PLAN Amphibious assault capability

It doesn't have to be a given to have more attackers than defenders to succeed. Last several decades of warfare have proved it.
Also, for amphibous landings, one doesn't need huge numberical advantage. allies landed 'just' 120 000 soldiers during first 24 hours of d-day.

Numbers game is not most important anyway. Strategy, including deceptions, could change things a lot. One thing that has to be forgotten is the notion of concealed landing. while one could conceal the exact place and time of landing, the fact there is one in preparation is impossible to hide. I doubt chinese would even try to hide it.

Well that D-Day comparison is not all that correct, allies had air-superiority over the channel and the immidiate landing region as well as sea controll in the channel. And the allies are said to have had greater numbers of soldiers anyway, since the beach they attacked wasn't the one the germans anticipated. Additionaly the german army was streched in fighting all over the european continent.

BTW, perhaps not related to conventional amphibious landing, but what are PLANs capabilities to bring SpecialForces to shore by subs ... ?

I used D day comparison precisely because of importance of air superiority. Without it, landing would be impossible. Same goes for sea superiority. Of course, once you have air superiority, you must use it. If chinese cant pin down better part of taiwanese armored formations - chinese marines would get pushed back into the water very quickly.

That being said, germans had 50 000 troops right on the beaches (combined) while allies, like i said, debarked 120 000 troops in first 24 hours. What figure i can't find is just how many were debarked in the first go. I would assume that 120 000 figure was achieved by multiple (at least one more go) trips of at least part of the amphibious fleet.

So, IF one has air and sea superioiry and is in position to make good use of it - one doesn't have to have more troops than defender to do a successful landing.

To make succesfull landing you don't need quantitical superiority, yeas. But the key issue is to hold that position. With the current transport capability, china cannot bring no more than few divisions in the shores of Taiwan. In the normandian landings, Germans didn't have (like said) enough troops there, but also they didn't know where exactly the strike was supposed to hit. THe are which the germans had to defend was huge compared to the area of Taiwan. So the germans weren't able to bring reinforcements in the needed time and couldn't focus it's defence in smaller areas.

Now in Taiwans case there really isen't many choises where the chinese landing force will hit. And even if the exact location isen't know, the ammount of defensive troops is much higher in those areas. Short distances means that Taiwanese can move additional units to the hotspots fast and concerate it's defence even greater.

PRC just doesen't have the capability to transport enough troops agross the strait fast enough so that the balance of power can be shifted on their favour. The overall capability of PLA, PLAN and PLAAF conduct the level of operations which would be required to bring down the Taiwanese defence just isen't sufficient enough. Tough there is procress in the overall modernisation of PRC troops, the main bulk of the troops are still desperetly inadequate to modern battlefield. It's ability to fight against modern army isen't the question, I'm sure it can do so, BUT in the Taiwan invasion the task is no smaller than the total anhilation of ROCs armed forces and without devastating nuclear strike, PRC just cannot do it...

Numerical superioty may not be in threory the neccerical to win a amphibious assault- type of strugle, but in this particular case it's a must. No matter how nice new toys PLA might have, the overall level of the equipment isen't anyway superior to Taiwanese and in most cases it's in fact inferior.

There is just noway that PRC could invade Taiwan at the moemnt and in near future as long as Taiwanese are fighting back

adeptitus said:

The ROC Army has approx. 200,000 active (+3.87 million maximum potential reserve) service, plus 3,000 assorted armored combat vehiciles, 1,500 artillery, and 200+ helicopters, including AH-1W Cobra's.

Even if the PLA makes it way through ROCN and ROCAF to land 1-2 divisions on Taiwan's western shores, they're going to get zerged by the ROC Army.

I honestly can't see the PLA using a lot of commercial ships. Because to get them you have to recall the ships to port, assume control, then load your men and equipment. Doing so with commercial ships is near impossible to conceal, and will give Taiwan plenty of early warning to active its reserves.

However I do think the PLA has the capability to invade Kinmen & Matsu, and may actually do so to "send a message".

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and don't forgot: Taiwan indeed can determine the "declaring of independence", which would be the step in the war. So Taiwan have the cards to start the game, and Taiwan indeed would set the optimum moment in taiwanese meaning.

And as Gollevainen sad:

Now in Taiwans case there really isen't many choises where the chinese landing force will hit. And even if the exact location isen't know, the ammount of defensive troops is much higher in those areas. Short distances means that Taiwanese can move additional units to the hotspots fast and concerate it's defence even greater.

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My five cents: in case of "declaring independence" they would mine all choises where the chinese landing force could hit.
I agree:

There is just noway that PRC could invade Taiwan at the moemnt and in near future as long as Taiwanese are fighting back

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D-Day vs Theoratical Invasion of Taiwan



Normandy
Assault Force:
176,000 amphibious troops
three airborne divisions
10,000 aircraft
136 warships [BB, C, DD]
3,000 landing craft
2,000 other ships

Defending:
400 aircraft
~50,000 troops [six divisions]
no naval presence

Air Situation
Attacking force had air supremacy many months prior to amphibious assault.

Intelligence
Luftwaffe flew no reconnaissance flights over the coastal regions of Great Britain during the early months of 1944.
Germans mounted no air reconnaissance during the first five days of June, because of bad weather.

Taiwan Invasion
Assault Force
15,000 amphibious troops
three airborne divisions
3,300 combat aircraft
60 warships [DD, FF]
~300 landing craft

Defending
490 fighter aircraft
220,000-troops
40 warships [DD, FF]

Air Situation
Attacking force would have to obtain air supremacy prior to amphibious assault.

Intelligence
American intelligence satellites overfly the area a dozen times every day.

