History of South American nation inter-rivalry and arms buildup

The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 3

Argentine Forces
The Argentine armed forces had not fought a significant external war since 1934. One of the oddities of this war was that much of Argentina’s armed forces were organized along British lines, and much of their equipment was virtually identical to that of Britain.

Argentina was in the midst of a serious border dispute with Chile at the time, known as the Beagle Channel conflict. This meant that a significant faction of the nation’s forces and better trained and equipped troops were committed to defending against a very possible conflict with Chile. Also the two nations came to the brink of war in 1978. The conflict was averted by Papal intervention. However, border tensions where high and skirmished where not uncommon
Naval Forces

The Argentine Navy was mostly a mix of surplus US Navy vessels and ships bought either new or used from Britain.
Surface Forces

1. Carrier forces - The flagship of the Argentine Navy was the ARA (Armada de la República Argentina) 25 de Mayo, a Colossus class carrier formally of the Royal Navy. Unlike the powerful attack carriers in the US Navy, this small carrier had a tiny air group consisting of mostly some 16 A-4Q Skyhawk’s and 6 S-2E Trackers. Further, the ship had older radar and sensors and was nearing the end of her useful life. It would be reasonable to presume that Argentina maintained the carrier more for reasons of national prestige than for any genuine military value it had.


ARA 25 de Mayo

2. Cruiser - The ARA General Belgrano was formerly the (USS Phoenix CL-56 and the only vessel to survive the attack on Pearl Harbor without damage), a Brooklyn class light cruiser armed with five triple turrets of 6” guns. Updated with French MM38 Exocet anti-ship missiles, she had considerable anti-ship capability, and her gun armament could have been devastating to British forces ashore.


ARA General Belgrano

3. Destroyers and Corvettes
1. Type 42 Destroyer - Argentina owned two Type 42 guided missile destroyers virtually identical to the Sheffield class the British deployed to the Falkland/Malvinas. Armed with the Sea Dart missile system, ARA Hercules and Santisima Trinidad were primarily tasked as escorts for the ARA 25 de Mayo forming Task Group 79.1. These were by far the most modern ships in the Argentine fleet.


Type 42 Destroyer

2. Sumner/Gearing Destroyer - The ARA Hipolito Bouchard and Pierdrabuena were former US Sumner class destroyers. They were tasked to serve as escorts for the ARA General Belgrano forming Task Group 79.3.


Gearing Class Destroyer

3. D’Estienne_d’Orves Corvettes - Corvettes are smaller warships, slightly smaller than frigates. ARA Drummond, Guerrico, and Granville formed Task Group 79.4. These small ships were intended for inshore anti-submarine warfare and patrol. They were relatively modern ships, but not intended for long duration offshore operations.


4. Amphibious Forces - The primary amphibious warfare ship was the ARA Cabo San Antonio, a Tank Landing Ship, or LST built in Argentina based on the US Desoto County Class.
5. Miscellaneous craft - Argentina also operated several small patrol craft, many of which were former US Navy auxiliary tugs.
6. Auxiliaries and merchant craft- Much as Britain supplemented its forces with fleet auxiliaries and pressed merchant ships into service, Argentina used its own merchant fleet to support operations, as blockade runners, and some fishing vessels were used as spy trawlers to locate the British task force as it made its way south.

Submarine Force
1. The ARA San Luis was a modern German made Type 209 diesel electric submarine. A second Type 209 submarine, the ARA Salta was not operational at the time of the war, since it was still under construction. The Type 209 is a very quiet and advanced submarine they were one of the best diesel electric submarines at that time.

Type 209

2. The ARA Santa Fe was the former USS Catfish (SS-339), a US WWII fleet boat that had been modernize through the GUPPY program. The GUPPYs were long range boats best suited to blue water operations, but were already badly obsolete by the 1980s. They vessel was used to secretly transport special forces to coastal operations

Guppy Class Submarine

Air Forces
The various air arms of the Argentine military were to play a pivotal role in the Falkland/Malvinas campaign and their order of battle will be the subject of our next instalment of this post.

