I think we might draw two inferences, based in conventional tactics:Russians made some major tactical mistakes violating basic laws of warfare:
1) Lack of concentration of forces/firepower. They split their troops against 4 or 5 different fronts at least, and the result with no overwhelming advantage in either one.
2) Lack of internal lines of supply. This was the problem for the White Russians during the Russian Civil War 1917-1922. The Bolsheviks eventually succeeded in part due to occupying central territories, so they could easily shift troops around from front to front depending on need. Meanwhile, Russians have to move troops in a huge circle in order to shift supply between fronts.
1) the generalist (multi-axes) approach was taken with the expectation that reserves would be committed to the axis on which a major breakthrough occurred.
2) the much celebrated southern axis was not the primary focus as insufficient reserves were positioned to follow up on a breakthrough outside the region.
As no breakthrough has occurred, except for the one along the southern coast, Russia has not had an opportunity to concentrate their a forces for a decisive engagement.
Additionally, the advance towards Kyiv has been nothing but perplexing, as it would seem that Russia did, indeed, concentrate sufficient forces, but did not follow-through. Perhaps the choice of an armored assault on the Capital was a flawed strategy to begin with?