09III/09IV (093/094) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[Gloire_bb]

Pointing to an elephant in the room: nuclear submarine capability is not the only submarine capability.
While the sentence that Chinese SSN procurement was relatively limited up till now is true, saying that Chinese o/l submarine procurement is limited is a stretch.

A nation that aspires to build nuclear submarines and nuclear aircraft carriers should first master the construction of surface combatants, amphibious ships, and logistics ships.

I don't think it's the case - Soviet Union and China (and possibly soon - North Korea) are counterexamples.
We are simply talking here about different directions of tech advancement/investment.

Especially when we are talking about specific geographical theater(westpac), specific use case, and add that until a certain point investment/improvement of a well-established capability (SSKs with a move to li-ion) gave a more relevant and easier improvement to integral combat capability ... and existing plans.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

US submarine fleet is never underestimated by the PLA and is considered one of the major threats. However, in a defensive war, SSKs are considered able to stalemate them, while China's SSNs that have traditionally more been about keeping the tech alive would have a supporting role only.

The scope involved for the defensive war over Taiwan and/or the SCS has also evolved over time.

Back then, the PLA can only conduct operations of defensive war over Taiwan near the Chinese shorelines, along the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan island at best. Unless DF-5 is used, China has very little means of striking enemy targets any further away, e.g. Guam, Okinawa, Tindal, Yokosuka etc.

However, the PLA now possesses sufficient (and growing) means to conduct operations of a defensive war over Taiwan that can reach as far as the Second Island Chain, primarily with various types of MRBMs and IRBMs, HGVs, H-6K/J/Ns and newer, more powerful warships with the necessary capabilities to project firepower much further away from Chinese shorelines than, say, 10-20 years ago. The incoming DF-27s, H-20s and CATOBAR CVs will further complement such capabilities.

Hence, SSN is certain to become a mainstay in the PLAN's underwater war-fighting doctrine in the IndoPac, especially for long-range missions. While SSKs will defend the waters within and slightly right outside the boundaries of the First Island Chain, SSNs will run amok throughout the entire Pacific and wreak havoc on enemy warships and bases spread across the ocean, i.e. Guam, Wake, Oahu, Aleutians, Diego Garcia, Darwin, Sydney etc. Perhaps even Kitsap and San Diego if the PLA warplanners are daring enough.

Furthermore, if India is also ignorant enough to join the war against China, then these Chinese SSNs can also do the same in the Indian Ocean with the overt/covert support of Pakistan and/or Iran.

Therefore, China definitely needs more newer, better and more capable SSNs in the coming years and decades, much more than what she has right now. Perferably, China's SSN fleet size should be 3/4ths or 4/5ths of her US counterpart.

 

[Gloire_bb]

Therefore, China definitely needs more newer, better and more capable SSNs in the coming years and decades, much more than what she has right now. Perferably, China's SSN fleet size should be 3/4ths or 4/5ths of her US counterpart.

US SSN fleet is a consequence of 'global commitments', coupled with a fundamental lack of any conceivable invasion threat.

For China, SSN calculus works very differently - and that's a geopolitical/geographical positional problem, which has to be solved first. Not a tech problem (thou a tech problem is also here, when PLAN submarines penetrate into less friendly waters).
Until then - SSNs are first and foremost viewed as fleet units. This doesn't require having too many of them.

The majority of China needs for this period are still better served by evolved SSKs - for they buy a bigger quantity(1), of more survivable units(2), in more places (3) (for the given amount of money).

 

[sunnymaxi]

For China, SSN calculus works very differently - and that's a geopolitical/geographical positional problem, which has to be solved first. Not a tech problem (thou a tech problem is also here, when PLAN submarines penetrate into less friendly waters).
Until then - SSNs are first and foremost viewed as fleet units. This doesn't require having too many of them.

The majority of China needs for this period are still better served by evolved SSKs - for they buy a bigger quantity(1), of more survivable units(2), in more places (3) (for the given amount of money).

time has changed. PLA is no longer playing defensive game.

indeed China have different war doctrine and difficult geography for SSN perspective. but as China continue to evolve into a major global power. arguably second most powerful country right now. so they need large fleet of SSN. this is the reason why they expanded Bohai shipyard at unprecedented scale. in 12th and 13th Five year plans they have spend Billions of RMB in submarine technologies.

first batch of type 093B SSN construction has begun. two units have completed
first unit of next generation type 095 SSN construction has begun. can launch in 2025.

they will launch 16 to 24 nuclear Submarines by 2030.

