search radar, as well as very tight beam patterns with very little sidelobes or active sidelobe cancellation on the fire control radar. To explain the latter, SEAD aircraft depends on the target radar's sidelobs in order to detect the target. The HARM also depends on these sidelobs to gain a seek on.

Now the only time the radar is detected by the hunting aircraft is when a tight beam is already directly illuminating the aircraft. That's the good news---it can still be ultimately detected. The bad news is that a SAM is already on its way.

When it comes to the next generation of radars, the SEAD tactics have to seriously change.

Now, do both NATO and China have LPI radar in operation?
 
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crobato

Colonel
VIP Professional
Ok, several points to make. First there is still a misunderstanding about the difference between the data link used for TVM and how Aegis communicates mid course guidance. TVM uses a discrete channel for each missile. To guide S-300 to it's target, the missile senses the reflected energy off the target and relays this information to the fire control unit via a data link. The fire control unit takes this data and data on target course and speed from the fire control radar and computes the intercept solution, then relays steering commands back to the missile. Aegis does do this. Each SM-2 flies to coordinates loaded into it's INS by the Aegis system. It is not receiving continuous communication. Also you have to remember that each AN/SPY-1 panel scans at very close to the speed of light, allowing each panel to accomplish literally thousands of tasks per second. Each scan used can be shaped differently to accomplish different things, such as an air scan for the anti-air engagement, sensing both the incoming aircraft and the outgoing missiles followed by a differently shaped scan to find sea skimming missiles. All of this data is sensed and correlated into an integrated battle space picture. If the Aegis decides the outgoing SM-2 needs some mid course guidance correction the AN/SPY-1 antenna, not a data link, but the actual radar antenna, accomplishes the communication to the missile of the mid course correction mentioned in the Navy Factfile. This is not a data link in the traditional sense, it is a discrete burst of data sent to one missile, not a two way communication as in a TVM scheme or CLOS like HQ-7, Crotale or Barak. Since the AN/SPY-1 is so fast, it can perform many different scans and communicate mid course guidance commands to hundreds of outgoing missiles at one time, literally doing a thousand tasks each second. It is an amazing system that even after thirty years of service has no close analog anywhere else.

Thank you I'm quite happy with this explanation. I helps clarify many things. Still even a discrete burst should have a unique channel or ID on its own, so only the right missile will get it.
 
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