Ground Forces
The Argentine Army was organized and equipped largely along the same lines as the British Army. Its officers and senior NCOs were long service professionals, but more than half of its enlisted personnel were short service draftees. Annually, year groups of 19 year old men were called up for 24 months of service. The short period of active duty meant that few lower enlisted troops had the experience to be considered properly trained. Basic training in most armies may only take a couple months, but it takes a couple years to make a truly proficient infantryman.

Further, the threat of war with Chile over the Beagle crisis meant that many of Argentina’s best units (volunteer army) were unavailable to serve in the Falkland/Malvinas. So instead of forces trained for cold wet climates in remote areas, units from northern, tropical Argentina were sent to the islands. Further, because of a lack of shipping, virtually all troops were flown into the Falkland/Malvinas. This meant that while large numbers of troop units were on hand, very few of those units had the vehicles, clothing and equipment they needed. In essence, it was an unbalanced force. Large numbers of infantrymen without transport or heavy supporting arms are almost more a liability than an effective combat force. This is because they are not trained as infantry, but as mobile forces. Without the element of mobility these troops are now static and cannot be fully utilized.

The initial seizure of the Falkland/Malvinas was made by a Special Forces units followed by a force of roughly 300 Argentine marines in 20 LVTP-7 amphibious assault vehicles. They quickly overwhelmed the 84 Royal Marines stationed on the islands

Argentine Special Forces guard British prisoners on Stanly Beach[/I]


But as it became clear that Britain intended to regain control of the islands. The junta deployed to the islands roughly a divisional sized force consisting of:
1. The 3rd Mechanized Brigade
2. The 10th Mechanized Brigade
As noted, since these troops had to be flown in, they left their vehicles behind, and in effect were foot mobile only.
Supporting artillery units of the 3rd Artillery group were also deployed, using towed 105mm howitzers, and a handful of 155mm howitzers.

Various support units were also deployed, as well as significant numbers of Argentine Air Force troops to operate aircraft and air defense units at Stanley airport and outlying air fields.

NEXT PART FOUR: ARGENTINE AIR FORCE


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The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 4

Argentine air forces – Air Force, Naval Aviation and Army Aviation
The primary air arms of Argentina were the Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina or FAA) and the Naval Air Arm (Comando de Aviación Naval Argentina – COAN), and the Argentine Army (Comando de Aviación del Ejército Argentino). While Argentine airpower was robust by the standards of South America, and outnumbered the available British forces, it suffered from significant deficiencies in modern equipment and armaments. The possibility of conflict with Chile resulted in the best and roughly half of Argentina’s airpower being unavailable for operations against British forces. The primary focus of the FAA, in this conflict, had been on providing close air support to Argentine ground forces in the field. Only the attack squadrons of the Navy had been trained for the anti-shipping role. Further, as a result of an arms embargo in place over human rights abuses of the military junta, lack of spare parts caused poor availability of aircraft. The FAA had no precision guided or stand-off weapons available. The Exocet missile, operated by the COAN was in extremely short supply (only 5 available at the time). Sinking ships at sea is hard enough without the proper tools. Doing so with older equipment and ill-suited weapons is nearly impossible, however it was done.

The FAA
Fixed Wing Tactical Aircraft
1. Fighters - The FAA operated two main types of fighter aircraft
1. Dassault Mirage IIIEA 19 on the books (17 on hand) - The French built Mirage was a Mach 2 aircraft, optimized for speed. It had short range, and while it could turn well, extended turning engagements quickly bled energy (due to the delta wind design), leaving them slower and vulnerable. These units were attached to the 8th Air Brigade.


Mirage IIIEA

2. IAI Dagger (30 on hand)- The Israeli built Dagger was a virtual copy of the Mirage IIIA, though it was optimized for the ground attack role, and had slightly better range. These units were attached to the 6th Air Brigade.


Dagger (Mirage III copy)

2. Attack Aircraft/Bombers
1. Douglas A-4B Skyhawk (approximately 35 on hand) - Surplus US Navy Skyhawk’s, operated from shore as ground attack aircraft. An excellent design for its time. These units were attached to the 5th Air Brigade.