From the above ORBAT, PLAN does not have the capability to invade Taiwan. Current USMC and USN amphibious doctrine demands "over the horizon" amphibious assault capability. The PLAN landing ships are still limited to LST's, which demands a certain particular terrain to adequately land. Secondly, the threat of truck mounted SSM's is very real. With line of site targetting, the PLAN's gator navy will have a very interesting time.

Terrain
From the perspective of an amphibious operations planner, Taiwan is not a particularly attractive objective. While it is certainly true that the most noteworthy amphibious assaults, such as Normandy and Inchon, achieved surprise against less-than-obvious objectives, there are limits to the possibilities overcoming physical obstacles to a successful assault. The eastern side of Taiwan is mountainous, and offers little opportunity for operational maneuver. Access to much of the western side oF Taiwan is blocked by tidal mud flats that extend many kilometers from the coast. An assault against the northern end of the island in the Taipei area would quickly turn into operations in urban terrain of a sort not likely to quickly produce decisive results. Similar difficulties would attend assaults in the southern area between Tainan and Kao-hsiung.

By process of elimination, the most attractive [though not most likely] target for an amphibious assault against Taiwan would be the coastal region between Tung-Hsiao and San-Wan. Midway between the northern Taipei urban agglomeration and the central populated region around Taichung, this coastal area is free of annoying mud-flats, and offers open terrain suitable for the build-up of a beach-head and subsequent decisive maneuver. A lodgement in this area would effective cut the island in half, and lay the foundation for subsequent operations to the north and south. Coincidentally, this area is roughly similar in size to the beach-head established by Allied forces during the Normandy amphibious assault of June 1944.

IDonT said:

D-Day vs Theoratical Invasion of Taiwan

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Excelllent analysis IDONT, perhaps one of the better ones I have seen.

Without being able to spend the time to accomplish significant attrition against the ROC I do not believe the PRC has the capability to successfully invade Taiwan at this point. Even if they were able to mount two divisions of amphibious troops (which I believe they conceivably could do), they do not have the means to adequately protect those troops during transit and landing.

If the PRC had 2-4 weeks of free reign, attriting ROC air and naval units to the point of air and sea dominance, they may have a chance...but I do not believe they would have more than a few days of such freedom before US air and naval assets (particularly subs) from Guam and then later CVN assets completely turned the tide.

Again, an excellent analysis and deserving of its own thread IMHO.

Jeff Head said:

Excelllent analysis IDONT, perhaps one of the better ones I have seen.

Without being able to spend the time to accomplish significant attrition against the ROC I do not believe the PRC has the capability to successfully invade Taiwan at this point. Even if they were able to mount two divisions of amphibious troops (which I believe they conceivably could do), they do not have the means to adequately protect those troops during transit and landing.

If the PRC had 2-4 weeks of free reign, attriting ROC air and naval units to the point of air and sea dominance, they may have a chance...but I do not believe they would have more than a few days of such freedom before US air and naval assets (particularly subs) from Guam and then later CVN assets completely turned the tide.

Again, an excellent analysis and deserving of its own thread IMHO.

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Errrr...I hate to steal IDon't's thunder but that's from Global Security ...sorry.

Regardless, this is still an excellent analysys. It really provides a template with which to judge the Taiwan situation. Of course, given the "attrition allowance" China's victory is almost assured. But I don't think that that is an option for reasons Jeff stated. D-Day was a close run thing; compare that to this analysis.

Finn McCool said:

Errrr...I hate to steal IDon't's thunder but that's from Global Security ...sorry.

Regardless, this is still an excellent analysys. It really provides a template with which to judge the Taiwan situation. Of course, given the "attrition allowance" China's victory is almost assured. But I don't think that that is an option for reasons Jeff stated. D-Day was a close run thing; compare that to this analysis.

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It's okay Finn.... that's why I included the link


Currently, I still don't believe that PLA has sufficient capability to invade Taiwan. Here is why:

Geography:
As Global Security has stated, the terrain of Taiwan is not conducive to amphibious assaults. Those that places that are will most likely be heavily defended. This problem is compounded by the heavy reliance of LST as the main landing force for the PLA. These ships need a certain type of beach (slowly sloping) to be able to deliver its cargo.

Lack of intelligence:
A military build up is not exactly hard to overlook. The moment the fleet is heading for Taiwan, the ROC forces will be heavily mobilized.

Defender's advantage:
Taiwan has many advantages that PLA has: shorter logistics line to adequately reinforce weakened lines, air to air combat is fought on its airspace (ejecting enemy pilots are captured, ejecting ROC pilots can be sent back to battle), terrain, etc.

To sum up:
The PLAN has the capability to land 1 heavy (armored) division plus 3 airborne (light brigade)(Assuming no losses from air and naval attacks). These forces will be outnumbered in the Island. How long will it take the PLAN ships to return to China, combat load the next wave, and return back? Can they do it in time before the 1st wave is pushed back through the sea?

This is not taking account losses suffered by the PLA in the attack. The ROC airforce is powerful with excellent AEW and command and control. Wrestling air superiority will not be easy. Furthermore, anti-ship missile strikes on the PLAN fleet will cause more losses and hinder its ability to logistically support the troops on the beach head.

Logistics is what its all about. The PLAN just don't have it for the types of operations we are talking about here.

This is intresting. It shows how this forum has matured in since it's inception.

Probally a year ago this type of thread would have started a small brush war among the forum members ending in a nuclear disaster.. But now a year latter we have intelligent discussion. Excellent.

Since it now appears that the PLAN will have probally two LPD's in a few years time what sort of air-cushioned, if any, landing craft will the 071 type ship have? I know we had a thread on this subject but I think no concrete information was produced. Any updates?...