09V/09VI (095/096) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[Blitzo]

I think comparing the progress on the Chinese nuclear submarines with the destroyers is a mistake. The Chinese had technology infusions with purchases from abroad in the Type 052-class, the Sovremennyy-class, plus aid from Ukraine. We have not heard of anything like that with regards to their nuclear submarine program. The Chinese nuclear power sector is well developed, they likely have much more advanced simulation tools and test facilities, they have improved construction facilities. But the question is can they put everything together and make it work well? A lot of systems we consider to be standard requirements for modern submarines AFAIK have not shown up in any Chinese nuclear submarines yet.

As latelanzy had written, we don't know what improvements may have been made in the successive 09III variant boats.

For submarines, there are obviously some external features that can reflect certain advancements. Various hydrodynamic design features, arrangement of control surfaces, weapons and sensors placements, may all be useful in gauging certain limited areas of development.

However, the things we're really interested in -- propulsion and powerplant and quietening -- are things that are impossible to gauge externally. And nuclear submarine information is something the PLA keeps very close to its chest. Until last year we didn't even know there were so many different variations of 09III!


It is true that we seen any direct purchases of foreign nuclear submarine relevant subsystems, however the various iterations of 09III seen may well be a parallel to the iterative improvements we saw in various destroyer classes prior to 052D (052/052B/052C, or 051B/051C). The difference between the two would be that the 09III iterative improvements would've likely relied entirely on indigenous subsystem developments whereas certain subsystems in the 052X and 051X family tree involved a few important foreign subsystems. However the rapid iteration of SSN and DDG subtypes is a parallel that is hard to ignore.

 

[Blitzo]

Yes, but if the Type-95 is still quite noisy, then it really makes much more sense to design a submarine with a greater number of longer-ranged missiles.

Or it might make sense to have delayed mass production of the new SSN (as well as delaying construction of facilities needed to build so many SSNs) until it was ready.

Personally I think a force of 40 SSN/SSGN is too small because:

1. If they were only aiming for 40 SSN/SSGN plus SSBNs, which is only 1.5 submarines per year. So they could have built the new construction hall at half the size but still have so much spare capacity left.

2. Plus look at China's available budgets/resolve on the surface navy.
At current construction rates, China will eventually end up with a larger surface navy (in terms of quantity and quality) than the USA.
But that surface navy will struggle to obtain sea control and project power in distant waters because of logistics.
Plus it will still be a lot smaller (and vulnerable) for another 15+ years.
Building a larger nuclear submarine force allows China to become a global maritime power much faster, with the ability to deny others command of the oceans

We can also see the US moving to construction of 3 nuclear submarines per year, so I would expect China to at least match that.
With a 35 year service life, we end up with a fleet of 100 nuclear submarines, so building 20 semi-competitive SSN/SSGNs over the next 7 years, isn't such a big deal.
Plus also consider how submarine construction is really labour intensive, even compared to surface warship construction.
Wages in China are still rising at almost 10% per year. If sustained, that means wages would DOUBLE in the next 7 years.
So from a cost-effectiveness point of view, it may still be worth building less capable submarines, but which are significantly cheaper.

In the very long term, assuming key assumptions about economic growth and relative geopolitical peace remain the same, more than 40 SSNs may be preferable in the long term.

I haven't seen any projections as to how Chinese shipbuilding costs may change in the medium to long term future. Based on what is seen from other major East Asian shipbuilders like in SK and Japan however, I think labour costs are less important than overall shipbuilding capacity, technology and orders to be competitive and skilled.

 

[Biscuits]

I imagine that 041 SSK technology would at the very least be ported for the 095, even if the electrical rim drive isn’t adopted. Accounting for that, it will likely be an exceedingly quiet boat.

I don’t think the PLAN has the same incentive to equip it with many SLCM. The advantages of the 095 vs 041 would be range, payload and speed, but their missions would largely be the same. They will be hunter killers of enemy submarines firstly and secondly carrier killers.

 

[AndrewS]

Or it might make sense to have delayed mass production of the new SSN (as well as delaying construction of facilities needed to build so many SSNs) until it was ready.

But what constitutes ready?
If the Type-95 is a low-risk evolution of the Type-93 with cruise missiles, then building 20 over the course of the next 7 years will change the strategic calculus in any conflict.
And afterwards, they will still be useful against surface ships, whilst a successor Type-97 would start introduction.

In the very long term, assuming key assumptions about economic growth and relative geopolitical peace remain the same, more than 40 SSNs may be preferable in the long term.

I haven't seen any projections as to how Chinese shipbuilding costs may change in the medium to long term future. Based on what is seen from other major East Asian shipbuilders like in SK and Japan however, I think labour costs are less important than overall shipbuilding capacity, technology and orders to be competitive and skilled.

