I think it makes a lot of sense to do that.
I think a second hanger, that will require raising that part so its level to the other side, then an HQ-10 launcher on top.
052/052B Class Destroyers
- Thread starter tphuang
- Start date
I think it makes a lot of sense to do that.
I think a second hanger, that will require raising that part so its level to the other side, then an HQ-10 launcher on top.
by pop3.
The Type 052 is China's second-generation destroyer design, employing a high flush-deck and CODOG configuration, driving twin shafts each hosting a variable-pitch propeller and steered by twin rudders. The 052 project was approved in 1983 and officially commissioned in June of 1984. The build contract was signed in September of 1989 and the first of class, DDG 112, was received by the PLAN on the 8th of May 1994. It took eleven years starting from project initiation for the first vessel to be delivered, giving rise to the slogan "one decade to hone one ship." At the time, DDG 112 represented the highest naval shipbuilding capabilities at China's disposal, thus being given the moniker "China's first-rate." During her service, DDG 112 undertook numerous goodwill visits to foreign ports and conducted numerous joint exercises with foreign navies.
Despite superficial grandiosity, the internals of the vessel were rather chaotic. Owing to the low industrial and R&D capabilities of contemporary China, DDG 112's design extensively employed imported systems. Examples include the LM2500 gas turbines, MTU956 cruising diesels, MTU396 electricity generating diesels, TAVITAC shipwide control system, Thomson-CSF combat management system, Crotale SAMs, Sea Tiger air-search radar, etc. The countries of origin for the various imported equipment included the US, France, Germany, UK, Sweden, etc, totalling seven foreign countries. Including China, equipment from eight countries made it aboard DDG 112 which was jokingly referred to as the "Eight Nation Alliance" by industry insiders, clearly demonstrating the chagrin endured by the PLAN in the 80s and 90s.
The next vessel of the class, DDG 113, built upon DDG 112's technical precedence and substituted numerous domestic systems for the foreign systems. The most notable substitutions included that of the French TAVITAC by the domestically designed ZKJ-4BII, the Sea Tiger by the Type 360, Crotale by HHQ-7, and simultaneously the British ICS-3 external communications system and French internal communications system by a domestic integrated communications system. There are rumours that DDG 113's gas turbines are not LM2500 due to an American export embargo but this is incorrect. Both ships' gas turbines are LM2500s. The source of these rumours come from analyses of the visually different gas turbine exhaust funnels between the sister ships but this is simply due to installation of IR-reduction features on DDG 113's funnels that were absent from DDG 112. Subsequently during her MLU in 2009, DDG 112 was fitted with similar IR-suppressors. In the ensuing years after commissioning, Chinese industry's improvement allowed for periodic upgrades to both ships, with DDG 112's TAVITAC and Crotale's upgraded to match DDG 113, and both ships' YJ-8A replaced by YJ-83, along with the outfitting of the Type 826 EW system, Type 309 VDS, a C-band strategic satellite communications TR assembly to augment the domestic communications suite, and upgrades to the 100mm dual-barrel main gun.
In 2009, the PLAN leadership approved plans to comprehensively upgrade both Type 052s during their MLUs. This was to be the most thorough upgrades ever given to either ship. After modernisation, both ships' place and roles in the PLAN's roster would undergo changes. There are some who believe the Type 052s' modernisation were minor operations due to the limited changes in superficial appearance but this simply betrays a complete lack of understanding of the process. For example, the 100mm main gun and ancillary systems were all upgraded, including the gun's tracking radar, EO tracking system, fire-control system, fire-control console, and ammunition feeding system. Even the apparently unaltered gun assembly itself underwent significant upgrades. The cost of upgrading just the main gun plus ancillary systems cost more than 35 million yuan. The two missile systems aboard were also upgraded with HHQ-7s' doubling their effective range at the cost of more than 10 million yuan.
During the MLU upgrades, both ships practically had their entire subsystems systems ripped out and reconstructed. The shipwide control system was replaced by the brand new ZKJ-5, improving their combat management efficacy to the level possessed by 052Ds. The ships' ASW, communications, navigation, EW, warning, and helicopter coordination systems were all replaced by new models. For example, the old Type 826 EW system was replaced by the Type 726, the 37mm cannons by PJ-12 CIWS, Type 2500 ASW rocket by Type 3200 ASW rockets, Type 7424 torpedo weapons system by VJQ-004B torpedo weapons system, Type 946 decoy launcher by Type 726-4, Type 309 VDS by Type 576A towed sonar, Type 064 sonar by Type 066, etc. Besides combat systems, non-combat systems and equipment pertaining to the ships' sailing and operation were also thoroughly overhauled.