 

[sheogorath]

Well, I think we have to be careful about saying Russian subs are on the same level as British and American subs. Yes, Yasen itself is very quiet, but that's due to it just being humongous which allows Russia to install a lot more noise absorbing materials in there. While that helps noise level, the size of such a boat (13m wide pressure hull) means that Russia struggles to build them. From that sense, it's really not on the same level as the other two nations. I haven't looked enough into the French.

Russia's submarine size is concious design choice, not some sort of limitation. They prefer double hulled submarines over single hull ones as it provides extra bouyancy, survivability, more flexible shaping solutions, and the inclusion of more automation and weapons systems at the expense of weight and noise.

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[Gloire_bb]

time has changed. PLA is no longer playing defensive game.

indeed China have different war doctrine and difficult geography for SSN perspective. but as China continue to evolve into a major global power. arguably second most powerful country right now. so they need large fleet of SSN. this is the reason why they expanded Bohai shipyard at unprecedented scale. in 12th and 13th Five year plans they have spend Billions of RMB in submarine technologies.

first batch of type 093B SSN construction has begun. two units have completed
first unit of next generation type 095 SSN construction has begun. can launch in 2025.

they will launch 16 to 24 nuclear Submarines by 2030.

PLAN has no choice here, because it's determined by INDOPAC geography and US containment system. Submarines aren't really tools of prestige (they're quite bad at it), they're means to an end.

When China (or, generically, any East Asian maritime power) goes in the offensive - it does it (1)for self-protection reasons, (2)without obvious guerre de course targets within reach. There is a reason why the IJN cruiser force became a night battlefleet - and neither prepared nor bothered with raiding (one single abortive raid in 1944). Nothing serious to raid.
The way to play the game is to deny access to its own SLOCs and coastal communications, while establishing&enlarging own zone of superiority - informational, asw, logistical. This is done through bases(air bases, naval bases, missile bases).

The best Chinese 'nuclear submarine' from this particular point of view is a well-escorted LHD. The most needed type of submarine is a numerous, stealthy, ambush-oriented unit, well-suited to denying certain swaths of the ocean to the enemy(including SSNs) - because it is good for both chokepoint control and for establishing geometry of airsea battles. That's an SSK first and foremost.

 

[Godzilla]

I think having a number more good enough SSN able to be deployed between Hawaii and Japan or there about a would have an even bigger effect in terms of anti containment measures. USN would have to divert significant resources for anti submarine and escort duties in that area to ensure supply of munitions and fuel into the theatre no? That would ensure the assets closer to China is spread even thinner. Just adding this capability into the calculus would affect the planning. I mean, it’s not like Japan or Korea is self sufficient in oil and gas and other materiel….

 

[Gloire_bb]

I think having a number more good enough SSN able to be deployed between Hawaii and Japan or there about a would have an even bigger effect in terms of anti containment measures. USN would have to divert significant resources for anti submarine and escort duties in that area to ensure supply of munitions and fuel into the theatre no? That would ensure the assets closer to China is spread even thinner. Just adding this capability into the calculus would affect the planning. I mean, it’s not like Japan or Korea is self sufficient in oil and gas and other materiel….

Forcing reaction is doable, but serious submarine offensive against SLOCs (or seriously affecting any strategic logistics) is untenable until the island of Taiwan is under its current management. It is a diversion, not the main axis of action.
Until at least then, for geographical reasons, the most dangerous sub base for pacific SLOCs will be Vilyuchinsk ... provided a certain close friend will get its submarine building act together.

 

[Godzilla]

Forcing reaction is doable, but serious submarine offensive against SLOCs (or seriously affecting any strategic logistics) is untenable until the island of Taiwan is under its current management. It is a diversion, not the main axis of action.
Until at least then, for geographical reasons, the most dangerous sub base for pacific SLOCs will be Vilyuchinsk ... provided a certain close friend will get its submarine building act together.

For sure, but it is also a means to an end. A few joint exercises and port visits by PLAN subs might pay very fruitful dividends. End of the day kinetic actions are a last resort, these gamesmanship that bring the options to the table are what will change the political calculus for all involved…. First we must have the competent subs in numbers though.

 

[Gloire_bb]

For sure, but it is also a means to an end. A few joint exercises and port visits by PLAN subs might pay very fruitful dividends. End of the day kinetic actions are a last resort, these gamesmanship that bring the options to the table are what will change the political calculus for all involved…. First we must have the competent subs in numbers though.

This is doable even with the current number of active SSNs - which is slowly going up anyways.