A-4 Skyhawk(naval aviation)

2. Douglas A-4C Skyhawk’s (15 on hand) - very similar to the A-4B, and also surplus US Navy. Operated from ashore. These units were attached to the 4th Air Brigade.
3. English Electric Canberra B. Mk62 (8 on hand) - The British built Canberra was one of the first tactical jet bombers. It had good range, but relatively poor speed and maneuverability. These units were attached to the 2nd Air Brigade.
4. FMA IA-58 Pucara (approximately 24 deployed to the Falklands) - The Argentine’s designed and built the Pucara. It was intended for close air support of ground troops in counter-insurgency warfare. A very capable and robust aircraft in its intended role, it was similar in concept and capability to the US OV-10A Bronco, though of a very different configuration. Many of these aircraft would returned to base full of holes and were patched up and resumed flying.

FMA IA-58 Pucara

Fixed Wing Transport Aircraft- Attached to the 1st Air Brigade
1. Tactical Transports
1. Lockheed C-130H (7 on hand) - The Hercules was the primary tactical lifter of the FAA. Shortages of other aircraft also saw the Hercules forced into other roles, such as maritime search.
2. Lockheed KC-130H (2 on hand) - Both these Hercules were configured as air-to-air refueling tankers, and were dedicated to that role in support of strike operations.

2. Non-tactical Transports
1. Boeing 707 - The FAA operated 3 707s, both as transports moving troops inside Argentina for transshipment to the Falklands, and later as search aircraft to locate the British task force.
2. Fokker F28 - Six short haul F28 jetliners were used.
3. Fokker F27 - Twelve twin turboprop short haul transports supported army operations.
4. In addition, several Boeing 737 and BAC 1-11 jetliners from the Argentine national airline provided airlift support inside Argentina and to Port Stanley, Falklands before the British task force began operations.
5. Escuadron Fenix- Approximately 30 small business jets were formed as Escuadron Fenix to perform deception operations against the British task forces Combat Air Patrol.
Helicopters - The FAA operated 2 Boeing CH-47C Chinooks and 2 Bell 212 Twin Hueys. Other helicopters in the war were operated by the Argentine Army or Navy.

The Argentine Navy (COAN)
Carrier Aircraft
1. Dassault Super Etendard (5 on hand, but one cannibalized for spares) - A carrier capable light strike plane. The Argentine’s had only just taken delivery of the Super Etendards, as replacements for their older A-4Qs. Shipments of the Super Etendard’s primary anti-ship weapon, the AM39 Exocet, were halted, and there were only five missiles on hand to arm them.

Dassault Super Etendard

2. Douglas A-4Q Skyhawk (12 on hand) - Very similar to the A-4B/C Skyhawk’s of the FAA, these Skyhawk’s retained the ability to operate from Argentina’s aircraft carrier, the ARA 25 de Mayo. They did not have any provision for precision stand-off weapons (long range missiles like the Exocet). Instead, they were armed with conventional gravity bombs.
3. Grumman S-2E Tracker (6 on hand) - These slow, piston powered anti-submarine aircraft were designed to hunt enemy subs from the Argentine carrier. They had little anti-shipping capability.
Land Based Aircraft - The COAN also operated several types of land based aircraft. Most contributed some to the war.
1. Aermacchi MB.339A (6 on hand) - A jet trainer aircraft, this jet was also used in the light ground attack role.

Aermacchi MB.339A

2. Beechcraft T-34 Mentor - 4 Mentors were stationed in the Falkland/Malvinas, intended to be used as liaison and light attack aircraft armed with machine guns and light rockets.
3. Lockheed SP-2H Neptune - The two Neptune’s, both surplus US Navy aircraft, were the ARA’s primary long range maritime patrol aircraft. Due to failures caused by the US arms embargo, both were withdrawn from service by mid-May. The loss of dedicated long range aerial surveillance of the waters around the Falkland/Malvinas would be a great blow to the Argentine war effort.
4. The COAN also operated a handful of transport aircraft, such as the Lockheed L-188 Electra and the Fokker F28.
Helicopters - The COAN operated just over a dozen helicopters, including Sikorsky SH-3 Sea Kings, the Westland Lynx and the Aérospatiale Alouette light helicopter.
The Argentine Army Air Service- The Argentine Army operated Chinook and Huey helicopters in the Falkland/Malvinas, as well as Aérospatiale SA300 Pumas, and Agusta A109s. They had little impact on the naval war.
Ill equipped and trained for the anti-shipping mission, the attack aircraft of FAA would nonetheless show the greatest courage and esprit de corps of all the Argentine services, and as we shall see, can very close to defeating the Royal Navy with just simple iron bombs.