Modernisation and rebuild of naval vessels is an extremely tedious and complicated endeavour. One must consider both the possible improvements as well as inherent constraints of the vessel. Simpy piling "wish list" upgrade items onto the hull is irrational and impossible to implement. The most significant upgrade received by the Type 052s during their MLUs are the installations of large-scale task force command suites, elevating their status within the PLAN to that of joint task force command ships, thus partially changing their mission profiles. PLAN task force command suites can roughly be classed into very large-scale, large-scale, and small-scale task force command suites, differing mostly in the number of ships able to be coordinated. Very large-scale task force command suites are installed on aircraft carriers and the forthcoming Type 075 amphibious assault ships.
At the time of its birth, the Type 052 was an "Eight Nation Alliance", representing the sorry state of Chinese industry and the PLAN, but through its constant improvements, the class testifies to the determination and ability of the Chinese people to advance in the face of adversity, to such a degree that today some of its subsystems have matched if not exceeded those possessed by its most advanced peers both domestically and globally, especially in the realm of data management and C&C. The path of the Type 052 from project commissioning til today mirrors the path forged by the Chinese Navy and affirms the progress China has made on the steady march to prosperity.
The Type 052 is China's second-generation destroyer design, employing a high flush-deck and CODOG configuration, driving twin shafts each hosting a variable-pitch propeller and steered by twin rudders. The 052 project was approved in 1983 and officially commissioned in June of 1984. The build contract was signed in September of 1989 and the first of class, DDG 112, was received by the PLAN on the 8th of May 1994. It took eleven years starting from project initiation for the first vessel to be delivered, giving rise to the slogan "one decade to hone one ship." At the time, DDG 112 represented the highest naval shipbuilding capabilities at China's disposal, thus being given the moniker "China's first-rate." During her service, DDG 112 undertook numerous goodwill visits to foreign ports and conducted numerous joint exercises with foreign navies.
Despite superficial grandiosity, the internals of the vessel were rather chaotic. Owing to the low industrial and R&D capabilities of contemporary China, DDG 112's design extensively employed imported systems. Examples include the LM2500 gas turbines, MTU956 cruising diesels, MTU396 electricity generating diesels, TAVITAC shipwide control system, Thomson-CSF combat management system, Crotale SAMs, Sea Tiger air-search radar, etc. The countries of origin for the various imported equipment included the US, France, Germany, UK, Sweden, etc, totalling seven foreign countries. Including China, equipment from eight countries made it aboard DDG 112 which was jokingly referred to as the "Eight Nation Alliance" by industry insiders, clearly demonstrating the chagrin endured by the PLAN in the 80s and 90s.
The next vessel of the class, DDG 113, built upon DDG 112's technical precedence and substituted numerous domestic systems for the foreign systems. The most notable substitutions included that of the French TAVITAC by the domestically designed ZKJ-4BII, the Sea Tiger by the Type 360, Crotale by HHQ-7, and simultaneously the British ICS-3 external communications system and French internal communications system by a domestic integrated communications system. There are rumours that DDG 113's gas turbines are not LM2500 due to an American export embargo but this is incorrect. Both ships' gas turbines are LM2500s. The source of these rumours come from analyses of the visually different gas turbine exhaust funnels between the sister ships but this is simply due to installation of IR-reduction features on DDG 113's funnels that were absent from DDG 112. Subsequently during her MLU in 2009, DDG 112 was fitted with similar IR-suppressors. In the ensuing years after commissioning, Chinese industry's improvement allowed for periodic upgrades to both ships, with DDG 112's TAVITAC and Crotale's upgraded to match DDG 113, and both ships' YJ-8A replaced by YJ-83, along with the outfitting of the Type 826 EW system, Type 309 VDS, a C-band strategic satellite communications TR assembly to augment the domestic communications suite, and upgrades to the 100mm dual-barrel main gun.
In 2009, the PLAN leadership approved plans to comprehensively upgrade both Type 052s during their MLUs. This was to be the most thorough upgrades ever given to either ship. After modernisation, both ships' place and roles in the PLAN's roster would undergo changes. There are some who believe the Type 052s' modernisation were minor operations due to the limited changes in superficial appearance but this simply betrays a complete lack of understanding of the process. For example, the 100mm main gun and ancillary systems were all upgraded, including the gun's tracking radar, EO tracking system, fire-control system, fire-control console, and ammunition feeding system. Even the apparently unaltered gun assembly itself underwent significant upgrades. The cost of upgrading just the main gun plus ancillary systems cost more than 35 million yuan. The two missile systems aboard were also upgraded with HHQ-7s' doubling their effective range at the cost of more than 10 million yuan.
During the MLU upgrades, both ships practically had their entire subsystems systems ripped out and reconstructed. The shipwide control system was replaced by the brand new ZKJ-5, improving their combat management efficacy to the level possessed by 052Ds. The ships' ASW, communications, navigation, EW, warning, and helicopter coordination systems were all replaced by new models. For example, the old Type 826 EW system was replaced by the Type 726, the 37mm cannons by PJ-12 CIWS, Type 2500 ASW rocket by Type 3200 ASW rockets, Type 7424 torpedo weapons system by VJQ-004B torpedo weapons system, Type 946 decoy launcher by Type 726-4, Type 309 VDS by Type 576A towed sonar, Type 064 sonar by Type 066, etc. Besides combat systems, non-combat systems and equipment pertaining to the ships' sailing and operation were also thoroughly overhauled.
