The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
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Don't know if this was shared here before but the Russian MoD says that out of 300k mobilised, 82k were already sent to Ukraine for some time now.
Those 82k additional troops turned the situation from a loss for Russia to a stalemate, we will see whether those 218k soldiers that have yet to be sent to Ukraine will make a significant difference or not.
Those 82k additional troops turned the situation from a loss for Russia to a stalemate, we will see whether those 218k soldiers that have yet to be sent to Ukraine will make a significant difference or not.
This is a very, very bold statement, especially considering the range of modern L7 ammunition, both anti-tank and anti-structure and anti-personnel.
I'm going to put you off, dueling tanks with tanks is rare in this war. Tanks work against infantry and light armoured vehicles and are knocked out more often by ATGMs and artillery.
In fact. Russian history demonstrates that this may be entirely true but it may also not happen, this goes back to the period of the Second World War.
One of the things that might explain why the Red Army stayed for a period of time not being able to have more sophisticated tactics but had to focus on the operational arts because they lost a lot of experienced officers, first in the purge and then with the Germans, in the first few months of the war. Some of the practices in the early days were disastrous: a division reduced to 300, mostly officials and officers, was ordered to counter the oblivion; they really shouldn't have done it that way and at least tried to evacuate them. They had to very quickly, in a hurry, train many lieutenants and promote the survivors to captains and majors. Any good commander had to be quickly promoted up to serve in superior units. David Glantz noted in When Titans Clashed that around late 1941, early 1942, the STAVKA had to issue orders instructing unit commanders in very simple and rudimentary tasks such as "planning an artillery fire before an infantry". It was evident that the commanders of the low-level units were very inexperienced.
Also, if you compare a German division with a Russian division, you can see that Russian divisions generally had fewer men and less artillery assets. Indirect fire assets were mainly mortars. However, the impression of the war was that the Russian used a lot of artillery to attack the enemy. How and why? Coordinating indirect fire with infantry attacks was a complicated task; therefore, at lower levels, with less qualified officers, it was relegated to direct-fire mortars and 76.2mm guns, which are primarily an infantry weapon: close to the front and directly linked to the infantry units conducting the assault.
Another effect you can see in the Red Army rushing efforts to train new officers and promote good ones: how quickly some of the commanders rose through the ranks. Ivan Chernyakhovsky was probably the best Soviet example: he commanded a Tank Corp in June 1942, a month later he commanded an army. In June 1944, he commanded a front. At the same time, old or bad senior commanders were quickly "promoted" to command positions and sent off the front (examples include Budyonny and Timoshenko, both of whom Stalin's initial trust, but after a few disastrous battles, they were "promoted" in silence and fees pushed aside). Rosmistrov, commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army; the guy whose body was assaulted on Prokhorovka, carried out another successful but expensive attack on Misnk, and was removed from frontline command and promoted to "Marshall of Armored Tropops". He didn't command an army of tanks again.
The "good" operations commanders definitely had an effect on tactical battles. One of the reasons why the campaign in the Leningrad area lasted so long and many offensives stopped there was twofold: first, it had lower priority for manpower and equipment; second, the senior commanders were not as good and experienced as the best in the central and Ukrainian sectors (people like Konev, Vatutin, and Rokossovsky). We all know that the Battle of Kursk was over the Kursk salient, but the reason this salient existed was interesting. It was the result of a series of general offensives a few months before that. Most of the fronts did poorly, except for Rokossovsky, which went very well, but ended up running out of steam. His advance created the bulge.
The maturing of Russian tactical and operational arts can be seen in Manchuria's offensive against Japan. There, the division received an additional support unit adapted to the terrain in which the unit had to fight and advance. Divisions destroying the fort received heavy tanks and artillery, those traveling across the plains received medium tanks, etc. relegated to raids across the mountains and Manchurian armies experienced in fighting in urban areas were tasked with raiding fortifications.
Update:
If I understand correctly, apparently Chechens in Belarus and claims that there are already 120k Russian soldiers in the country
This source has already made several untrue claims, but I'll post it because the primary source is Forbes and because if it's true, it has evidence based on analysis of real losses of the 11th Russian Army Corps in previous battles.
Britain has donated 7,000 NLAW anti-tank missile systems to Ukraine, half of the country's total stockpiles. According to sources in The Times at the British Ministry of Defense, the country is at risk of running out of this type of weapon, as the authorities have not yet signed new contracts for the supply of anti-tank systems to replace those sent to Ukraine. In total, up to 10,000 anti-tank missiles were transferred to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including NLAW, Javelin and Brimstone, the publication specifies.
This is fake Ukrainian news. The Sun republished what Channel 24() claimed based on unverified sources.
Ukraine's propaganda department works 24 hours a day, it didn't even wait 24 hours after Lapin was fired before killing him on the internet.
Look at the author of this news debunking the fake news:
"Я прямо даже жалею, что написал сегодня эту шутку в Твиттере! Пошла гулять новость по Интернету. Надо будет в конце каждого сообщения ставить знак ЧЮ - чувство юмора."
Both T-55s and T-62s are single-use, five-rocket shit that cannot be turned into a modern tank by any upgrades. They can be used as an ersatz for limited use, more like a stormtrooper for infantry support. In such a case the 105mm L7 would be better and more accurate than the 115mm t62, and the projectile power of the 105 is higher.
The difference is that probably they will not put YaT-55 in the important direction, but T-62 are and are lost in tens (they are lost, most are captured, but not shot down) in the Kherson direction.
All these ersatz tanks are from poverty, Ukrainians take what they are given, and Russians pick up what is not rotten.
The fact is that Belarus is having a lot of military movement, either going out or coming in.
The first video shows the BM-21 Grad MLRS and the BTR-80-based KShM, while the second video shows the Giacint-B 152-mm towed guns and MT-LB tractors.
I'll get back to my answer after I've done some digging in my archive:
At ranges up to 2000m, the L7 cannon has comparable armor penetration and higher accuracy than the T-62 gun.
With modern projectiles, at these distances it can successfully penetrate all types of armoured vehicles and, with some probability, the T-72's old modifications' APCs.
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