Next we’ll look at an abbreviated timeline of significant events in the naval war, and then we’ll start the series on the operations and lessons to be learned.

NEXT PART FIVE: TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS


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Mirage, wondering if you can write more about the ground combat of the Falkland/Malvinas War. Much have been written about air/naval combat, but the ground action in that war is relatively ignored. thanks

shen said:

Mirage, wondering if you can write more about the ground combat of the Falkland/Malvinas War. Much have been written about air/naval combat, but the ground action in that war is relatively ignored. thanks

Click to expand...

Hello Shen. In fact you will actual get exactly that. I am in the process of writing another series that specifically goes over the ground campaign have it ready in April 2015. I will also go over some portions of the ground campaign here but to a lesser extent.

Please take a look at the beginning of this thread, since it provides some interesting insight on the dynamics between the different South American nations.

http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/mil...n-nation-inter-rivalry-arms-buildup-6905.html

As I mentioned in the beginning of this post (part 1) I was worried that it would cause a heated debate among some of the forum members. So I tried to write this as neutral as possible from a fact point of view with none or little opinion (bias).
Thanks and enjoy!


I will now get back to bottling my Malbec

The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 5
Timeline of significant events

Here is an abbreviated timeline of significant events during the war. In the next couple of installments, we’ll take a look at the operational significance of these events.

All Dates 1982
2 April - Argentine forces invade the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

3 April - Argentine forces occupy South Georgia- UN Security Council condemns invasion, calls for removal of Argentine forces and for a peaceful solution.

4 April - HMS Conqueror, a nuclear attack submarine sets sail from England toward the Falkland/Malvinas. Two more sail within days.

5 April - HMS Invincible and Hermes sail from England toward the Falkland/Malvinas. The carriers form the core of the British task force.

9 April - SS Canberra, a civilian passenger liner “taken into service” as a troopship, sails with the first wave of ground forces.

12 April - Britain announces a 200 mile “Total Exclusion Zone” or TEZ around the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

18 April - The main body of the British task force sails from Ascension Island, roughly 2000 miles from the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

April 25/26 - Royal Marines and SAS from a small, two-ship task group retake South Georgia from a token Argentine force.

1 May - The war begins in earnest. The main body of the task force arrives on station in the TEZ. Large scale Argentine air raids attack the task force. Two British Vulcan bombers, staged out of Ascension Island make the first air raid on Port Stanley airfield in the islands. Harriers from the task force’s carriers make their first raids on the Falkland/Malvinas. Small parties of SAS and SBS troops are landed in the Falkland/Malvinas for reconnaissance missions.

2 May - Deadliest single day of the war. ARA General Belgrano sunk by torpedoes from HMS Conqueror.

4 May - HMS Sheffield struck by Exocet missile. Burns, abandoned, later sinks.

14 May - SAS troops raid Pebble Island

19 May - 21 SAS troopers killed in helicopter crash.

21 May - First landings of the main body at San Carlos Bay. Large Argentine air raids. HMS Ardent sunk.

23 May - HMS Antelope sunk

24 May - British amphibious ships RFA* Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot severely damaged by bombs.

25 May - HMS Coventry sunk, HMS Broadsword severely damaged, MV Atlantic Conveyor struck by Exocet missile.

27/28 May - Battle of Goose Green/Darwin. MV Atlantic Conveyor sinks.

8 June - RFA Sir Galahad destroyed, RFA Sir Tristam severely damaged in landings at Bluff Cove.

12 June - HMS Glamorgan severely damaged by shore launched Exocet missile.

14 June - British forces occupy Stanley, effective end of hostilities.



NEXT PART SIX: THE INVASION



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The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 6

The Invasion

Let’s take a look at some of the major operations in the Falkland/Malvinas listed above.