Modernisation and rebuild of naval vessels is an extremely tedious and complicated endeavour. One must consider both the possible improvements as well as inherent constraints of the vessel. Simpy piling "wish list" upgrade items onto the hull is irrational and impossible to implement. The most significant upgrade received by the Type 052s during their MLUs are the installations of large-scale task force command suites, elevating their status within the PLAN to that of joint task force command ships, thus partially changing their mission profiles. PLAN task force command suites can roughly be classed into very large-scale, large-scale, and small-scale task force command suites, differing mostly in the number of ships able to be coordinated. Very large-scale task force command suites are installed on aircraft carriers and the forthcoming Type 075 amphibious assault ships.
At the time of its birth, the Type 052 was an "Eight Nation Alliance", representing the sorry state of Chinese industry and the PLAN, but through its constant improvements, the class testifies to the determination and ability of the Chinese people to advance in the face of adversity, to such a degree that today some of its subsystems have matched if not exceeded those possessed by its most advanced peers both domestically and globally, especially in the realm of data management and C&C. The path of the Type 052 from project commissioning til today mirrors the path forged by the Chinese Navy and affirms the progress China has made on the steady march to prosperity.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Good summary of all the upgrade done on PLAN ship and PLAAF plane
Less Visible Aspects of Chinese Military Modernization
Besides new equipment, we need to pay attention to how China is upgrading old systems.
By Shahryar Pasandideh
September 21, 2018
Buoyed by a rapidly growing economy and increasing defense industrial capabilities, China’s military continues to field large numbers of increasingly sophisticated and capable military equipment. Every year, photos of new ships, planes, and missiles emerge, providing analysts with important datapoints to assess Chinese military capabilities. Although the quality of analyses of material aspects of Chinese military power has been very good and continues to improve, there has been something of bias toward emphasizing new pieces of equipment over upgrades of existing equipment. This is unfortunate for it leads to an underestimation of Chinese military power and a misunderstanding of possible future trajectories.
Impressive as China’s defense industrial output has been, the annual flow of new equipment constitutes just a small fraction of the total inventory and military equipment generally remains in service for 20-40 years. Hence, it is important that analysts keep track of what China does with its existing equipment. After all, two decades of increasingly intense and comprehensive Chinese military modernization make clear that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not only interested in fielding as much equipment as possible or even the largest possible numbers of the latest equipment. Instead, it prioritizes resources, buying new equipment where and when necessary while upgrading older in-service systems to make the most out of their service life. In the naval and aviation realms, this has included upgrades of existing equipment, which, although less visible, have important implications for Chinese military power.
Upgrades of Existing Warships
For over a decade, Chinese shipyards have not only cranked out large numbers of new warships, they have also fielded entirely new designs. Since 2010, for example, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has fielded three progressively more capable destroyer classes. Although production rates have been impressive, modernizing a fleet the size of China’s is a decades-long process, the end of which heralds the replacement of the first wave of modern vessels. In the interim, when facing adversaries, the PLAN will go to war with both very modern and older vessels. Therefore, the scope and effects of upgrades to existing ships, if any, is an important and underexamined part of assessing China’s naval capabilities. Analysts are fortunate in that pictures of individual warships are more readily available than those of individual aircraft and that major improvement in the capabilities of a warship are generally visible.
Since 2011, just as production at Chinese shipyards was reaching its ongoing period of high intensity, China began upgrading some of its existing warships. The first were the two Type 052-class destroyers, the first modern destroyers built by China. At the time that they were upgraded, the youngest of the Type 052s was 17 years old, meaning that this was a mid-life upgrade. New air defense systems were added, improving survivability against cruise missiles while also reducing manpower requirements. To improve the detection of aerial targets, a Type 517M radar was installed. To facilitate longer-range deployments, a satellite communications (SATCOM) system was also added. None of these upgrades required major structural changes as would happen if the limited capability HQ-7 surface to air missile (SAM) system was replaced with a more capable system using a vertical launch system (VLS). Whereas these changes are visible, changes, if any, to internal systems cannot be discerned from imagery. That said, it can be reasonably assumed that the combat management system (CMS) was modified to integrate the new sensors and armaments.
On balance, the upgraded Type 052-class destroyers are not very impressive. In many respects, however, this is largely a function of them being relatively obsolete even they were built. Old and obsolescent warships are difficult to upgrade comprehensively, and the cost is rarely worthwhile, particularly given ongoing production of much more advanced warships. In other cases, however, China appears to have judged the cost and complexity of upgrading small classes of warships worthwhile and has invested in more comprehensive upgrades.
