PLA New Gen Tanks (Type 100, new heavy MBT)

[Gloire_bb]

I broadly remember noises that the main reason armata isn't procured to this day is that exact problem - huge cost without obvious gain (it's still a tank, i.e. it's expendable, with broadly same primary parameters).

China is just big/rich and can afford things, plus there's hope power of consumer electronics industry can optimize things over production run.

The question is it has to be right - my original assumption was that type 100 family is exact meant for drone battlefield. If yes and it can effectively keep attacking projectiles away, that's certainly worth the cost.

 

[enroger]

I broadly remember noises that the main reason armata isn't procured to this day is that exact problem - huge cost without obvious gain (it's still a tank, i.e. it's expendable, with broadly same primary parameters).

China is just big/rich and can afford things, plus there's hope power of consumer electronics industry can optimize things over production run.

The question is it has to be right - my original assumption was that type 100 family is exact meant for drone battlefield. If yes and it can effectively keep attacking projectiles away, that's certainly worth the cost.

IMHO modern drone battlefield is pretty heavily stacked against MBTs, even if you take into account next generation anti-drone tech like lasers or AI remote gun you then have to contend with autonomous drone swarm that may saturate the system.

My guess is for tanks to be viable on the battlefield again there needs to be a dedicated anti-drone platform following every tanks, sort of like a ZBD-100 for ZTZ-100. Such a platform maybe more pivotal than type-100 itself.

 

[Gloire_bb]

IMHO modern drone battlefield is pretty heavily stacked against MBTs, even if you take into account next generation anti-drone tech like lasers or AI remote gun you then have to contend with autonomous drone swarm that may saturate the system.

Well, it "can". But it has to be large enough, and honestly, it's the next problem.
Right now, we don't really know what to do, even with just single ones, controlled by a pilot via cable/sometimes shitty datalink.

As well as many similar problems - like, dunno, what nations that let Starlink in will do when someone with money for alibaba drone will really hate the guy in charge.

Swarms, interconnected autonomy/mesh ai/etc is the next problem to solve. We aren't out of the current ones really...

 

[Tanker_MG]

Well, it "can". But it has to be large enough, and honestly, it's the next problem.
Right now, we don't really know what to do, even with just single ones, controlled by a pilot via cable/sometimes shitty datalink.

As well as many similar problems - like, dunno, what nations that let Starlink in will do when someone with money for alibaba drone will really hate the guy in charge.

Swarms, interconnected autonomy/mesh ai/etc is the next problem to solve. We aren't out of the current ones really...

@enroger
The challenge is that any claim such as “X drones will overwhelm anti-drone capability mounted on an AFV” would be speculative unless supported by test data on the APS’s engagement cycle, magazine depth, and multi-target handling.

Drone Swarms (fully autonomously drones) of small class I and I UAVs is barely here and is not the drone combat in Ukraine. Currently, in open source, the majority of anti-armor (AFV) is FPV drones. Also I maybe incorrect, but there is nor tactical level drone swarm system that is aimed at anti-armor, or anti-vehicle.

@Gloire_bb Could we have Swam tactical level UAV anti-vehicle system? I believe you are right, with investment and a shit ton of AI pore into the development. I can think of better ways to spend that level AI investment (targeting for Operational and Strategic ends for one) bc I don't think the PLA has the true 'AI-enabled “intelligentized” warfare' system yet, nor one that is tested.

So, back to the thread subject at hand, China looked at the problem set brought forward by observations in Ukraine and what could change and they came up with the ZTZ-100 series. I think that instead of looking at tanks in isolation, they would operate in units and with the ZTZ-100 series there is a capability, now the reason question is, does the PLA GF have the right C2 systems and Soldiers with leaders to employ the capability against a threat (such as Taiwan or the US)?
Again this is speculative on our part.

 

[latenlazy]

IMHO modern drone battlefield is pretty heavily stacked against MBTs, even if you take into account next generation anti-drone tech like lasers or AI remote gun you then have to contend with autonomous drone swarm that may saturate the system.

My guess is for tanks to be viable on the battlefield again there needs to be a dedicated anti-drone platform following every tanks, sort of like a ZBD-100 for ZTZ-100. Such a platform maybe more pivotal than type-100 itself.

Networked sensing and prompt target designation is more important. The main issue drones pose to mechanized infantry is awareness and lead time. Solve lead time to countermeasure and you mitigate a lot of the drone threat.

 

[Wrought]

I broadly remember noises that the main reason armata isn't procured to this day is that exact problem - huge cost without obvious gain (it's still a tank, i.e. it's expendable, with broadly same primary parameters).

China is just big/rich and can afford things, plus there's hope power of consumer electronics industry can optimize things over production run.

The question is it has to be right - my original assumption was that type 100 family is exact meant for drone battlefield. If yes and it can effectively keep attacking projectiles away, that's certainly worth the cost.

The timelines involved make it very unlikely that any real-world lessons from the "drone battlefield" informed the design of the Type 100. Certainly not Ukraine, and probably not Armenia either. I think it's far more likely that @latenlazy is correct and its design was aimed at delivering capabilities for high-end informatized warfare—meaning lots of networks and sensors and so forth—which fortuitously happen to suit the drone battlefield very well.