2 April - Argentine forces invade the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.
The Argentine Navy was the major force behind the invasion of the Falklands. At a time of a degrading economy, major domestic unrest against the military junta, and the potential for a shooting war with Chile over disputed territories in the Beagle Channel, the ruling junta expected the seizure of the Falkland/Malvinas to be perceived as more of a diplomatic matter than an actual military conquest. The initial occupation was reasonably well planned, but the follow on actions displayed a disbelief that the British would actually fight for the islands.

The initial invasion of the islands was carried out both by special operations forces landed from a destroyer, a submarine (mostly to reconnoiter the main invasion beaches) and by Argentine marine infantry landed via amphibious assault vehicles launched from an LST similar the old US De Soto County class. About 100 special operations troops, and 300 or so marines landed. They were opposed by a force of about 84 Royal Marines. The normal garrison of the Falklands was a token force of 40 Royal Marines, but the invasion happened just as one force was being replaced by another garrison, so the force on hand was double the normal.

The British guessed correctly that the invasion was coming, and alerted the defenders. They failed to properly guess where the landings would come, however, and the bulk of the garrison was out of place to resist. In any event, it was unlikely that the garrison, greatly outnumbered, with only small arms and the most token anti-armor weapons, could have long withstood the Argentines. Having said that, they did resist. Early on, the message was sent that British forces would fight. But there would be no fight to the death. Soon after the initial clashes, the Argentines had seized Government House in Stanley, and Governor Hunt, the senior British official in the islands, arranged a surrender. There were no British casualties in the invasion, and only one Argentine fatality. Governor Hunt and the Royal Marine garrison would be evacuated to Argentina, and then via Uruguay, to be quickly repatriated to Britain.

The Argentine assault showed the flexibility of what U.S. Marines today would call “Operational Maneuver From the Sea” or OMFS. The attacking force, having control of the seas surrounding the objective, had the option to maneuver their force out of contact with the British, and choose their time and place of attack so as to avoid his defenses, and strike from an unexpected and undefended direction. Thus, freedom of maneuver at sea gives the attacker freedom of maneuver ashore. Had the Argentine forces landed against the prepared defenses of the garrison, they still likely would have prevailed, but the cost, both to them and the British, would have been higher.

The vast majority of human population and thus militarily significant objectives are located near a coastline. Ports, river inlets, cities, manufacturing and transportation hubs are abundant near the sea. Not surprisingly, the defenses of the world tend to be concentrated near these points as well. But the coastlines of the world are so vast that not every inch can be strongly defended. Indeed, most cannot be defended at all. This gives an attacker an opportunity to bypass defended positions, and strike a vulnerable location. That is why it is important for the defender to have a mobile force that can react to the location of the land zone to thwart any operation and limit advancement by the enemy.

To be sure, this isn’t always the case. In France in 1944, almost the entire coast was defended to one degree or another. The choice of Normandy as the invasion site was a deliberate choice to avoid the far stronger defenses in the Pas de Calais.

In the Pacific campaigns of WWII, many objectives were so small that there was virtually no point that wasn’t strongly defended. Any assault would almost by definition be a frontal assault. Yet even here, judicious use of the freedom of maneuver at sea meant that many island strongholds of the Japanese were simply bypassed, and other locations seized instead. Rabaul is the classic example of this, but several times a similar tactic was used in the New Guinea campaign. As you can see, control of the sea is often key to control of the land. By extension of this thinking then control of the air provides control of the seas

Britain, having lost the Falkland/Malvinas for lack of control of the sea (and air), was determined to regain the islands. To do so, she would need control of the seas surrounding them. But before she could do that, she had to deny that control to Argentina.

4 April - HMS Conqueror, a nuclear attack submarine, sorties from England toward the Falkland/Malvinas. Two more sail within days.

