You're talking about the past, I'm talking about the present.
Come on, I'll apply your logic. Let's say Russia builds this crossing structure with concrete pillars, do you really think they're going to stay intact with Ukraine being inert about it? If they have already managed to attack crossing points when there was evacuation of civilians in Kherson with ferries that are mobile vehicles, there is not the slightest doubt that by creating a crossing bridge using civil engineering equipment that is stationary, Ukraine would duly have one more target to be directed, by the way, with Himars, the chances of success are almost 100% of success. How would this affect Russia's long-term logistics?
I agree. But what about the AFU attacks? Himars has enough range to hit all these points. How would that affect long-term logistics? By the way, what you are proposing here is an unusual effort of logistical structure in order to keep the troops resupplying on the right bank, the very fact of having to transport these structures and they fit perfectly in the Dnieper, would still be a tremendous logistical effort, even pre-assembled structure.
Continuing logistical support is difficult in any combat. In watercourse crossing operations, assault forces are separated from their support elements by the river. As a result, it is necessary to emphasize the continuity of logistical support and, at the same time, minimize congestion in the crossing area. The planning of logistical support must take into account the increasing needs in watercourse transposition operations. Plans are made in advance and plans must seek to mitigate the consequences:
(1) the effects of loss of supplies, equipment and personnel, fundamental to the operation;
(2) the delay in the assembly operation and in the construction of bridges and other vital structures for the transposition;
(3) enemy interference with surface travel and
by air, in the rear areas and in the crossing area;
(4) the limited number of highways.
If you apply the logic to the case in Kherson, you will see that from option 2) to 4), the Russians would have to continually worry because of the widespread Ukrainian interference, since the construction of bridges is only started as long as you manage to drive away from the enemy the selected places, by any means, the observed fire of enemy artillery, which is the case of Kherson,, normally such condition is obtained by the conquest of the regions that prevent the enemy to carry out the artillery fires. Obviously this will go into other details from the employment of Russia's labor in Ukraine to effectively other types of analysis to arrive at common sense, but what is in the central debate is that the way you express it, it would be impossible for Russia to maintain.
In fact, some a little less, in the range of 450 meters. But I return to the previous question, you are applying the logic of 6 months ago, where they had enough time to create solutions for crossing.
Would the AFU artillery be inert on this? Also, how many redundant crossing points are needed? How many specialized vehicles are needed? Allied to all this, will Russian artillery support all these redundancies? What about the air defense apparatus to create this redundancy? And what about logistical support at all these redundant points? Do you know that maintenance is intensified in the preparation of transpositions? Will you have enough maintenance units for all these crossing areas? Whether for communications equipment and weapons that require additional efforts? By the way, let's say that they actually create this crossing width and many redundant points, how will the logistical support facilities that are staggered as far forward as possible to support the operation look like? The AFU will not attack? Will all this be covered by Russia's air defense? If the AFU can attack military installations in the rear, how prudent would that be in order to create a necessary foothold with extensive air defense coverage against the AFU? Did you see the state of the Antonovsky bridge even though it was under air cover from the Russian defense system? How much would this be possible over a wide range of redundant traversals?
Here's the error. I was talking about the present, you about the past. But again, it returns to my previous questions. Would they all be intact in the face of the precision of the Ukrainian artillery system? What other solutions?