In 2014, China began upgrading the two oldest of the four-strong Russian built Sovremennyy-class destroyers. Although these were very capable warships relative to China’s fleet circa 2000, there is a very large gap between their capabilities and those of the latest Chinese warships. The upgrades help address such deficiencies for the second half of their service lives. Compared to the changes made to the Type 052-class, the upgrades to the Sovremenny have been far more impactful. The 48 Russian VLS cells for the Russian Shtil SAM have reportedly been replaced with 32 Chinese VLS cells. Although fewer in number, the PLAN’s logistical requirements are eased by not longer having to support this aging foreign system. Moreover, the new VLS can launch both Chinese HQ-16 SAMs as well as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missile. Other major changes include the installation of a new air search radar and the reported replacement of the supersonic Russian Moskit anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) with the analogous Chinese YJ-12. Overall, open source imagery analysis indicates that there are over a dozen identifiable changes to the armaments and sensors carried by the two upgraded Sovremennyy-class destroyers.
In 2015, China began upgrading the single Type 051B destroyer, underscoring the PLAN’s desire to not let even a single hull go to waste. After 16 years of service, the ship’s limited air defense capability received a dramatic improvement. The HQ-7 SAM system, with a dozen or so kilometers range, was been replaced with the HQ-16 SAM with a range of around 50 kilometers. More importantly, whereas the ship previously only carried 16 HQ-7 SAMs (eight ready to fire), it is now equipped with 32 VLS cells (all ready to fire) equipped with longer-ranged HQ-16 SAMs. To guide these missiles and improve aerial coverage, a more advanced Type 382 radar was installed. Other changes were made to the helicopter hangar, air defense guns, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. All things considered, these upgrades have made the Type 051B destroyer a much more capable warship, one warranting consideration in military assessments for the next 10 or so years that it is expected to remain in service.
Less Visible Aspects of Chinese Military Modernization
Besides new equipment, we need to pay attention to how China is upgrading old systems.
By Shahryar Pasandideh
September 21, 2018
Buoyed by a rapidly growing economy and increasing defense industrial capabilities, China’s military continues to field large numbers of increasingly sophisticated and capable military equipment. Every year, photos of new ships, planes, and missiles emerge, providing analysts with important datapoints to assess Chinese military capabilities. Although the quality of analyses of material aspects of Chinese military power has been very good and continues to improve, there has been something of bias toward emphasizing new pieces of equipment over upgrades of existing equipment. This is unfortunate for it leads to an underestimation of Chinese military power and a misunderstanding of possible future trajectories.
Impressive as China’s defense industrial output has been, the annual flow of new equipment constitutes just a small fraction of the total inventory and military equipment generally remains in service for 20-40 years. Hence, it is important that analysts keep track of what China does with its existing equipment. After all, two decades of increasingly intense and comprehensive Chinese military modernization make clear that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not only interested in fielding as much equipment as possible or even the largest possible numbers of the latest equipment. Instead, it prioritizes resources, buying new equipment where and when necessary while upgrading older in-service systems to make the most out of their service life. In the naval and aviation realms, this has included upgrades of existing equipment, which, although less visible, have important implications for Chinese military power.
Upgrades of Existing Warships
For over a decade, Chinese shipyards have not only cranked out large numbers of new warships, they have also fielded entirely new designs. Since 2010, for example, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has fielded three progressively more capable destroyer classes. Although production rates have been impressive, modernizing a fleet the size of China’s is a decades-long process, the end of which heralds the replacement of the first wave of modern vessels. In the interim, when facing adversaries, the PLAN will go to war with both very modern and older vessels. Therefore, the scope and effects of upgrades to existing ships, if any, is an important and underexamined part of assessing China’s naval capabilities. Analysts are fortunate in that pictures of individual warships are more readily available than those of individual aircraft and that major improvement in the capabilities of a warship are generally visible.
Since 2011, just as production at Chinese shipyards was reaching its ongoing period of high intensity, China began upgrading some of its existing warships. The first were the two Type 052-class destroyers, the first modern destroyers built by China. At the time that they were upgraded, the youngest of the Type 052s was 17 years old, meaning that this was a mid-life upgrade. New air defense systems were added, improving survivability against cruise missiles while also reducing manpower requirements. To improve the detection of aerial targets, a Type 517M radar was installed. To facilitate longer-range deployments, a satellite communications (SATCOM) system was also added. None of these upgrades required major structural changes as would happen if the limited capability HQ-7 surface to air missile (SAM) system was replaced with a more capable system using a vertical launch system (VLS). Whereas these changes are visible, changes, if any, to internal systems cannot be discerned from imagery. That said, it can be reasonably assumed that the combat management system (CMS) was modified to integrate the new sensors and armaments.
On balance, the upgraded Type 052-class destroyers are not very impressive. In many respects, however, this is largely a function of them being relatively obsolete even they were built. Old and obsolescent warships are difficult to upgrade comprehensively, and the cost is rarely worthwhile, particularly given ongoing production of much more advanced warships. In other cases, however, China appears to have judged the cost and complexity of upgrading small classes of warships worthwhile and has invested in more comprehensive upgrades.