Few vessels are more suited to denying an enemy the freedom of the seas than the nuclear powered attack submarine. The SSN is the ultimate stealth fighter. It goes about unseen by eye or radar, and can only be heard by the most sensitive sonars, and then only at a modest range. A submarine will not prevent the enemy from getting near your coastal areas, but it will make him pay dearly for that proximity. Not only did the deployment of SSNs give the British the ability to deny sea communications to the Argentine forces, they could perform other important roles. They could intercept communications, eavesdrop on Argentine airfields (this let them give some warning to the fleet when airstrikes might be underway), land SAS and SBS troops to perform reconnaissance, and even perform reconnaissance of the islands themselves via periscope photography.

When the British declared an exclusion zone around the Falkland/Malvinas, a large part of the enforcement of that zone was to be on the shoulders of the sub skippers.

5 April - HMS Invincible and Hermes sail from England toward the Falkland/Malvinas. The carriers form the core of the British task force.

Since World War II, it has been clear to every modern navy that you cannot control the seas if you cannot control the skies above them. The sinking of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales on 10 December, 1941 drove this lesson home to every sailor.

The aircraft carrier is the means to provide this control of the air over a fleet. In our modern usage, most US carriers have been used more for “power projection,” that is, strikes against land targets, than “sea control,” or controlling the skies above the fleet. But that doesn’t mean the need to control the skies is obsolete. It just means we haven’t faced an opponent lately with the airpower to challenge us. Unfortunately for Britain, the small Harrier squadrons of the task force would barely be enough to provide a bubble of protection over the main body of the fleet. And as good as the Harrier was, it wasn’t really an air superiority fighter.

For many years, it was accepted dogma that carrier forces could not operate within range of enemy shore based airpower. The advantage would lie with the enemy, and losses of carriers would be prohibitive. But battles such as the “Great Marianas Turkey shoot” led to a new school of thought. Carrier forces could operate against land based air forces, under certain circumstances. But the risk would be higher. Hit and run raids would exploit the ability to maneuver at sea. After all, the carriers knew the enemy airfields weren’t going to move. But the enemy ashore would first have to find the carriers before they could counterattack. And that’s not always the easiest task.

In this case, the war would ultimately come down to who could control the seas around the Falkland/Malvinas, and that meant it came down to who could wrest control of the skies above them. We will take a deeper look at the operations of the task force and the Argentine struggle for air and sea superiority.


NEXT PART SEVEN: TASK FORCE PREPARATION



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The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 7

Task Force Preparation

Let’s continue with our look at some of the major events of the and their significance.


9 April - SS Canberra, a civilian passenger liner “taken up into service” as a troopship, sails with the first wave of ground forces.

I’ve been referring to the “task force” as a single entity, but in truth, it was actually a series of task groups, each with its own special role. Major elements included the submarines sent as a screen, the two light carriers with their escorts, the underway replenishment group, and the amphibious forces together with their escorts.

The British amphibious forces, while a good deal more robust than those of Argentina, were still too small to carry the large numbers of troops needed. After the initial invasion, the Argentines had replaced the initial invasion force with a vastly larger garrison composed mostly of conscripted troops, in total, a force of roughly divisional size. We’ll talk more about the shortcomings of this conscript force later, but clearly, a large British landing force would be needed.


Canberra during landing operations

Since the British did not have enough troop lift available via their amphibious landing ships, they therefore pressed into service several civilian liners. The British government had subsidized the construction of these ships, with the understanding that when needed, they would be available. This practice was hardly new, and was called “Ships Taken Up from Trade” or STUFTs. Indeed, most US attack transports in World War II had originally been intended as passenger liners, and were pressed into service via a very similar mechanism. But in those days, there existed enough time to modify the transports into actual attack transports, each carrying roughly a battalion of troops, and enough landing craft to land the battalion in one wave. In the case of the SS Canberra, there was no opportunity to perform more than the most modest changes, mostly to cram in as many troops as possible.

Rather than landing her forces directly ashore, after the amphibious ships had made their first landings, they would shuttle to the Canberra well offshore, transfer aboard the troops, and make follow up landings. This piecemeal approach to amphibious landings invited the destruction of the previously landed forces, but it was better than nothing. This lengthy process was one reason it was important that the British make their landings well away from the main strength of the Argentine positions. Any significant counterattack by the Argentine forces would take time, and with a little luck, the British would be able to land a sufficient number of troops to defeat that counterattack. What actually occurred is that Argentine forces failed to mount a ground counterattack, instead relying on the strength of their static positions around Stanley, and the attacks upon British shipping by their air forces. More on that later.