[/quote]

China is already the world's largest trading nation.
And it already has an economy larger than the USA, in terms of actual output of goods and services, as per the IMF and World Bank.

Those 2 factors means China has the capacity and also a reason to build a Navy to protect its overseas investments and trade.
And that Navy will have to be sized up against its competitors, which means a build rate of 2-3 per year.

I haven't seen any projections on how Chinese shipbuilding costs will change either, and I agree that labour is just one part of the cost.

But I think it's instructive to compare the Yuan and the Soryu, which are broadly comparable in terms of size, technology and production rate.
The Yuan is probably around $300M (based on the export proposal to Thailand) and the latest Soryu is $550M.
So what accounts for the difference? I suspect a lot of this is related to labour costs.

Of course, the Yuan and Soryu are much simpler submarines than the Type-95, but let's try to compare the latest SSN/SSGN submarines:

1. The first Yasen was only $1.6B. I'm ignoring the huge increase in costs for the subsequent submarines which is completely illogical.
2. The latest Virginia VPM submarines are $3.2B. And they benefit from a larger production run.
3. The Astutes (which don't have a missile modules) is $1.8B.

So let's say that the Type-95 costs around $1.6B in total, like the Yasen.
And that the Type-95 takes 9 million man hours to construct, like the latest Virginia.
There is also an old Type-54 Frigate estimate of 3.2 million man hours costing $75M

So the Type-95 takes 9 million man hours, which costs roughly $225M today.
But if wages do double, then that is a direct increase of $225M.
That is still significant

 

[Blitzo]

But what constitutes ready?
If the Type-95 is a low-risk evolution of the Type-93 with cruise missiles, then building 20 over the course of the next 7 years will change the strategic calculus in any conflict.
And afterwards, they will still be useful against surface ships, whilst a successor Type-97 would start introduction.

Good question. Naturally, the answer would be a piece of equipment that can satisfy requirements. For the purpose of a nuclear submarine, those missions would include anti surface but also anti submarine warfare.

Considering the ship classes that the PLAN have decided to mass produce in the last decade and a half and when compared to international peers as well as the level of threat that those Chinese ships can be judged to be capable of facing, I think a reasonable threshold that the PLAN would want 09V to achieve is something like early block Virginias.

China is already the world's largest trading nation.
And it already has an economy larger than the USA, in terms of actual output of goods and services, as per the IMF and World Bank.

Those 2 factors means China has the capacity and also a reason to build a Navy to protect its overseas investments and trade.
And that Navy will have to be sized up against its competitors, which means a build rate of 2-3 per year.

I haven't seen any projections on how Chinese shipbuilding costs will change either, and I agree that labour is just one part of the cost.

But I think it's instructive to compare the Yuan and the Soryu, which are broadly comparable in terms of size, technology and production rate.
The Yuan is probably around $300M (based on the export proposal to Thailand) and the latest Soryu is $550M.
So what accounts for the difference? I suspect a lot of this is related to labour costs.

Of course, the Yuan and Soryu are much simpler submarines than the Type-95, but let's try to compare the latest SSN/SSGN submarines:

1. The first Yasen was only $1.6B. I'm ignoring the huge increase in costs for the subsequent submarines which is completely illogical.
2. The latest Virginia VPM submarines are $3.2B. And they benefit from a larger production run.
3. The Astutes (which don't have a missile modules) is $1.8B.

So let's say that the Type-95 costs around $1.6B in total, like the Yasen.
And that the Type-95 takes 9 million man hours to construct, like the latest Virginia.
There is also an old Type-54 Frigate estimate of 3.2 million man hours costing $75M

So the Type-95 takes 9 million man hours, which costs roughly $225M today.
But if wages do double, then that is a direct increase of $225M.
That is still significant

I respect that you plugged some numbers into this analysis however I am skeptical as to the applicability of some of the numbers (comparing the export Thai SSKs vs Soryu for example) as well as certain assumptions about the relationship between labour cost, labour cost growth and overall cost.

Overall, I certainly agree that the PLAN likely has a large requirement for nuclear submarines and I don't think they would've built such a large facility if they had not planned on using its potential in the near future sometime.

 

[Biscuits]

But what constitutes ready?
If the Type-95 is a low-risk evolution of the Type-93 with cruise missiles, then building 20 over the course of the next 7 years will change the strategic calculus in any conflict.
And afterwards, they will still be useful against surface ships, whilst a successor Type-97 would start introduction.

China is already the world's largest trading nation.
And it already has an economy larger than the USA, in terms of actual output of goods and services, as per the IMF and World Bank.

