Air Defense Umbrella Argument

Me and a fellow "friend" were arguing about the effectiveness of a SAM umbrella network against modern fighter aircraft and AWACS.

My argument is that a properly managed SAM umbrella network will remain effective under the threat of anti-radiation munitions and Phalcon-level AWACS jamming. This means integrating radar data, displacing mobile launchers at random intervals, keeping some radars off until the last moment, integrated passive radar, and having AWACS of your own. The SAM system used here is the Patriot PAC-2.

He counters that most of these measures will be destroy by anti-radiation missiles and destruction of SAM sites with long range cruise missiles pinpointed using satellite. But that still leaves the mobile launchers and radar sets!

How well will a invading air force fare under these conditions?

Depends who the enemy is - against US you are done for. But everyone else either has too few munitions to completely destroy a modest ADN, or doesn't have trhe capability at all.

Oh of course, US superiority is such a given, you don't even need to justify your claim with any supporting evidence.

? haha, never been accused of pro-US bias here before, Popeye will be proud!

US has a massive quantity of suitable weapons for this task. Many other countries have the right weapons, but not in the right quantities - or not the right weapons at all. Western European 'major' countries like UK and France have excellent SEAD weapons for example, but frankly too few. China and Russia and India have the right weapons, but do they have the quantity required to truly saturate a good ADN?

? haha, never been accused of pro-US bias here before, Popeye will be proud!

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No you have not..You are a very even handed poster..sometimes very funny.

Depends who the enemy is - against US you are done for. But everyone else either has too few munitions to completely destroy a modest ADN, or doesn't have trhe capability at all.

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True. The US has more munitions than any other nation. The US ECM can shut down virtually any air defense or electronic device. This is been true for some time. In any sort of air attack conducted by the US. The nation under attack will have difficulty defending itself.

During the 1986 US attack on Lybia. E/A-6B Prowlers shut down all Lybian electronic signals. Tv,radar radio you name it. It was shut down. Everything. The US blinded the Lybians with their ECM.

planeman said:

? haha, never been accused of pro-US bias here before, Popeye will be proud!

US has a massive quantity of suitable weapons for this task. Many other countries have the right weapons, but not in the right quantities - or not the right weapons at all. Western European 'major' countries like UK and France have excellent SEAD weapons for example, but frankly too few. China and Russia and India have the right weapons, but do they have the quantity required to truly saturate a good ADN?

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Planeman this statement really exemplifies the answer to this thread's question. In short it is: Any ground-based AD netwrok can be destroyed, it is only a matter of how much resources and how much time the attacker is willing/able to spend. The US has the resources, and many other countries do not.

Since any AD network can be destroyed, it is evident that if an Air Force really wants to defend an airspace under a really large attack (a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan or a US attack on Iran are examples here but hey that's not what this thread is about their just examples!!!) it will need capable fighter cover. AD weaponry only increases the cost of such an operation to the enemy by shooting down some but not all planes, forcing them to put more planes in the air and overall making the offensive much more complicated.

In that way AD networks act to increase the cost and difficulty of an air war, but they will never make it impossible.

Accusing people of bias is not allowed here. Holding people to the same standard of proof when they make bold assertions, no matter who it is in favor of, should be encouraged.

Personally I favour SAMs over fighters - again the common mistake is to use the US as the case study, when in fact they are not representative of any other country.

SAMs like SA-10/20/22, SA-11/17, SA-12, Patriot etc are definitely really impressive and relatively survivable systems (more so than fighters IMO).

SL-AMRAAM, Spyder, Mica-VL and SAMP/T (Aster) are particularly potent because they have good altitude coverage with active seekers.

kovona said:

How well will a invading air force fare under these conditions?

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Well, for starters it seems that the US Navy for example is nowadays pressing more for SAM based rather than interceptor based defense, which in a kind of way makes sense as SAM's are easier to mass, easier to keep in readiness and also can intercept more variety of targets. The key here is the advent of systems like USN's Co-operative Engagement Capacity, which allows for data fusion from various sources.

We should not forget that during the Cold War the West also had a fairly comprehensive SAM defense system, Nike and Hawk belt coupled with triple-AAA and shoulder-based missiles - during the Cold War in Germany, even though interceptors get more notice.

What should be considered is the changing nature of air threat. The air threat is formed out of ballistic missiles (ATACMS, Iskander etc.), cruise missiles, shorter range stand-off weapons and finally short range munitions such as bombs and short-range missiles from aircraft. SAM's can intercept all of these targets, even bombs dropped from stealth aircraft, fighters can intercept just normal aerodynamic targets.

There's also the range issue. Most advanced SAM systems offer ranges comparable to interceptor aircraft.

Finally there's the issue on how the attacking force can neutralize various kinds of enemy air defense systems. SAM's are surface (ie. land or sea mobile) they can be eliminated only with timely targeting data. Use of ARM's will be less efficient than before due to introduction of more advanced point defense systems capable of shooting down ARM's and also due to sensor fusion, which allows another radar to give fire control information if another one is threatened.

Interceptors, however, often are not ground mobile, they're tied in bases
which offer fixed targets for cruise missiles, tactical missiles, pre-planned ground operations etc. While in the air interceptors can be neutralized by air-to-air missiles or even SAM's of the attacker.

In the end, if money permits, I'd say some interceptors are still worthwhile for the defender, if for nothing else they force the attacker to tie in forces for escort and airfield neutralization duties. Besides, what's cooler in a parade, an overflight by fighters or boring march of SAM TEL's?

Yes there are many arguements in favor of a SAM-based defence but when it really comes down to it SAMs fail. Why? Because they are sedentary. They force you to react to the enemy. They cannot strike back, and they cannot truly disrupt enemy operations.

SAMs, being ground based and limited in mobility, allow the attacker plan for them. They can know or expect that SAMs will be present, make plans to attack them, and although their operation will be more complex as a result of SAMs being present they can be accounted for. With fighters, the defender forces the enemy to react to HIM. The defender takes the initiative, and although you can plan to defend against fighters with other fighters the outcome of that battle ultimately rests on who has the better equipment and pilots. With SAMs, it is a game of percentages. An offensive force knows what will happen if they are facing SAMs, when they are facing fighters they do not know what will happen. That, and the fact that an Air-based defence can strike back, is why fighters are ultimately superior to SAMs.

Don't get me wrong here. I'm not saying SAMs have no place in modern militaries. In fact, if you are facing the USAF/N, you are probably going to want to go with a SAM based defence because they would be more survivable then fighters. But in confrontations between other countries, the fighter gives the defenders the critical ability to force the enemy to react.