Had the British not had a robust merchant marine to call upon, finding enough shipping to carry the large ground force needed might have been an insurmountable challenge. In addition to troop ships, cargo/container ships were needed to move the vehicles and supplies for the force, and tankers and oilers were needed just to keep the ships at sea fueled. Small transport ships are needed to move equipment ashore from large ships when sufficient wharf size and space is not available. This is a big less to learn; that no nation can have a strong Navy without a strong merchant marine to call upon.


12 April - Britain announces a 200 mile “Total Exclusion Zone” or TEZ around the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

Even before the first submarine arrived on station, the British gave fair warning that any shipping in an area 200 miles around the Falkland/Malvinas was fair game. British and neutral shipping wisely gave the area a very wide berth.

The announcement was a bit of excessive, but not an unreasonable one. The British could hardly initiate unrestricted sea and air warfare around the globe, sinking civilian and neutral ships left and right. But denying Argentina sea access to the Falkland/Malvinas, either through ships of their own navy, their own merchant shipping, or via the shipping of a third party nation, was a legitimate course of war. The TEZ was of reasonable size that no legitimate shipping going about its lawful commerce would be unduly inconvenienced in its navigation. By announcing this exclusion zone, the British in effect told everyone that anything in those waters was fair game, and liable to being sunk.

The initial enforcement of the TEZ fell upon the nuclear attack submarines dispatched to the Falkland/Malvinas. On the one hand, trying to track every possible contact in a circle 400 miles across is a big job for just a handful of submarines. On the other hand, if you were a merchant skipper who had no way of detecting a submarine except serving as a target for its torpedoes, the thought of cruising in those waters was less than appealing.

Of course, the British subs that arrived on station had more to do than simply enforce the TEZ. They also had to perform reconnaissance of the waters around the islands, gather hydrographic data, gather intelligence on Argentine shipping outside the TEZ, localize Argentine navy patrol areas, perform signals intelligence gathering, and eventually land reconnaissance parties ashore. In the event, actually looking for shipping in the TEZ was more of an activity done between “real jobs” than a primary mission.

Incredibly, Argentina failed to take advantage of this. The follow up to the initial invasion shows that Argentina had given little thought to the possibility of a significant military response. Argentina poured thousands of men into the islands as a garrison, but virtually all of them were flown in by air. But since Argentina was still confronted with the possibility of conflict with Chile, their best light infantry forces, those trained for cold weather operations, were deployed to the border with Chile. The troops actually sent to the islands came from more temperate regions and where conscripts not part of the professional volunteer army. Further, they were motorized and mechanized forces. But since they deployed by aircraft, they came without their armored vehicles. With the exception of a handful of armored cars, and about 100 trucks, the Argentine forces in the Falkland/Malvinas had no mobility. This also meant they would be fighting without the supporting fire of their armor. The islands, for the most part are large portions of which were little more than peat bogs, might not be ideal armor country. However, the lack of firepower and mobility meant the British would have time and space to maneuver against the Argentine infantry (which were in static positions) when the time came.


Argentine C-130 on the islands

So why didn’t Argentina send in the troops armor? Supporting documentation is difficult to find, but my personal opinion is that because they did not anticipate the British reaction, they had not prepared a full and complete plan to defend the islands. Had they planned in advance for a British invasion to retake the islands, they would have made arrangements to requisition merchant shipping to load and transport the mechanized infantry equipment to the islands. Stuffing a load of soldiers onto a C-130 is logistical child’s play compared to finding the shipping and equipment to move a mechanized brigade by sea and disembark it in a primitive port. But it could have been done. Indeed, by the 3rd of April, Argentina should have begun to glean that if it wanted to keep the Falkland/Malvinas, it would have to fight for them. And yet, other than some very modest logistical shipping, such as one or two tankers for fuel, little was done. Argentina had more than a week of absolutely uncontested control of the seas, and yet failed to use that time and freedom of navigation to improve their defenses in the islands. Even after the putative announcement of the TEZ, Argentina had the ability to at least attempt seaborne reinforcement, but made no attempts to do so. That shortsightedness would leave the garrison on the islands terribly vulnerable and with no tactical maneuver capability whatsoever. Just 30 to 40 APCs with 20mm auto cannons could have made the difference when English force landed in San Carlos. The English after all where in a time constrain (onset of winter in the South Atlantic) and the supply line that could not keep up with the amount of fuel, food and ammunition for a protracted engagement. The English needed to win the war quickly and Argentina had the ability to protract that engagement. Basically the lack of planning and forethought (on many levels) by the Argentine high command cost them the war.