In 2014, China began upgrading the two oldest of the four-strong Russian built Sovremennyy-class destroyers. Although these were very capable warships relative to China’s fleet circa 2000, there is a very large gap between their capabilities and those of the latest Chinese warships. The upgrades help address such deficiencies for the second half of their service lives. Compared to the changes made to the Type 052-class, the upgrades to the Sovremenny have been far more impactful. The 48 Russian VLS cells for the Russian Shtil SAM have reportedly been replaced with 32 Chinese VLS cells. Although fewer in number, the PLAN’s logistical requirements are eased by not longer having to support this aging foreign system. Moreover, the new VLS can launch both Chinese HQ-16 SAMs as well as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) missile. Other major changes include the installation of a new air search radar and the reported replacement of the supersonic Russian Moskit anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) with the analogous Chinese YJ-12. Overall, open source imagery analysis indicates that there are over a dozen identifiable changes to the armaments and sensors carried by the two upgraded Sovremennyy-class destroyers.
In 2015, China began upgrading the single Type 051B destroyer, underscoring the PLAN’s desire to not let even a single hull go to waste. After 16 years of service, the ship’s limited air defense capability received a dramatic improvement. The HQ-7 SAM system, with a dozen or so kilometers range, was been replaced with the HQ-16 SAM with a range of around 50 kilometers. More importantly, whereas the ship previously only carried 16 HQ-7 SAMs (eight ready to fire), it is now equipped with 32 VLS cells (all ready to fire) equipped with longer-ranged HQ-16 SAMs. To guide these missiles and improve aerial coverage, a more advanced Type 382 radar was installed. Other changes were made to the helicopter hangar, air defense guns, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. All things considered, these upgrades have made the Type 051B destroyer a much more capable warship, one warranting consideration in military assessments for the next 10 or so years that it is expected to remain in service.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
(cont)
Upgrading Existing Aircraft
Every year, China adds dozens of new combat aircraft as well as large numbers of supporting platforms, such as airborne early warning aircraft (AEW). Over the past decade or so, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLAN have fielded 11 KJ-200 AEW aircraft. Although a decent complement to the five larger and more capable KJ-2000 AEW aircraft that China fielded in the same period, the KJ-200’s design did not allow for 360-degree radar coverage, a major limitation. At the same time, observers of the Chinese military had evidence by 2013 that a new AEW aircraft was under development. More or less based on the same airframe as the KJ-200, the new KJ-500 used a different radar design which, amongst other things, allowed for 360-degree coverage.
Although this new platform heralded a coming improvement in Chinese AEW capabilities, it did not change the limited capabilities of the 11 existing KJ-200 aircraft, which had decades of service ahead of them. In 2016, observers caught their first glimpse of an upgraded KJ-200 airframe, reportedly designated the KJ-200A. The most obvious change was the addition of rather large new forward-looking radar to improve radar coverage. Whether changes were made to the internal components is unclear but not unlikely given China’s rapid advances in defense electronics. In late 2017, evidence emerged of a further upgrade for the KJ-200 fleet, one adding a SATCOM system and passive electronic sensors to complement the radar picture. Overall, then, although the number of KJ-200 aircraft remains fixed at 11 and even though they have been complemented by growing numbers of the newer KJ-500 aircraft, upgrades to the KJ-200 result in the continued improvement of China’s AEW without gaining the attention that new designs and new airframes do.
Chinese combat aircraft have also become progressively more capable, with existing aircraft receiving upgrades and subsequent batches of production also improved. In some cases, such as the J-10 fighter jet, changes are very visible. Observers comparing a picture of the first variant of the J-10 and a J-10B can identify a different radome, air intake design, and the addition of an infrared search & track (IRIST) sensor, for example. These, however, are differences between new-build aircraft and many of these changes, such as the different air intake design, cannot be backfitted to existing airframes.
Other developments, however, can be backfitted and analysts have photographic evidence that PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft receive upgrades, showing that these services do not commit all their resources to new construction. Combat aircraft have been upgraded with new radio antennae and the integration of new, more capable munitions. Some aircraft, such as J-11A fighter jets, have received missile approach warning system (MAWS) years after entering service. Others, such as the J-11B, have received electronic countermeasures (ECM) pods. Although not likely to elicit headlines in the manner of new aircraft designs or even new munitions, these small developments herald important advances in capabilities. In these cases, the result is that Chinese fighter aircraft have better defenses against adversary missiles and radar.
Although the underlying technologies can be integrated across all Chinese aircraft, these are platform specific upgrades. In contrast, munitions can be integrated onto a wide range of aircraft, as the case of the new PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile indicates. Other important Chinese munitions, such as the supersonic YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missile, have been integrated onto older aircraft, including the PLANAF’s H-6G bomber. ECM pods have also been integrated onto multiple designs, including several variants of the H-6 bomber family and the JH-7 fighter-bomber. Without such relatively unglamorous equipment, Chinese strike aircraft are likely to struggle against adversary air defenses. With these and their new munitions and supported by other PLAAF and PLANAF capabilities, however, they are increasingly capable of successfully completing their missions.