Those 2 factors means China has the capacity and also a reason to build a Navy to protect its overseas investments and trade.
And that Navy will have to be sized up against its competitors, which means a build rate of 2-3 per year.

I haven't seen any projections on how Chinese shipbuilding costs will change either, and I agree that labour is just one part of the cost.

But I think it's instructive to compare the Yuan and the Soryu, which are broadly comparable in terms of size, technology and production rate.
The Yuan is probably around $300M (based on the export proposal to Thailand) and the latest Soryu is $550M.
So what accounts for the difference? I suspect a lot of this is related to labour costs.

Of course, the Yuan and Soryu are much simpler submarines than the Type-95, but let's try to compare the latest SSN/SSGN submarines:

1. The first Yasen was only $1.6B. I'm ignoring the huge increase in costs for the subsequent submarines which is completely illogical.
2. The latest Virginia VPM submarines are $3.2B. And they benefit from a larger production run.
3. The Astutes (which don't have a missile modules) is $1.8B.

So let's say that the Type-95 costs around $1.6B in total, like the Yasen.
And that the Type-95 takes 9 million man hours to construct, like the latest Virginia.
There is also an old Type-54 Frigate estimate of 3.2 million man hours costing $75M

So the Type-95 takes 9 million man hours, which costs roughly $225M today.
But if wages do double, then that is a direct increase of $225M.
That is still significant[/QUOTE]

Why do you think the 095 would be like a SSGN?

Looking back at PLAN submarine roles, they have never adopted the doctrine of relying on them as VLS launch platforms. Instead, PLAN submarines rely primarily on stealth and torpedoes. Most of China’s rivals have relatively good air defense.

Regarding the cost analysis, I don’t think it’s very instructive to compare the potential costs of a 095 boat and the Yasen, Virginia etc. simply because their roles might be radically different. These submarines essentially provide SSGN functions, giving cheap anti land firepower, ideal in low intensity conflicts.

China on the other hand is more in need of and has a design history/doctrine in favor of a boat more like the Seawolf class within SSNs, but the best comparison might be “a larger, faster Yuan with unlimited range”.

Such as submarine would ditch the cost of VLS subsystems but will gain cost in other areas.

Shipbuilding costs in China seem to be analogous to US costs, slightly below EU/Japan costs. Burkes cost 770 million and 055s cost 1 billion, and the 055 is slightly larger.

 

[Totoro]

Is there any way of knowing which buildings are involved in building the hull structure of submarines at various sub shipyards around the world? So I'm not taking just about the final assembly building but about all the buildings in the production chain, from the one turning the metal sheets into custom pieces from which sub modules will later get assembled.
Which buildings are in that chain at two us shipyards, the Russian one, the British one and at two Chinese production lines, including both the new one but also the old production line?

 

[AndrewS]

China is already the world's largest trading nation.
And it already has an economy larger than the USA, in terms of actual output of goods and services, as per the IMF and World Bank.

Those 2 factors means China has the capacity and also a reason to build a Navy to protect its overseas investments and trade.
And that Navy will have to be sized up against its competitors, which means a build rate of 2-3 per year.

I haven't seen any projections on how Chinese shipbuilding costs will change either, and I agree that labour is just one part of the cost.

But I think it's instructive to compare the Yuan and the Soryu, which are broadly comparable in terms of size, technology and production rate.
The Yuan is probably around $300M (based on the export proposal to Thailand) and the latest Soryu is $550M.
So what accounts for the difference? I suspect a lot of this is related to labour costs.

Of course, the Yuan and Soryu are much simpler submarines than the Type-95, but let's try to compare the latest SSN/SSGN submarines:

1. The first Yasen was only $1.6B. I'm ignoring the huge increase in costs for the subsequent submarines which is completely illogical.
2. The latest Virginia VPM submarines are $3.2B. And they benefit from a larger production run.
3. The Astutes (which don't have a missile modules) is $1.8B.

So let's say that the Type-95 costs around $1.6B in total, like the Yasen.
And that the Type-95 takes 9 million man hours to construct, like the latest Virginia.
There is also an old Type-54 Frigate estimate of 3.2 million man hours costing $75M

So the Type-95 takes 9 million man hours, which costs roughly $225M today.
But if wages do double, then that is a direct increase of $225M.
That is still significant

Why do you think the 095 would be like a SSGN?

Looking back at PLAN submarine roles, they have never adopted the doctrine of relying on them as VLS launch platforms. Instead, PLAN submarines rely primarily on stealth and torpedoes. Most of China’s rivals have relatively good air defense.

