The War in the Ukraine

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
Mobile bridge vehicles are offensive, we are talking about defensive. They dont need those specialized vehicles, just set the sections and anchor them as appropriate, anchor them to the existing bridge pier (which is what they eventually did). You dont even really need floating sections, Just start sinking concrete caissons as piers for the shallow depths and use floating sections in the middle. When you are on the defensive and had over 6 month these are options that should have been tried within weeks.
Of course they need these specialized vehicles, as the Antonovsky bridge is unable to be used to transfer heavy equipment, this doesn't work even if Russia sinks the sections, all the bridge sections would need to be reinforced with the specialized vehicles to be able to successfully crossing of military equipment and materials would be unusable without reinforcement even if barriers were placed in the most affected sections so as not to apply pressure points in the affected places, as the entire structure and sections are no longer transferable to military equipment.

Look:
It is noted that the two main road bridges leading to the Russian-occupied territory on the west bank of the Dnipro in Kherson region “are now probably out of use for the purposes of substantial military resupply”.
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They are using pontoon ferry. Something quite different from what you claim as a "bridge" that was your initial argument.

Another thing, engineering vehicles are not only used in offensive cases, but also in defensive cases, as tactical bridges are the first to be targets of an enemy artillery campaign, this you can find in any manual of any army in the world, because they know that there will be the main crossing point and there will be a huge concentration of enemy artillery fire and even air bombs if there are not adequate air defense resources in the area.
You're acting like this is Anzio, the Russians had 40km to the river in most places and the beachhead wouldnt be so limited if they had extra bridges and backup bridges. This is complicity and incompetence
hahahaha
Take the map, young man. See the most likely locations to be used as crossing points, creating a crossing point is not something to be stipulated as simply as you believe, it takes three field commanders to complete a course crossing of water retracting and various other operational needs to be worked out to create the best spots. One example, do you really think they will create crossing points between Berislav and L'vove, points so hardly usable as crossing points and so close to where the Ukrainian troops are? Of course not.
There isnt a delaying action, this is just them leaving. Ukrainian would be forced to fight in urban Kherson, the best terrain for a defender if this is a delaying action.
Trading space for time is just that, a trade. Forcing Ukrainians to 3v1 a defensive position is a good trade, forcing them to spend 130k missiles on a 12k pontoon section is a good trade, downing a SU24 and losing one bridge-layer destroyed is a good trade. Leaving the entire western bank is not a good trade.
Them coming out is a delaying action.

Russia in this war tried in every way to avoid urban warfare, either in offensive mode and, now we are seeing them avoiding being in defensive mode, this is clearly because they know they will have huge casualties and if they employ small troops in the city, they will be quickly eliminated because they are completely outnumbered. Can they inflict casualties on the enemy? Undoubtedly, but at the cost of their own strength.

I realized that the Russian military almost looks like a European military from the times before European kings managed to assert their authority over regional lords. Before then kings had a little part of their country under their direct control. Even though they were the sovereigns of the other parts of their countries, they weren't actually managing the lands. When they needed soldiers, most of the army was mobilized, sent and, sometimes, even led by the local lords and nobilities. To give a popular culture reference to describe how armies were raised, think of the Seven Kingdoms from the Game of Thrones.
The concentration of martial power under central governments happened mostly after the Thirty Years' War and then the French Revolution. Nowadays, almost every national government holds a monopoly over martial power and has a standing national military. That national military commands a vast majority of the country's martial power. You don't see modern nations clumping together a lot of different regional armed organizations to wage war.

Now let's look at the Russian forces in Ukraine:
- Russian Armed Forces. The standing national military of Russia.
- Rosgvardiya. It is like a gendarmerie but is uniquely independent of the national military and ministries. It is effectively a second military.
- LPR and DNR armies. The militaries of recently annexed de-facto republics. Separate from the Russian Armed Forces.
- Various police forces from Russia. I have no idea who is commanding them.
- Militias from various parts of Ukraine. Again, I have no idea who is commanding them.
- Chechen forces. Another military force from Russia that is independent from the Russian national military. But this time, it is raised, trained, and commanded by a local governor.
- Wagner and a lot of other mercenaries. Largely independent from the Russian Armed Forces.