Upgrading Existing Aircraft
Every year, China adds dozens of new combat aircraft as well as large numbers of supporting platforms, such as airborne early warning aircraft (AEW). Over the past decade or so, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLAN have fielded 11 KJ-200 AEW aircraft. Although a decent complement to the five larger and more capable KJ-2000 AEW aircraft that China fielded in the same period, the KJ-200’s design did not allow for 360-degree radar coverage, a major limitation. At the same time, observers of the Chinese military had evidence by 2013 that a new AEW aircraft was under development. More or less based on the same airframe as the KJ-200, the new KJ-500 used a different radar design which, amongst other things, allowed for 360-degree coverage.
Although this new platform heralded a coming improvement in Chinese AEW capabilities, it did not change the limited capabilities of the 11 existing KJ-200 aircraft, which had decades of service ahead of them. In 2016, observers caught their first glimpse of an upgraded KJ-200 airframe, reportedly designated the KJ-200A. The most obvious change was the addition of rather large new forward-looking radar to improve radar coverage. Whether changes were made to the internal components is unclear but not unlikely given China’s rapid advances in defense electronics. In late 2017, evidence emerged of a further upgrade for the KJ-200 fleet, one adding a SATCOM system and passive electronic sensors to complement the radar picture. Overall, then, although the number of KJ-200 aircraft remains fixed at 11 and even though they have been complemented by growing numbers of the newer KJ-500 aircraft, upgrades to the KJ-200 result in the continued improvement of China’s AEW without gaining the attention that new designs and new airframes do.
Chinese combat aircraft have also become progressively more capable, with existing aircraft receiving upgrades and subsequent batches of production also improved. In some cases, such as the J-10 fighter jet, changes are very visible. Observers comparing a picture of the first variant of the J-10 and a J-10B can identify a different radome, air intake design, and the addition of an infrared search & track (IRIST) sensor, for example. These, however, are differences between new-build aircraft and many of these changes, such as the different air intake design, cannot be backfitted to existing airframes.
Other developments, however, can be backfitted and analysts have photographic evidence that PLAAF and PLANAF aircraft receive upgrades, showing that these services do not commit all their resources to new construction. Combat aircraft have been upgraded with new radio antennae and the integration of new, more capable munitions. Some aircraft, such as J-11A fighter jets, have received missile approach warning system (MAWS) years after entering service. Others, such as the J-11B, have received electronic countermeasures (ECM) pods. Although not likely to elicit headlines in the manner of new aircraft designs or even new munitions, these small developments herald important advances in capabilities. In these cases, the result is that Chinese fighter aircraft have better defenses against adversary missiles and radar.
Although the underlying technologies can be integrated across all Chinese aircraft, these are platform specific upgrades. In contrast, munitions can be integrated onto a wide range of aircraft, as the case of the new PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile indicates. Other important Chinese munitions, such as the supersonic YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missile, have been integrated onto older aircraft, including the PLANAF’s H-6G bomber. ECM pods have also been integrated onto multiple designs, including several variants of the H-6 bomber family and the JH-7 fighter-bomber. Without such relatively unglamorous equipment, Chinese strike aircraft are likely to struggle against adversary air defenses. With these and their new munitions and supported by other PLAAF and PLANAF capabilities, however, they are increasingly capable of successfully completing their missions.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
(cont)
What to Look Out for in the Naval Realm
It remains to be seen how many in-service warships and aircraft will receive major upgrades and mid-life modernizations. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that China will start midlife upgrades for its two Type 052B-class destroyers in the next few years and the two Type 051C-class and the two newer Sovremennyy-class destroyers a few years later. If extant upgrade projects are a good indicator, then it is likely that these ships will have their Russian VLS systems replaced with multirole Chinese VLS systems. Sensors and communications are also likely to be upgraded, bringing them in line with the rest of the fleet.
Other things to look for are upgrade programs to backfit design alterations to ships well in advance of their midlife upgrade. For example, by the time construction of the class wraps up in 2019, just under half of the 30 strong Type 054A-class frigate fleet will be equipped with variable depth sonars (VDS). Although it is not essential for to be equipped with such a potent ASW sensor, the PLAN may want more VDS-equipped ships and may upgrade some of these recently commissioned frigates. Similarly, as advanced ASCMs, particularly those capable of hypersonic speeds, proliferate in the region, the PLAN may have to make heavy investment into upgrading radars, electronic countermeasures, and air defenses of even relatively new vessels. Today, China has just six destroyers needing upgrade in the next few years. In a decade, however, it may have to upgrade some two dozen currently very new destroyers to keep up with qualitative advances in the ASCM threat.