Regarding the cost analysis, I don’t think it’s very instructive to compare the potential costs of a 095 boat and the Yasen, Virginia etc. simply because their roles might be radically different. These submarines essentially provide SSGN functions, giving cheap anti land firepower, ideal in low intensity conflicts.

China on the other hand is more in need of and has a design history/doctrine in favor of a boat more like the Seawolf class within SSNs, but the best comparison might be “a larger, faster Yuan with unlimited range”.

Such as submarine would ditch the cost of VLS subsystems but will gain cost in other areas.

Shipbuilding costs in China seem to be analogous to US costs, slightly below EU/Japan costs. Burkes cost 770 million and 055s cost 1 billion, and the 055 is slightly larger.[/QUOTE]

Previously, the Chinese Navy was a conventional submarine force.
And those submarines could rely on stealth and torpedoes, because they could rely on silent batteries or AIP.
But batteries and AIP impose limits on overall endurance and range.
Plus those systems will be rapidly drained when a submarine has to operate at full speed underwater.

Nuclear powered submarines don't suffer from these disadvantages, but they do have to keep the reactor running all the time.
And a Chinese SSN/SSGN is unlikely to be as quiet as a Virginia/Yasen, although I would expect it to be equivalent to between the early-Later Los Angeles.

---

The US Navy never went the SSGN route either, until they found themselves with 4 spare Ohio class submarines.
But now all the new Virginia SSNs are being equipped with cruise missile payload modules.
Ditto with the Russian Yasens.

Q. So why are both Russia and the USA going with SSGNs instead of SSNs?
A. They must see definite advantages in using VLS missiles in either the anti-ship or ground-attack role.

And the same logic that applies to the Virginia and Yasen, should also apply to the Type-95.

We did see a test Type-93 variant built as an SSGN, which also means the Chinese Navy did see it worthwhile to explore the concept.

---
The Yasen/Virginia doesn't provide cheap land-attack firepower, because the platforms costs billions, whilst a Tomahawk costs $1M.

Cheap land attack firepower for China is provided by cheap missile trucks based on the Chinese mainland, and which can reach all of its neighbours and its core interests within the First Island Chain.

But the SSGN VLS missiles do provide the ability to launch attacks on land targets, pretty much anywhere in the world, and with complete surprise if the submarine has remained undetected.

---
Where did you get the Burke costs from?
The Burkes actually cost $1.8B, whilst I understand the Japanese/Korean versions come in around $1.1B-$1.3B.
And if the Type-55 is $1B, that sounds about right.

So China does have a huge cost advantage over the USA, although it is smaller than with Japan/Korea.

 

[Broccoli]

India has same cost advantage, they have also clear plans for their own nuke sub fleet, and soon they have two more SSGN subs not just lone Arihant. That means Chinese have a lot more enemies with submarine fleets than United States, so 095-class is probably going to have it work cut out for it.

 

[plawolf]

I think we need to stop parroting the propaganda of the western MSM which attributes Chinese lower costs pretty much exclusively to lower labour costs and ‘inferior quality’.

That might have been true decades ago, but it is not the case now.

Increasingly, China’s lower production costs are a result of superior technology and labour skill.

Western company heads said it themselves that there are plenty of places with lower labour costs, but there is nowhere that can make goods to match the quality that China produces at the same price points.

You cannot achieve that with minimal labour costs only, you need your labour force to also be extremely well trained and skilled, in addition to having the technology and infrastructure to give them the tools they need to make world class products.

In terms of shipbuilding, China’s advantages are clear.

Not only does the sheer volume of comercial work allows China to train up an extremely capable work force, the massive investments in new production technology also allows Chinese yards to build ships of the highest quality.

In addition to available equipment and training, there is also another massive factor contributing to the amazing efficiency and cost effectiveness of Chinese manufacturing, and that is the work ethics of Chinese blue collar workers.

I have seen how Chinese blue collar workers work, and how their western peers work, and the gulf in attitude is staggering.

Chinese blue collar workers are as self motivated and hard working as western or Chinese white collar workers, whereas anyone who has had first hand experience dealing with and managing western blue collar workers will know how big of a gulf in attitude there is between the two classes.

Obviously I am talking of overall workforces, and there will of course be individual exceptions on both sides, but the general trend is extremely clear.

The world commercial shipping order collapse has been a massive boon for the PLAN, because whereas before yards were loathed to get naval orders on account of the much lower margins compared to commercial work, now they are fighting with each other for naval orders to keep their workforce employed.

For National priority projects like nuclear subs, I would also expect the shipyards to be able to pretty much get whoever they want to work for them.

That means only the very best workers from China’s vast shipbuilding industry would be selected. So both quality and efficiency should be top notch.