Air Defense Umbrella Argument

In theory, SAM radars can be technologically developed to a point it would be difficult if not impossible to be destroyed by ARMs, countered by ECM or detected by SIGINT aircraft. And that point is not far off and is quite clear.

By totally cancelling and removing sidelob emissions, all three becomes possible with one stroke. And the means to achieve this is by AESAs with ultra low sidelob emission with frequency agility and LPI techniques, all of which renders SIGINT detection and ARM homing very difficult. and through side lob cancellation which filters out jamming and ECM.

The use of non radar or passive SAMs would also tie to the SAM's favor. You can't detect or jam SAMs that use thermal and optical as guidance, such as the SA-3 upgrade or the Croatale and its derived ilk, like the HQ-7. Passive radiation or SAM with HOJ can be used to attack airborne jamming aircraft. Although such aircraft can in paper, can turn off or use blink tactics to lure off passive radar SAMs, for it to work, the aircraft has to detect the passive AR-SAM, which can be most difficult since the SAM does not emit nor does it command vehicle, and then recognize the incoming SAM as a passive radiation one, as opposed to one using thermal or using LPI signals.

PAC-2 which uses a phase array uses electronic beam steering and side lob cancellation, but passive phase arrays still leak considerable sidelob emission compared to an AESA type radar, so the PAC-2 itself would be quite vulnerable against modern SEAD measures. But keep progressing, using AESAs for tight beam forming and steering, frequency agility, pulse compression and other LPI techniques, use of side lob reduction and cancellation measures, use of backup thermal/optical modes, passive radar homing and HOJ.

crobato said:

The use of non radar or passive SAMs would also tie to the SAM's favor. You can't detect or jam SAMs that use thermal and optical as guidance, such as the SA-3 upgrade or the Croatale and its derived ilk, like the HQ-7.

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Tell that to the Libyans, their Crotale was blinded by ECM in '87, but other than that an interesting and informative post.

Depends if the Croatales had TV backup. The Command Guidance can also be jammed if you know the frequency, something the French may passed information to the US. The TV system works only on daytime, meaning at night time, it has to be radar only, but later versions also had infrared cameras. I find it ironic that the PLAN vessels criticized for having HQ-7 only, might actually be more ECM resistant compared to more "advanced" ships using Shtil, S-300, HQ-16 or HQ-9.

One potential SAM technology is SAL or Semi Active Laser. In other words, a laser is used to track and illuminate a target, making it invulnerable to radio wave based countermeasures. The disadvantage however is shorter range, making this only a point defense system.

Finn McCool said:

Don't get me wrong here. I'm not saying SAMs have no place in modern militaries. In fact, if you are facing the USAF/N, you are probably going to want to go with a SAM based defence because they would be more survivable then fighters. But in confrontations between other countries, the fighter gives the defenders the critical ability to force the enemy to react.

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Your argument had place before, when range of SAM's was smaller and data fusion was still a coming thing. But let's take an example of a quite large country, France. (Why France? It is conventiently blob looking to easen up calculations, and much larger than miniature states.) The country is sized roughly 900km's both in lateral and longitudal dimensions. To make things more difficult, let's presume every neighbouring country of France has become hostile and now they're joining up forces to attack France. This is an geographical example, thus no real order of battle is used.

Now, to cover the country with S-400 or SM-6 class SAM's you need ca. 4 theoretical battery positions (in practice, you need more) for coverage. In practice, various point defense systems are also needed, but they're also needed even if the main focus on air defence would lie with interceptors.

With interceptors, you would need same number of bases, which would be, however, most probably be fixed. Even though aircraft themselves have the range to perform interceptions in ca. 400km range, taking off takes time so that in practice only those planes on CAP can react. With use of tankers the CAP time can be improved.

So, the fabled ability to react is not really what it theoretically seems to be.
At most only a small portion of country's interceptor fleet can be kept up in the air. It is also rather slow to react if the threat is coming from unexpected direction. In French case, if the "airborne reserve" CAP was kept around Central France and it had to react to threat coming from Spain, it would take some 15 minutes before it was in the place. Thus, if the ability to react had any meaning the means of early warning would have to extend to a range of 15 minutes flight time beyond French borders.

