054B/new generation frigate

Well, let me make a run at it. Probably shall serve as an explanation to why I don't really see the need for any excessive capability for a big navy frigate, too. 2nd line navies that are compensating for their lack in something (Major European navies, incl. Russian one, Japanese navy) have a big lure in big superior frigates - but for big 2 it's ultimately either a worse destroyer or a ship that took a place from a more reasonable frigate and a fleet destroyer.

Cruiser: blue water ship, capable of fully and simultaneously supporting and fulfilling various tasks of air-sea fleet action (including counter space), while simultaneously supporting heavy anti-shipping/land strike potential. Flagship and key node. Core combatant of surface battle fleet.
Task: flagship, local air/sea superiority, anti-ship and land strike.
Example: 055 in our case, though slightly borderline with a big destroyer (core node, if it even needs to be, probably shall aim at some sort of ability to take hits and remain combat-capable; subject to discussion).

Destroyer: universal blue water combat ship, intent on fully participating in air-sea fleet action at its normal combat ranges (hundreds of miles). Line combatant of the surface battle fleet.
Task: local air/sea superiority, fleet action.
Example: 052D

Frigate: green or blue water ship, intended primarily on either fulfilling its own missions under the umbrella of the battle fleet or friendly coast, or fulfilling its own separate missions wherever mission doesn't call for the employment of full battle fleet formations.
Task: escort, multipurpose combatant; trade protection.
As a ship that can be dedicated to fulfilling various submissions (local air defense unit, strike, colonial cruiser - specialized versions are highly likely for navies that can't afford destroyer-centric ecosystem as their main combat strength) - specifics may vary, but the general outlook as above.
Example: 054A, B

Corvette: green/brown water ship, intended at fulfilling specific local missions under the umbrella of the friendly coast.
Task: coastal escort/sea control, trade protection.
As a ship that can be dedicated to fulfilling various submissions (local air defense unit, strike, colonial sloop - specialized versions are highly likely for small navies there littoral specifics are forced onto them) - specifics may vary, but the general outlook as above.
Example: 056A

Gloire_bb said:

If there is a 7m UVLS - well, depends on the price of integration(relative to 5-5-5).
But if there is a 7m UVLS, as I wrote before, I doubt there is much point in the simultaneous existence of 052D and such an expensive 054B. Two destroyers, when frigate's reason d'etre is in not being a destroyer. It's not a sign of a bad design, quite on the contrary - and it aligns very well with the basics of naval warfare.

There is no requirement on how radar setup determines class - bringing in fixed modern aegis-type frigates will take less than a few seconds of search.
The point, again, is capability - you're intent on making your engagement work to twice the range, meaning that massive shadow cast by Earth curvature(but not only that - inland AA is also a mission!). That costs a lot, not just additional arrays with their power supply. And it won't be realized there where frigates are often expected to operate. If they don't operate there - again, they probably just aren't frigates.

If a ship can fully support this type of engagement - then it's a fleet action-capable destroyer. And if you put such a ship into a situation where it physically can't realize its potential due to physical restrictions of Earth - it's a triple mistake - ship isn't fighting where it should be fighting, location where it currently is, gets a lot of unnecessary potential (where it just won't be realized), another location (which also needs a presence of a frigate) doesn't get a warship at all (money and shipbuilding capacity went elsewhere).


As far as I currently see - it actually costs quite a lot, there is a whole bunch of Mk.41 ships with instrumental capability to support longer range engagement, but which intentionally avoided it. European AA frigates and JMSDF destroyers are particularly notable - they basically form a distinct subclass.


Yes, you're right.
It's kinda "battlecruiser problem" - if a ship can do a higher-level mission - it should do it. Even if it actually can't(battlecruiser armor), but appears that it can - it will be forced into that role by situation regardless.
Additional problem is that we're paying for much of that mission.

In a way, heavy SAM/full sensor-suite armed frigate may indeed be viewed as a relative "battlecruiser" indeed(relative to a full-sized destroyer, which will be "battleship"). And IMHO it's a wrong type of a ship - a cheaper destroyer(052D)/cheaper frigate (054 series) offer more combat capability to the missile age fleet overall.
But then again, I always like the cheapest possible things when we're talking military. ;p

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This discussion can't really be had if we do not agree with what the likely sensor fit for 054B will be to begin with.