Russophiles here, I am sorry but this is not how a modern nation wages war. This is a widely inefficient organization. It makes coordinated action and uniformity impossible. This is how military forces looked until the late-1700s. I am not sure how Russian Federation ended up like this. The results are easily observable, though.
Russia is a federation, the name of the country defines it, Russian Federation.

Also, I don't know why use the earlier European example when Russia itself at the time of the Empire was also in the same kind of military organization as the Europe you mentioned. An example, Suvorov was under a Russian army that differed little from other European monarchies, the weapons were the same and the organization identical.

The fact is that Russia has always used irregular troops to wage its wars, at the time of the Empire, the cavalry was composed of irregulars, the traditional Cossacks who are also in Ukraine now, the most famous Cossack knights were those of the Don who could muster in the order of 15,000, he used it for reconnaissance and rearguard security, with a few incursions on the enemy's lines of communication to unsettle him. There were other irregular units that imprinted the Russian Army with its most striking originality composed of Tatars, Kalmyks, Bachkirs, Muslims (today Chechnya) among others, all used in 1812 against Napoleon as extreme resources, in World War II and other wars.

Coming back to the present, most of what you mentioned is already under the command and control of Russian forces, so coordinated action is not a case to be applied here, the 1st (Donetsk) and 2nd (Luhansk) Army Corps are under the command of the 8th CAA since the beginning of the war, for example, General Andrey Mordvichev was personally with Kadyrov in Mariupol, noting that he was in operational command of all units stationed there, from the regular Russian forces, Chechens and the 1st (Donetsk ) Army Corps. The only evidence here is that the mobilized LDNR forces which are the second largest force after the regular Russian forces are underequipped and had the highest death rate during the war.

Speaking of uniformity, what is being achieved with the mobilization, whether due to the number of casualties of irregulars or regulars, this will certainly bring more uniform national character, in addition, the amount mobilized totally triples the forces employed pre-invasion and covers comfortably the total irregular forces used. Obviously they will still count on the participation of irregulars in missions, but the demand for certain types of missions will clearly change with the arrival of newly mobilized troops.

Also, if you think that modern wars only occur from the perspective of uniformity, look at the case of the Gulf War, where Coalition Arab troops were used with their own general, Khalid bin Sultan Al Saud who was the equivalent of the Norman Schwarzkopf and was on an equal footing with the American general being responsible for +150,000 of the coalition forces.
 

RedMetalSeadramon

Junior Member
Registered Member
Of course they need these specialized vehicles, as the Antonovsky bridge is unable to be used to transfer heavy equipment, this doesn't work even if Russia sinks the sections, all the bridge sections would need to be reinforced with the specialized vehicles to be able to successfully crossing of military equipment and materials would be unusable without reinforcement even if barriers were placed in the most affected sections so as not to apply pressure points in the affected places, as the entire structure and sections are no longer transferable to military equipment.

Pontoon are placed with specific vehicles don't need their constant presence to operative, only when requiring of adjustments and repair. I have no idea what you mean when you say "sink the sections", I meant the deployment of precast concrete caissons, which are widely available as common civil engineering components to use as temporary bridge piers towards a temporary crossing.

Floating bridge can maintain themselves for quite some time once anchored, only really affected by flowrates and water level changes, which you can control via the DAM THAT THEY NOW GAVE UP.