EDIT: In worst case ew scenario the enemy has disabled defender's long range radars and AWACS. In this situation fighters are almost useless even if passive sensor based information (ranging from airplane lookouts to automatic systems) is available as the range of detection of enemy planes begins from the defender's border, the time to react is too small for any but planes in immediate readiness to take off. Also, with interceptor defense a clever enemy in a protracted campaign can also use fake raids to wear down defender's pilots and readiness.

Meanwhile, the ability of SAM's to react is made easier than before as if France had more than those four batteries, additional can be used to give more strength to air defence in some direction. But even more importantly, with range of modern SAM's just one battery situated in Central France (situated around Bourges) will have range to cover almost entire France, so in effect that geographical position can be used to strengthen defence in any direction the threat is coming from.

The coverage now also extends somewhat beyond French borders. But hey, if we locate an additional SAM battery on, say, Caen, we have nice SAM range up to Nottingham, so if there's cueing ability to locate targets above Britain it's possible to strike them. Fighters also have range, but if they were to intercept enemy planes above Nottingham they would most likely have to penetrate British air defence system before they could even act against their target.

Now, as almost all fighters are multirole planes nowadays the interceptors have the ability to be used as strike planes if not needed for air defense. But the problem is that even the USAF/USN has to use considerable effort to punch through enemy IADS, is it really an option for smaller countries? For offensive I would go for satellite based / UAV recon combined with tactical ballistic missiles (such as ATACMS) and cruise missiles. CAS is very airplane intensive and entails high casualties, rather more artillery.

crobato said:

One potential SAM technology is SAL or Semi Active Laser. In other words, a laser is used to track and illuminate a target, making it invulnerable to radio wave based countermeasures. The disadvantage however is shorter range, making this only a point defense system.

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RBS-70/Bolide is that kind of missile used in many countries. Although air defense is not considered a thing of budgetary importance nowadays in many countries I think you have to add various passive optronic and sound systems to your list of possible SAM advantages. A thermal imager situated in TV station tower or similar can be used to track targets within long range, coupled with image intensifier it can defeat stealth if there's no cloud cover. Then it's rather easy task to triangulate the target. Sound detection can be also used, if for nothing else than to cue other sensors etc. All these technologies can be used to guide fighters as well, of course.

The reasons why SAM's are always at a disadvantage against an airforce is a matter of physics. SAM's always start their attack at 0 speed and 0 elevation.

Furthermore, the keyword is air defence suppression NOT attrition. If I can force your radar/sam sites to shut down and cease firing WITHOUT the need to destroy them, I have already won. The main goal of an airstrike is to put bombs on target. I can do that as well by silencing your sams as destroying them.

IDonT said:

The reasons why SAM's are always at a disadvantage against an airforce is a matter of physics. SAM's always start their attack at 0 speed and 0 elevation.

Furthermore, the keyword is air defence suppression NOT attrition. If I can force your radar/sam sites to shut down and cease firing WITHOUT the need to destroy them, I have already won. The main goal of an airstrike is to put bombs on target. I can do that as well by silencing your sams as destroying them.

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Erm, that's a ridiculous argument in regards to why SAM's are at a disadvantage. In fact, if you even bring in physics into the equation, missiles will always have the advantage over manned aircraft. Most SAMs are capable of speeds untouched by any combat aircraft; they have no need to be restricted by fragile human pilots. Missiles have no need for maintaining a launch platform above the ground nor do they need to have any defensive systems or life support / visual controls.

It's entirely possible to suppress both air-based manned aircraft and land-based SAM defenses. Disable a single AWACS aircraft and you've already crippled much of the effectiveness of interceptors. Crater their runways and destroy their fuel depots; the planes' effectiveness would be neutered. Ultimately, it comes down to cost effectiveness and the reality is that a SAM-based air defense network is cheaper and more efficient than maintaining a multirole interceptor force.

What a SAM network helps make redundant is an interceptor point defense system, e.g. one that uses short range fast interceptors like MiG-21s and J-7s. However do note that even if airbases are attacked, they can be repaired, and bunkers that are underground or heavily reinforced require that you need either a huge free falling precision guided bunker buster or a PGM right into the entrance door, though the latter can be repaired eventually and there may be other outlets as well.

This is one reason why for a large country like China or Russia, you may like some long range interceptors because of the range and projection they can cover. I am pretty sure that the Russians have long realized they cannot dot and protect their own borders using S-300s alone. The cost would be enormous compared to a dedicated strategic interceptor fleet. There is still the airbase vulnerability of strategic interceptors, but then, these can be put deep inside the country and protected by layered defenses of SAMs or even point defense interceptors.