My view is that 054B's radar is a twin faced AESA with each face about 2/3 to 3/4 the size of a single array on 052D, which when considering modern technology, could give 054B's radar performance in the SAMPSON ballpark -- and thus the ability to organically engage long range aerial targets.

If we can agree that 054B will use the 7m long UVLS as well, then when pairing that with the new twin face AESA, I have to ask why the ability to conduct long range engagements (i.e.: integration of the HQ-9 LR SAM) would not be at least capitalized on?

Gloire_bb said:

That, unlike sensor range, isn't a qualitative(tactical/theater) metric, it's a function of individual capability.
Ship that can effectively reach with its main armament (SAMs in sufficient numbers, not ASCMs - i.e. sorta Lanchesterian unit) to theater-level ranges is a destroyer.
A ship that can't (even if it has a massive capability in the theater salvo combat model) - isn't.

Magazine size without relation to the whole battleforce degradation equation is of particularly small relevance IMHO - it's the single cheapest metric to change(esp. now when you soon will just be able to add a few unmanned VLS carriers), it mainly affects numbers game (no qualitative changes for the enemy) - and reasonable magazine depths for a known combat role are long since established anyways.

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Yeah, I disagree with that.

I think that the ability to reach out to longer ranges *may* be a factor in differentiating between surface combatants, but magazine depth and simultaneous target engagement capability are as important if not more important.

Blitzo said:

Yeah, I disagree with that.

I think that the ability to reach out to longer ranges *may* be a factor in differentiating between surface combatants, but magazine depth and simultaneous target engagement capability are as important if not more important.

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It's a curious point.

I still think that a destroyer with a single cell block is a destroyer by definition. Oddly useless one, that one is for sure - but in principle, it gives us that capability ... it's just that just about anything will overwhelm it (not counting for CEC ofc).

Thus it isn't practical to have such a combatant with less than 40-44 - as it isn't really practical to go beyond 80-96. Koreans going for it on the first try really looked childish (sudden blank check) - with batch II they came up with something far more reasonable.

Blitzo said:

This discussion can't really be had if we do not agree with what the likely sensor fit for 054B will be to begin with.

My view is that 054B's radar is a twin faced AESA with each face about 2/3 to 3/4 the size of a single array on 052D, which when considering modern technology, could give 054B's radar performance in the SAMPSON ballpark -- and thus the ability to organically engage long range aerial targets.

If we can agree that 054B will use the 7m long UVLS as well, then when pairing that with the new twin face AESA, I have to ask why the ability to conduct long range engagements (i.e.: integration of the HQ-9 LR SAM) would not be at least capitalized on?

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I don't oppose the point that it will be able to engage long-range targets - it will, moreover - passing on it HHQ-9 missiles may very well be worth it. I don't like spending too much on a ship which is normally isn't even expected to operate with fleet. And without it - ducking under the horizon is such a basic action for maritime aviation that honestly there is little point even trying.

Argument can be made that it's worth it to keep high-flying ISR unmanned aircraft even further away... but I am not sure 100 v 200 miles here give us a qualitative difference - as, once again, if they will want to - horizon will screw us over once again.

W20 said:

No, there is no such thing, moreover, the beauty of the case is that only in the Chinese Navy we can see the definition of Corvette, Frigate, Destroyer and Cruiser.

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Umm no. Russian Navy has all four of these plus Battlecruiser. So all five possible categories of surface combatants.

W20 said:

Question: What is a "Corvette"
Answer: This

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Question: What is a "Frigate"
Answer: This

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Question: What is a "Destroyer"
Answer: This

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Question: What is a "Cruiser"
Answer: This

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Click to expand...

A CRUISER is a large surface combatant that does Anti-Ballistic Missile Warfare, Anti-Air Warfare and has Command & Control facilities built in which allows it serve as the Anti-Air Warfare Command Centre of a naval task force. A Cruiser typically has around 90-120 VLS cells.

A DESTROYER is a large surface combatant of size 3/4th to 4/5th as compared to a Cruiser that does Anti-Ballistic Missile Warfare (limited compared to a Cruiser), Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Anti-Surface Warfare - in short, a fleet's truly multipurpose warship. A destroyer does not have Cruiser-like Command & Control facilities built in. A destroyer typically has around 60-90 VLS cells.