The secrecy veiling China’s submarine fleet and the contained nature of a submarine’s equipment make it difficult to discern if Chinese submarines are being upgraded and what the effects of these upgrades are. Although unconfirmed, stills from a recent Chinese news broadcast may indicate that China has lengthened one of its Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, presumably to install an air independent propulsion (AIP) system. Such an effort would not be without parallel, as Sweden demonstrated with the insertion of a hull section containing AIP onto its Västergötland-class submarines. Assuming that China has undertaken such an effort, then it may equip its 11 other Kilo-class and 13 Song-class submarines with AIP, complementing its 17 or so AIP-equipped Yuan-class submarines. This would give the PLAN over 40 AIP submarines even without major new construction and, more importantly, greatly improve the capabilities of its submarine force. Similarly, it remains to be seen if the munitions used by the PLAN submarine fleet are standardized and whether highly capable munitions, such as the new YJ-18 supersonic ASCM, are integrated onto all existing submarines.
What to Look Out for in the Aviation Realm
As production of fourth-generation fighter aircraft such as the J-10 and J-11 family eventually draws down and as the number of fourth and fifth-generation fighter aircraft in service approaches the PLA’s force structure requirements, counting the number of aircraft produced and tabulating the inventory will become increasingly limited in terms of analytic utility. Instead, analysts will have to pay greater attention to what the PLA does with its fielded hardware and assess the implications of upgrades. In some cases, these upgrades will be visible and can be identified through careful imagery analysis. For example, it is not enough to know that China has apparently developed and fielded a very capable air-to-air missile, such as the PL-15. The important questions are how many missiles are produced and how many aircraft are capable of fielding them. Unfortunately, the PLA’s secrecy renders impossible the answering of the first question. The second question, however, can be answered by observing and tracking which aircraft types fly with a given munition.
Similarly, although the radars mounted on Chinese fighter jets are becoming increasingly capable, China currently fields hundreds of competitive fourth generation aircraft with older, less capable radar designs. It remains to be seen whether China will mount the active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars found on its latest J-10 and J-11 fighter jet variants on older variants of these aircraft. Similarly, with so many variants of each of these aircraft in service, the logistical burden of sustaining such a diverse fleet will grow until a standardization upgrade of avionics and electronics takes place, a process similar to the Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) which the U.S. Air Force undertook to standardize its disparate F-16 fighter jet inventory. In other cases, however, the development of capabilities in fielded forces will be less visible. To understand advances in defense electronics, including those installed on upgraded airframes, analysts will have to examine Chinese technical journals and follow the activities of China’s electronics industry.
More Than Meets the Eye
The Chinese military has made dramatic improvements in its military capabilities. Many of these developments are both visible and measurable. Analysts know, for example, that the PLAN has commissioned dozens of new warships in the past few years. Similarly, they can discern that these warships are increasingly capable, featuring more advanced munitions and sensors. But improvements in Chinese military capabilities do not only come from the continued production and fielding of new hardware. Older systems – even those fielded over a decade ago – constitute the bulk of the inventory and are likely to remain in service for decades to come. Even with high rates of production, the annual flow of new equipment is just a small fraction of the total inventory that can be used in conflict at any given time.
Rather than devoting all of its resources into new production, the Chinese military is making greater investment into upgrades of its existing hardware. In the naval and aerial realms, this has considerably improved Chinese capabilities without getting the attention that newly built hardware receives upon entering service. With upgrades to the same existing platforms, China’s military is more capable than it was just a few years ago. As China’s force structure stabilizes and as the inventory of modern equipment matures, identifying and assessing upgrades of existing equipment will become ever more important to understanding Chinese military capabilities. Analysts would do well to pay more attention to these less visible aspects of Chinese military modernization.
Shahryar Pasandideh is a Ph.D. student in political science at The George Washington University. His writing has been published at World Politics Review, the NATO Council of Canada, and The Diplomat.
What to Look Out for in the Naval Realm
It remains to be seen how many in-service warships and aircraft will receive major upgrades and mid-life modernizations. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that China will start midlife upgrades for its two Type 052B-class destroyers in the next few years and the two Type 051C-class and the two newer Sovremennyy-class destroyers a few years later. If extant upgrade projects are a good indicator, then it is likely that these ships will have their Russian VLS systems replaced with multirole Chinese VLS systems. Sensors and communications are also likely to be upgraded, bringing them in line with the rest of the fleet.
Other things to look for are upgrade programs to backfit design alterations to ships well in advance of their midlife upgrade. For example, by the time construction of the class wraps up in 2019, just under half of the 30 strong Type 054A-class frigate fleet will be equipped with variable depth sonars (VDS). Although it is not essential for to be equipped with such a potent ASW sensor, the PLAN may want more VDS-equipped ships and may upgrade some of these recently commissioned frigates. Similarly, as advanced ASCMs, particularly those capable of hypersonic speeds, proliferate in the region, the PLAN may have to make heavy investment into upgrading radars, electronic countermeasures, and air defenses of even relatively new vessels. Today, China has just six destroyers needing upgrade in the next few years. In a decade, however, it may have to upgrade some two dozen currently very new destroyers to keep up with qualitative advances in the ASCM threat.