For a country the size of France or modern Germany, you probably dont' have the rationale for a strategic interceptor. But China, Canada, Russia, even Australia can benefit from a strategic interception force.

zhouj said:

Erm, that's a ridiculous argument in regards to why SAM's are at a disadvantage. In fact, if you even bring in physics into the equation, missiles will always have the advantage over manned aircraft. Most SAMs are capable of speeds untouched by any combat aircraft; they have no need to be restricted by fragile human pilots. Missiles have no need for maintaining a launch platform above the ground nor do they need to have any defensive systems or life support / visual controls.

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You missed the point. In air combat, the energy state (defined as a function of altitude and speed) is very vital. An AMRAAM launched at 40,000 ft at mach 2 at a target at 10,000 ft can travel much more than if it were launched at ground level at the same target. You also need to factor in the relative targets bearing (whether its coming at you or towards you). While SAMS may be capable of speeds and maneuvers "untouched by any combat aircraft", they are limited in their targeting data and endurance. A missile must allocate a majority of its fuel just to get to catch up to an aircraft. Long Range sam's that you advocate are very large because of this.

The key aspect here is the are of no-escape (a function of distance, target bearing, and angle of attack). If an aircraft is within this area, the targeting missile has a good probability (key word) of destroying it.

The first line of defense against SAMs or any AA missile is to not get into its area of no-escape in the first place. With a certain combination of speed, altitude and angle and a missile will have zero chance of hitting you. This has been proven in combat numerous times. The majority of downed aircraft are hit by SAm sites that they did not know where there. (Hence the saying: you never see the one that hits you).

It's entirely possible to suppress both air-based manned aircraft and land-based SAM defenses. Disable a single AWACS aircraft and you've already crippled much of the effectiveness of interceptors. Crater their runways and destroy their fuel depots; the planes' effectiveness would be neutered. Ultimately, it comes down to cost effectiveness and the reality is that a SAM-based air defense network is cheaper and more efficient than maintaining a multirole interceptor force.

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It is possible but several levels of magnitude in difficulty than a SAM based defense. One of the key aspects for success of an air attack is timing. Attacking, or for that matter, harrassing an enemy air "package" before they can even form up is something a SAM system can never do. Furthermore, AWACS have a very very long radar horizon than ground based systems.

IDonT said:

You missed the point. In air combat, the energy state (defined as a function of altitude and speed) is very vital. An AMRAAM launched at 40,000 ft at mach 2 at a target at 10,000 ft can travel much more than if it were launched at ground level at the same target. You also need to factor in the relative targets bearing (whether its coming at you or towards you). While SAMS may be capable of speeds and maneuvers "untouched by any combat aircraft", they are limited in their targeting data and endurance. A missile must allocate a majority of its fuel just to get to catch up to an aircraft. Long Range sam's that you advocate are very large because of this.

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How much does it cost to deliver that AMRAAM? In fact, considering that you must keep the launch platform loitering (burning fueling) and other support aircraft (AWACS, ECM, tankers, etc.) available to provide support, and you'll realize that the cost is that much greater. In fact, everything available to guide combat aircraft is entirely capable of guiding missiles and their endurance is comparable to air-launched missiles.

You miss the point; cost-efficiency is critical in military systems. It's not about whether SAMs or interceptors are more effective, it's about which combination of systems results in the necessary level of coverage at the minimal cost.

The key aspect here is the are of no-escape (a function of distance, target bearing, and angle of attack). If an aircraft is within this area, the targeting missile has a good probability (key word) of destroying it.

The first line of defense against SAMs or any AA missile is to not get into its area of no-escape in the first place. With a certain combination of speed, altitude and angle and a missile will have zero chance of hitting you. This has been proven in combat numerous times. The majority of downed aircraft are hit by SAm sites that they did not know where there. (Hence the saying: you never see the one that hits you).

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You display the "Top Gun" mentality here. A "ace" pilot can "eliminate" a missile's chance of hitting a plane. That's wishful thinking; while kill probability declines towards the edge of the the SAM's range, area saturation is much more likely with SAMs than interceptors in addition to the fact that SAM placements will always be in the areas of value.

In reality, the same problem applies to AAMs weapons as well; kill probability varies with target range and the missile's optimal range. The key goal in any air defense system is to minimize cost and prevent arbitrage opportunities by your enemy.