A FRIGATE is medium-to-small surface combatant of size 2/3rd to 3/4th as compared to a Destroyer and does Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare and Convoy Escort as its main missions. A frigate is capable of only limited Anti-Air Warfare. A frigate typically has 30-60 VLS cells.

A CORVETTE is a mainly a littoral/green water surface combatant that does limited Anti-Submarine Warfare, limited Anti-Surface Warfare and offensive Mine Warfare and is incapable of any Anti-Air Warfare. A Corvette also is incapable of Convoy Escort.

Surpluswarrior said:

Okay, mine was a dumb question given the complexity of this thread.

I guess it's always been hard to pin down classes, since types and roles are always changing.

I just wondered what are the common "functions" expected from each type.


Going by the PLAN, corvettes would seem to be greenwater ships for patrol and anti-sub. But I don't know if that's the case in all European navies, for example.

Frigates seem to escort larger ships, and are a minimal blue-water combatant. Destroyers have the sensors and armaments to hunt down other surface ships / targets. Powerful destroyers are cruisers.

This largely applies to PLAN, I suppose.


I guess where it gets confusing for me is when frigates get larger, like 054B maybe. Why is a large frigate still a frigate? Because of role?

Sorry to take up space on the thread with this line of questioning. It just seems like there was an informal discussion already occurring as to what some of these new types actually are.

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For PLAN frigates I see two distinctive roles
1. Cost efficient general purpose surface combatant for green water missions with limited blue water capabilities
2. Anti-submarine specialist for blue water missions, e.g. part of a carrier strike group.

Possible green water missions for Role 1 includes: maintaining constant naval presence, monitoring U.S. naval activities, anti-submarine operations, providing escort to logistics and amphibious ships, all in China's adjacent waters including SCS.

The question is whether those two roles should be played by the same class of ships. From the recent commemorative coins, 054B will play Role 2. But will Type 054A continue to be produced for Role 1, or will 054B eventually take over Role 1 as well? Furthermore, if 054B is going to play Role 1, is its job in Role 2 a stop-gap measure that will in not too distant future be replaced by another class of ships? In other words, there are four possibilities
1. 054A will continue to play Role 1 and 054B will be produced only for Role 2 in foreseeable future. No plan to replace 054A with 054B in Role 1 or to replace 054B with another class in Role 2 in foreseeable future.
2. 054A's production will stop. 054B will be produced for both Role 1 and Role 2. No plan to replace 054B in Role 2 in foreseeable future.
3. 054A's production will stop. 054B will be produced for both Role 1 and Role 2. However, 054B's is only a stopgap in Role 2 and a replacement class is planned. Once the replacement class is available, 054B will be transferred out of Role 2.
4. 054A's production will not stop. 054B will be produced in very limited numbers for Role 2. However, 054B's is only a stopgap in Role 2 and a replacement class is planned. Once the replacement class is available, 054B will be transferred out of Role 2.

The reason that 054B might only be a stopgap in Role 2 is that blue water operations needs endurance (in term of supply-carrying capacity and onboard living comfort), seaworthiness and speed (to keep with the carrier fleet). All three requirements favor larger ships. For hydrodynamic reasons (wave-making resistance), it takes proportionally less power to propel a larger ship to a specific high speed than a smaller ship. All else being equal, if you double the displacement, you don't need double the power to get the same maximal speed, and it becomes relatively easier to reach higher speed (speed-length ratio). So if the additional displacement can be utilized to good effects (e.g. a second helicopter hanger, VLS for anti-surface missiles), it could be better to go for a larger hull to satisfy those three requirements more efficiently. Overall I think it's preferable to have both the ASW frigate role and AAW destroyer role played by 8kt ships with the same power/propulsion system.

Was there improvement in its propulsion for blue water patrol?

I think there's a decent chance the 054B will not be equipped with HQ-9s and we may just see a loadout of something like 8x YJ-18, 8x ASROC, 32x quadpacked SAM for a total of 24x UVLS cells, or 32 cells with 8 FFBNW.

Anything more would be deviating from the 054A's current role, which is a cheap and numerous ASW frigate

AndrewS said:

If the Type-054B already has a rotating 2-face version of a common AESA system with AEGIS, the cost of integrating an existing longer-range SAM should be minimal.