The argument that pontoon and/or temporary bridges are not viable, and that the logistic situation would become an inevitability is absolutely worthless when you have a variety of solution and 6 whole months to prepare for it. Multiple redundant crossing is not a technical impossibility, to suggest that is an excuse for complicity and incompetence.
Take the map, young man. See the most likely locations to be used as crossing points, creating a crossing point is not something to be stipulated as simply as you believe, it takes three field commanders to complete a course crossing of water retracting and various other operational needs to be worked out to create the best spots. One example, do you really think they will create crossing points between Berislav and L'vove, points so hardly usable as crossing points and so close to where the Ukrainian troops are? Of course not.

YOU look at a map, multiple points are 500m or less, perfectly viable for pontooning, then you have both the road bridge and the rail bridge, whose piers you can use to stabilize your pontoons by just tying sections to them. Apparently those 3 field commanders all sat around and circlejerk each other off for 6 months straight if they cant even come up with one alternative crossing.

Russia in this war tried in every way to avoid urban warfare, either in offensive mode and, now we are seeing them avoiding being in defensive mode, this is clearly because they know they will have huge casualties and if they employ small troops in the city, they will be quickly eliminated because they are completely outnumbered. Can they inflict casualties on the enemy? Undoubtedly, but at the cost of their own strength.

About 7500+ km2 of strategically important area to be handed over to avoid casualties. Could have probably just paid 5000 dead, kill 15-20k enemy and keep half of it. But Russians insist that this war has to fought like a children's cartoon where no one dies.
 

memfisa

Junior Member
Registered Member
A few square of kilometers on the other side of a major river, sure matter. I am sure you realise the difference between land in a middle of nowhere and what's happening now.

After all, without a foothold on the other side how can Russia stop Ukraine from randomly shelling them. They need to destroy Ukraine as a country for them to get out of this now


Previous hatred was nothing. I am talking about a Ukraine that is preparing for the next 10 years for a real war with all their strength, with all their economic strength committed to it.

The post-2014 Ukraine was preparing but with a lot less resources invested and with much less knowledge that there would 100% be a war (at least for their general population).
Exactly what economic strength is Ukraine going to muster after this war? I just don't understand where this economic might and strength is going to come from unless western nations excise their own valuable industries and place them in corrupt Ukraine

Ukraine doesn't have economic strength. If it did, it wouldn't be demanding handouts from every western taxpayer every single waking day
 
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Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
Pontoon are placed with specific vehicles don't need their constant presence to operative, only when requiring of adjustments and repair. I have no idea what you mean when you say "sink the sections", I meant the deployment of precast concrete caissons, which are widely available as common civil engineering components to use as temporary bridge piers towards a temporary crossing.
You're talking about the past, I'm talking about the present.

Come on, I'll apply your logic. Let's say Russia builds this crossing structure with concrete pillars, do you really think they're going to stay intact with Ukraine being inert about it? If they have already managed to attack crossing points when there was evacuation of civilians in Kherson with ferries that are mobile vehicles, there is not the slightest doubt that by creating a crossing bridge using civil engineering equipment that is stationary, Ukraine would duly have one more target to be directed, by the way, with Himars, the chances of success are almost 100% of success. How would this affect Russia's long-term logistics?
Floating bridge can maintain themselves for quite some time once anchored, only really affected by flowrates and water level changes, which you can control via the DAM THAT THEY NOW GAVE UP.
I agree. But what about the AFU attacks? Himars has enough range to hit all these points. How would that affect long-term logistics? By the way, what you are proposing here is an unusual effort of logistical structure in order to keep the troops resupplying on the right bank, the very fact of having to transport these structures and they fit perfectly in the Dnieper, would still be a tremendous logistical effort, even pre-assembled structure.
The argument that pontoon and/or temporary bridges are not viable, and that the logistic situation would become an inevitability is absolutely worthless when you have a variety of solution and 6 whole months to prepare for it. Multiple redundant crossing is not a technical impossibility, to suggest that is an excuse for complicity and incompetence.
Continuing logistical support is difficult in any combat. In watercourse crossing operations, assault forces are separated from their support elements by the river. As a result, it is necessary to emphasize the continuity of logistical support and, at the same time, minimize congestion in the crossing area. The planning of logistical support must take into account the increasing needs in watercourse transposition operations. Plans are made in advance and plans must seek to mitigate the consequences:
(1) the effects of loss of supplies, equipment and personnel, fundamental to the operation;
(2) the delay in the assembly operation and in the construction of bridges and other vital structures for the transposition;
(3) enemy interference with surface travel and
by air, in the rear areas and in the crossing area;
(4) the limited number of highways.