The secrecy veiling China’s submarine fleet and the contained nature of a submarine’s equipment make it difficult to discern if Chinese submarines are being upgraded and what the effects of these upgrades are. Although unconfirmed, stills from a recent Chinese news broadcast may indicate that China has lengthened one of its Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, presumably to install an air independent propulsion (AIP) system. Such an effort would not be without parallel, as Sweden demonstrated with the insertion of a hull section containing AIP onto its Västergötland-class submarines. Assuming that China has undertaken such an effort, then it may equip its 11 other Kilo-class and 13 Song-class submarines with AIP, complementing its 17 or so AIP-equipped Yuan-class submarines. This would give the PLAN over 40 AIP submarines even without major new construction and, more importantly, greatly improve the capabilities of its submarine force. Similarly, it remains to be seen if the munitions used by the PLAN submarine fleet are standardized and whether highly capable munitions, such as the new YJ-18 supersonic ASCM, are integrated onto all existing submarines.
What to Look Out for in the Aviation Realm
As production of fourth-generation fighter aircraft such as the J-10 and J-11 family eventually draws down and as the number of fourth and fifth-generation fighter aircraft in service approaches the PLA’s force structure requirements, counting the number of aircraft produced and tabulating the inventory will become increasingly limited in terms of analytic utility. Instead, analysts will have to pay greater attention to what the PLA does with its fielded hardware and assess the implications of upgrades. In some cases, these upgrades will be visible and can be identified through careful imagery analysis. For example, it is not enough to know that China has apparently developed and fielded a very capable air-to-air missile, such as the PL-15. The important questions are how many missiles are produced and how many aircraft are capable of fielding them. Unfortunately, the PLA’s secrecy renders impossible the answering of the first question. The second question, however, can be answered by observing and tracking which aircraft types fly with a given munition.
Similarly, although the radars mounted on Chinese fighter jets are becoming increasingly capable, China currently fields hundreds of competitive fourth generation aircraft with older, less capable radar designs. It remains to be seen whether China will mount the active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars found on its latest J-10 and J-11 fighter jet variants on older variants of these aircraft. Similarly, with so many variants of each of these aircraft in service, the logistical burden of sustaining such a diverse fleet will grow until a standardization upgrade of avionics and electronics takes place, a process similar to the Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) which the U.S. Air Force undertook to standardize its disparate F-16 fighter jet inventory. In other cases, however, the development of capabilities in fielded forces will be less visible. To understand advances in defense electronics, including those installed on upgraded airframes, analysts will have to examine Chinese technical journals and follow the activities of China’s electronics industry.
More Than Meets the Eye
The Chinese military has made dramatic improvements in its military capabilities. Many of these developments are both visible and measurable. Analysts know, for example, that the PLAN has commissioned dozens of new warships in the past few years. Similarly, they can discern that these warships are increasingly capable, featuring more advanced munitions and sensors. But improvements in Chinese military capabilities do not only come from the continued production and fielding of new hardware. Older systems – even those fielded over a decade ago – constitute the bulk of the inventory and are likely to remain in service for decades to come. Even with high rates of production, the annual flow of new equipment is just a small fraction of the total inventory that can be used in conflict at any given time.
Rather than devoting all of its resources into new production, the Chinese military is making greater investment into upgrades of its existing hardware. In the naval and aerial realms, this has considerably improved Chinese capabilities without getting the attention that newly built hardware receives upon entering service. With upgrades to the same existing platforms, China’s military is more capable than it was just a few years ago. As China’s force structure stabilizes and as the inventory of modern equipment matures, identifying and assessing upgrades of existing equipment will become ever more important to understanding Chinese military capabilities. Analysts would do well to pay more attention to these less visible aspects of Chinese military modernization.
Shahryar Pasandideh is a Ph.D. student in political science at The George Washington University. His writing has been published at World Politics Review, the NATO Council of Canada, and The Diplomat.
Is that 168 or 169? how long has it been there is it going to be sitting around for ages like the sovremennyy's you think?
Seems like stripped of all weapons and electronics. My guess is a 32 cell VLS in the front for HQ-16 and an HHQ-10 launcher in the back or an 8 cell UVLS for cruise missiles. Type 730 ciws replaced by 1130.
Definitely 168.
169 just took part in a South China Seas exercise recently, photos of this event is in another thread.
No idea. But my 'feeling' is that 168 is going to be a lot easier to upgrade than the Sovs will be, due to having a more modern mindset in its engineering than the Cold War Sovremennyy which looks like a mess. Hopefully it can be as smooth as the 051B's. This isn't the only ship going into an MLU refit, one of the two 054 (no A) is also getting one and has gotten stripped.