The AEGIS software has already been developed with the Type-055/52D in mind, so the less strenuous Type-054B use cases are already there.
The AEGIS hardware should be COTS technology, so the hardware cost should barely register.
The UVLS has already been developed as well. So buying extra UVLS cells should be relatively cheap.

So you might as well put some existing long-range SAMs onto a Type-054B. But whereas a Type-052D has enough AESA modules to track and engage hundreds or thousands of targets at long-range, a Frigate single AESA face would manage many fewer targets at lower range.

I don't see integrating long-range SAMs on a Type-054B Frigate as much extra cost, apart from some testing and the cost of the SAMs themselves, and possibly some more space used on the Frigate.

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Just a side thought.

Future AEGIS datalinks and the resulting battlefield network would incorporate AI/machine learning algorithms trained on millions of simulated scenarios.

When faced with incoming antiship missiles for example, the algorithms on each ship decide between themselves on the optimal defensive SAM fire plan, CEC capability, offboard targeting etc

And when we look at the Type-054B, we can expect it to be used in high-threat environments, either as part of large battlegroups, in small SAGs or even operating singly.

Having some long-range SAMs on the Type-054B would be very useful, because opposing ISR aircraft won't be able to tell what type of ship is operating the AESA (as they use the same AESA modules, frequencies and AEGIS) and they have to assume a long-range SAM system is available.

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Its likely, at least to my opinion, that the 054B's dual faced AESAs won't be using the same modules as the 052D or 055. To start with, they would have to be lighter, need to save as much weight as possible, to reduce rotational mass as much as possible. The modules would have to rotate. Second is that the modules would have to run cooler. As we do not see any kind of air cooling, the modules have to be cooled by a portable refrigerant unit set between the two array faces and still leave enough room for back end electronics. For this its likely to use Gallium Nitride as this lets modules operate cooler but the peak power would have to be reduced compared to a module for a fixed faced set. This will also push the art and science of packaging tricks available for these modules, making them the most advanced fielded for the PLAN yet.

As this is software, the Type 346 + HHQ-9 control software can be passed to the 054B, and may even be modified for the dual sided AESA and the quad pack 3-5. You would have to account for the rate of update, the rotating array won't have the rate of update as a fixed face can. Your horizontal update tick is dependent on rate of the array's mechanical rotation, unless the array is made to stop and glare at the target, only turning to the rate of the target. However the radar would lose its 360 degree FOV. But that's probably why the ship has a second rotating dual sided antenna on a second mast. The constellation of fewer path points can also be smoothed out using algorithms to predict the target's track in the absence of new data based on the existing path points.

If the target gets into range of the second array (we can refer to its as the Type 368 and it currently serves on the 075), this array can be turning even faster than the large array. While being smaller and has a higher frequency, its range won't be as great as the larger array, but its rate of update is much quicker, and with a higher frequency, this second radar will give a better real time quality track. The track can be combined with the bigger radar, to make an even more real time accurate track, that can be used for the midphase guidance of a missile.

Opposing ISR aircraft don't need to know they are being scanned, tracked and targeted, if the AESA is capable of LPI, or Low Probability of Intercept. This means the ESM aboard these aircraft won't know the emissions are from a surface radar, or any radar, as it may look like random noise, static or sea clutter. For the victim, it may not look like it is already being scanned, until their own radar detects the incoming missile, or their own RWR alerts them that a homing seeker has been activated in the vicinity.

Tam said:

Opposing ISR aircraft don't need to know they are being scanned, tracked and targeted, if the AESA is capable of LPI, or Low Probability of Intercept. This means the ESM aboard these aircraft won't know the emissions are from a surface radar, or any radar, as it may look like random noise, static or sea clutter. For the victim, it may not look like it is already being scanned, until their own radar detects the incoming missile, or their own RWR alerts them that a homing seeker has been activated in the vicinity.

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LPI modes tend to severely cut into range against all targets, for reasons all too obvious; furthermore, LPI's L depends a lot on whom we're scanning: fooling average fighters' slightly legacy RWR set is one thing; fooling P-1 or P-8 is a completely different story.

I don't think it's such a straightforward answer to the problem.