Kinda a long response.
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Well, this begs the question of what condition those nuclear weapons are in, their relative complexity, their efficacy, the time it would take to operationalize them, and the deliverability of them (pertaining to delivery platforms, and their own technical and sustainment characteristics). I did a little bit of work near the beginning of my career on optimizing SLBM salvo profiles, so while I definitely don't have the same level of expertise as I do on PLA systems, I know at least enough about the Russian nuclear forces to point out some of their notable characteristics, and how they differ from the US in some respects. One thing I will say is that the US, for all our flaws, is
really serious about maintaining our nuclear stockpile - and we pour enormous amounts of time, money, and effort into ensuring our inventory is absolutely certain to perform as expected.
I personally don't have a very rosy view of post-Soviet Russia's high-complexity technical capabilities in general, and I would be extremely confident positing that Russia's delivery platforms and their ~1600 nominally "deployed" warheads (out of their total ~4300 warheads circa 2020 ((of which, ~2,000 are nonstrategic yield devices)) as reported by Hans Kristenson in
, who by the way is awesome) are in relatively sustainment-hungry, if still operational, condition. Further, the number of actively deployed/deliverable warheads at any given time is FAR below the inventory size, or even the nominal "deployed" warhead figure.
An easy example, Russian SSBNs (especially throughout the 90s and 2000s) were patrolling at paltry cadences compared to during the Cold War, which left large numbers of SLBMs and warheads essentially mothballed and sitting in storage facilities, rather than being consistently maintained, technically validated, certified, and deployed. Image below displays Russian SSBN (as well as other SSx) patrols from '91 to '06.
View attachment 94669
Of the 10 SSBNs in Russian inventory, 5 are Delta IV (Pr.667BRDM) and 5 are Borei (Pr955) class boats (though 2 of the Boreis are improved Pr955A Borei II class boats).
Both classes carry 16 SLBMs, with Borei-class boats carrying RSM-56 (SS-N-32) Bulava mussiles, and Delta IVs modified to carry the R-29RMU2 (SS-N-23 SKIFF) Layner missiles. These delivery systems are capable of employing 6 and 4 MIRVs respectively, though they have historically carried 4 and 3 respectively due to arms control treaties and limited operational strategic yield stockpile.
Thus, the Russian SSBN force in total hosts:
80x RSM-56 (SS-N-32) Bulava [6x 100-150Kt MIRV]
80x R-29RMU2 (SS-N-23 SKIFF) Layner [4x 100-150Kt MIRV]
This comes out to a total of 800 nominally deployed warheads. However, not all boats are underway simultaneously, which brings us down to ~4 boats at any given time, while the rest are in various maintenance, workup, or other cycles. Splitting it down the middle by class of boat, this gets us a revised deliverable warhead figure of 320 warheads. Certainly not too shabby, but significantly below the nominal figures.
Russian ICBM warheads are also likely maintained at lower snap salvo yields than US equivalents, and those that are available are unlikely to be subjected to the same level of ***constant*** maintenance, validation, and certification processes as US warheads and systems (again, we have invested enormous money, time, and effort into maintaining and validating our nuclear stockpile's efficacy - I seriously cannot stress this enough). First, let's note the composition of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces circa 2020 (when New START imploded and we got our last best count):
- 46x R-36M2 (SS-18 SATAN) [10x 550-750Kt Mod 6 MIRVs] < Silo
- 2x UR-100N (SS-19 MOD 4 STILLETO) [1x Avangard HGV] < Silo
- 36x RT-2PM/RS-12M (SS-25 SICKLE) [1x 800Kt RV] < Road-Mobile
- 18x RT-2PM2/RS-12M1 (SS-27 Mod 1 SICKLE B) [1x 1Mt RV] < Road-Mobile
- 60x RT-2PM2/RS-12M2 (SS-27 Mod 1 SICKLE B) [1x 1Mt RV] < Silo
- ~135x RS-24 (SS-29/SS-27 Mod 2) [4x 150-300kt(?) MIRV] < Road-Mobile
- 14x RS-24 (SS-29/SS-27 Mod 2) [4x 150-300kt(?) MIRV] < Silo
Theoretically, these launch vehicles are capable of deploying ~1172 warheads, give or take (though, while New START was in effect, and potentially even now due to the limited strategic warhead inventory, not all of these munitions are deployed with their full warhead payload). This is a lot, however the number of LOW-relevant, and/or snap salvo systems (those which are capable of launching in the time from when adversary weapons are detected to the mean impact time of nuclear counterforce tasked warheads) is only a portion of this force.
Of these systems, only the following are capable of snap salvo and LOW relevant cue to "coming" envelopes:
- R-36M2 (46x, 460 Warheads)
- RT-2PM2/RS-12M2 (60x, 60 Warheads)
- RS-24 (14x, 56 Warheads)
This is a total of 120 missiles, and 576 Warheads theoretically ready to go on a moment's notice.
When we combine Strategic Rocket Force and Boomer deliverable warhead figures, we end up with a prompt salvo volume of 896 warheads from 156 missiles. Again, not half bad by any stretch, but a far cry from the thousands ostensibly in the stockpile.
It is also worth noting again that these warheads and launch vehicles are not subjected to the same extensive and rigorous maintenance and validation that US systems are. As a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of US nuclear spending goes into our laboratories (a LOT of money goes into those), reactability validation (sites like National Ignition Facility operate in direct support of nuclear maintenance by simulating reactant behavior as time passes, parts wear out and are replaced, etc - which helps ensure we maintain our warheads in such a manner that we don't compromise their yield), specialized manufacturing facilities (highly specialized materials, radiation hardened components, etc.), and on maintaining, improving, and validating infrastructure such as silos work correctly.
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