If you apply the logic to the case in Kherson, you will see that from option 2) to 4), the Russians would have to continually worry because of the widespread Ukrainian interference, since the construction of bridges is only started as long as you manage to drive away from the enemy the selected places, by any means, the observed fire of enemy artillery, which is the case of Kherson,, normally such condition is obtained by the conquest of the regions that prevent the enemy to carry out the artillery fires. Obviously this will go into other details from the employment of Russia's labor in Ukraine to effectively other types of analysis to arrive at common sense, but what is in the central debate is that the way you express it, it would be impossible for Russia to maintain.
YOU look at a map, multiple points are 500m or less, perfectly viable for pontooning, then you have both the road bridge and the rail bridge, whose piers you can use to stabilize your pontoons by just tying sections to them. Apparently those 3 field commanders all sat around and circlejerk each other off for 6 months straight if they cant even come up with one alternative crossing.
In fact, some a little less, in the range of 450 meters. But I return to the previous question, you are applying the logic of 6 months ago, where they had enough time to create solutions for crossing.

Would the AFU artillery be inert on this? Also, how many redundant crossing points are needed? How many specialized vehicles are needed? Allied to all this, will Russian artillery support all these redundancies? What about the air defense apparatus to create this redundancy? And what about logistical support at all these redundant points? Do you know that maintenance is intensified in the preparation of transpositions? Will you have enough maintenance units for all these crossing areas? Whether for communications equipment and weapons that require additional efforts? By the way, let's say that they actually create this crossing width and many redundant points, how will the logistical support facilities that are staggered as far forward as possible to support the operation look like? The AFU will not attack? Will all this be covered by Russia's air defense? If the AFU can attack military installations in the rear, how prudent would that be in order to create a necessary foothold with extensive air defense coverage against the AFU? Did you see the state of the Antonovsky bridge even though it was under air cover from the Russian defense system? How much would this be possible over a wide range of redundant traversals?
About 7500+ km2 of strategically important area to be handed over to avoid casualties. Could have probably just paid 5000 dead, kill 15-20k enemy and keep half of it. But Russians insist that this war has to fought like a children's cartoon where no one dies.
Here's the error. I was talking about the present, you about the past. But again, it returns to my previous questions. Would they all be intact in the face of the precision of the Ukrainian artillery system? What other solutions?
 

SampanViking

The Capitalist
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
Well, sometimes things are exactly how they seem and other times they are not.
I am very much aware of two critical factors.
1) Deception is a key ingredient in warfare ancient and modern
2) A good general knows the weaknesses of his opponents.

A good deception can only work if it is credible and the Ukrainian leadership crave media victories above all other.
If any Russian General understands both of these points, its Armageddon!

It is strange timing, after months of successfully maintaining a front on the North bank of the River, to suddenly call time, just on the eve of having the forces and the conditions to go back on the offensive.

Now I found myself torn on this. Many have said that Nikoliave and after that Odessa were the main strategic aims of the next Russian offensives, while I have always looked to the areas adjacent to the Donbass in the East. That part of me says that the withdrawal is real and that the Dnieper will form the real new ultimate boundary between Russia and the the Ukraine.

The other part can see the grand deception, telegraphed for all to see and even a woeful looking Shoigu being lectured by Armageddon on TV.

Bluff? Double Bluff?..... The Russians are still there and I hear that the Ukrainian commanders are reluctant to start moving forward to occupy supposedly abandoned positions.....

Well gentleman, place your bets.....
 
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