NEXT PART EIGHT: TASK FORCE LOGISTICS



I will now get back to bottling my Malbec

The inactions seemed to be way too incompetent, I wonder if the Argentinians had been using false intelligence, which gave them a strong conviction that the British weren't actually going to seriously attack the island?

wtlh said:

The inactions seemed to be way too incompetent, I wonder if the Argentinians had been using false intelligence, which gave them a strong conviction that the British weren't actually going to seriously attack the island?

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The main lack of foresight by the high command was the underestimating the response by Britain. Since Britain was in the process of reducing the size of the fleet and other force,s Argentina had given little thought to the possibility of a significant military response. Therefore no follow through on placing a garrison on the islands that could repel an invasion. There was some intense negotiations taking place and it was thought (incorrectly so) that a peaceful settlement would take place. After all no British blood was shed in the takeover. When it was realized that England was serious about retaking the islands Argentina poured thousands of troops into the islands as a garrison, but virtually all of them were flown in by air, since the nuclear submarines where already patrolling the area around the islands. But since Argentina was still confronted with the possibility of conflict with Chile, their best light infantry forces, those trained for cold weather operations (all volunteer and professional), were deployed to the border with Chile.


I will now get back to bottling my Malbec

The Falkland/Malvinas War, or the War of the South Atlantic, Part 8

Task Force Logistics

18 April - The main body of the British task force sails from Ascension Island, roughly 2000 miles from the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.
From Great Britain to the Falklands/Malvinas is roughly 8,000 miles. Even with robust supporting elements, few if any fleets can operate that far from a support base. Indeed, never in the history of naval warfare has it been attempted. British task force elements instead staged from the British possession at Ascension Island. Ascension Island served as the forward base for the task force. The task force dropped anchor here to organize, plan, resupply, fill bunkers, and prepare for the arduous task ahead.

Modern warships have a range of roughly 3,000 to 5,000 miles. While that range can be extended by underway refueling, there was no possible way the fleet’s oilers could travel from the theater of operations to Britain and back in time to replenish the fleet. Instead, point-to-point tankers would traverse from Britain to Ascension, and refill the fleet oilers. Those ships would then shuttle to the fleet, and replenish them at sea.


HMS Ark Royal being refueled by the Wave Knight

Even fleets with the most robust service forces must have access to forward operating bases.
As the US Marines and the US Navy spent the 1920 and 1930s struggling to define their war plans against a future war with Japan, they soon discerned that seizing forward bases would be key. The Marines, prior to this, had only the vaguest mission description. But as the possibility of war in the Pacific loomed, clarity was shone upon them. The Marines would assault to secure forward operating bases from which the Navy would utilize air power and supply bases to defeat Japanese forces. And that was pretty much how they were utilized in WWII.


Wideawake Airfield, Ascension Island

The British in 1982, as a result of their previous Empire, had no need to forcibly seize Ascension Island. But it served much the same purpose. If only as a place to drop a hook, and secure place for a night, it was invaluable. But it was more than that. Even sailors must call a port home. And Ascension Island served as the forward most airbase the British had access to in the war. Critical cargo could be airlifted there, and long range maritime patrol aircraft operated from there. If the maritime patrol planes failed to pinpoint the enemy fleet, they at least showed where the way was clear.

Had the British not had ready access to a secure forward base, it is difficult to see how they could have been successful in retaking the islands.



NEXT PART NINE: ISLAND DEFENSES



I will now get back to bottling my Malbec