Personally I am of the opinion that the significance of the so-called "drone battlefield" is hugely overhyped in any case, and is better viewed as simply a manifestation of the informatized battlefield under conditions of two dismally led armies. That is to say, if you are unable to coordinate larger-scale maneuver operations then of course the battlefield devolves into the kind of capabilities most effective at the individual squad level. The guy sitting in a trench with a machine gun certainly has an easier time of it than the guys trying to charge his position, but that hardly means warfare stopped evolving at that terminal point. The inability to concentrate mass has crippled both Russian and Ukranian offensive efforts, but that's far more of an indictment of their organizational incompetence than any verdict on the nature of war.

To be fair, it's legitimately very hard to do that. Probably only US and China can do it in the modern day.

 

[TK3600]

The timelines involved make it very unlikely that any real-world lessons from the "drone battlefield" informed the design of the Type 100. Certainly not Ukraine, and probably not Armenia either. I think it's far more likely that @latenlazy is correct and its design was aimed at delivering capabilities for high-end informatized warfare—meaning lots of networks and sensors and so forth—which fortuitously happen to suit the drone battlefield very well.

Personally I am of the opinion that the significance of the so-called "drone battlefield" is hugely overhyped in any case, and is better viewed as simply a manifestation of the informatized battlefield under conditions of two dismally led armies. That is to say, if you are unable to coordinate larger-scale maneuver operations then of course the battlefield devolves into the kind of capabilities most effective at the individual squad level. The guy sitting in a trench with a machine gun certainly has an easier time of it than the guys trying to charge his position, but that hardly means warfare stopped evolving at that terminal point. The inability to concentrate mass has crippled both Russian and Ukranian offensive efforts, but that's far more of an indictment of their organizational incompetence than any verdict on the nature of war.

To be fair, it's legitimately very hard to do that. Probably only US and China can do it in the modern day.

There is no sign US could do it. You do not see US adapting new tactics from Ulraine, or enhance their hardware to adapt. They are very static, still doing the "cold war but better" type of thing. If US enter the war in Ukraine they are still getting swarmed by FPV drones and real time guided artillery, while lacking the same thing to strike back.

 

[Wrought]

There is no sign US could do it. You do not see US adapting new tactics from Ulraine, or enhance their hardware to adapt. They are very static, still doing the "cold war but better" type of thing. If US enter the war in Ukraine they are still getting swarmed by FPV drones and real time guided artillery, while lacking the same thing to strike back.

They have the airpower to strike back lol. Cold War but better is fine when you hugely outclass the other guy. Drones and artillery obey the same laws of physics as every other kind of supply, and they need functioning logistical networks to arrive at the front in sufficient numbers to make a meaningful difference. Smash those supply lines from the air, and you have a far easier time massing forces uncontested.

It's not that Russia or Ukraine are incapable of telling a lot of people to gather in one place at one time. It's that they are unable to gain the localized superiority to prevent that mass from being anything but a bigger target once they start pushing into hostile territory.

 

[TK3600]

They have the airpower to strike back lol. Cold War but better is fine when you hugely outclass the other guy. Drones and artillery obey the same laws of physics as every other kind of supply, and they need functioning logistical networks to arrive at the front in sufficient numbers to make a meaningful difference. Smash those supply lines from the air, and you have a far easier time massing forces uncontested.

It's not that Russia or Ukraine are incapable of telling a lot of people to gather in one place at one time. It's that they are unable to gain the localized superiority to prevent that mass from being anything but a bigger target once they start pushing into hostile territory.

US and Israel is on same league, and Israel's uncontested air supremacy did not make them fare better in information warfare. They still could only grind. They did worse than Russia to be honest. And arguably Israel is better than US because they have newer hardware, entire US intelligence and logistics, and US military itself. Anything US can do Israel has access and let me tell you they are very lacking. The current pinnacle of information warfare is Russia vs Ukraine, and maybe China is better than those two(more resource potential, willing to learn, less experience). Rest are lagging to various degree. Either lacking willingness to learn or straight up cannot afford to.

Type 100 is an example of this, a whole new design philosophy. Sacrifice traditional large caliber gun in exchange for electronics and active protections. US would not be pulling the same. They would not be able to afford to build a whole new tank design twice as expensive, or willing to if they could. Teaching every frontline soldiers to familiarize with drones is very cheap, Ukrainian operators are available to teach them. Does US show willingness to learn? It seems not.

The Type 100 tank design is one thing, but it reflect more on who is invested to adapt. Personally I think Type 100 is just a stop gap. The future of informationized warfare would require even more drastic of a change in tank design, but that would be another debate.

 

[Wrought]

US and Israel is on same league, and Israel's uncontested air supremacy did not make them fare better in information warfare. They still could only grind. They did worse than Russia to be honest. And arguably Israel is better than US because they have newer hardware, entire US intelligence and logistics, and US military itself. Anything US can do Israel has access and let me tell you they are very lacking. The current pinnacle of information warfare is Russia vs Ukraine, and maybe China is better than those two(more resource potential, willing to learn, less experience). Rest are lagging to various degree. Either lacking willingness to learn or straight up cannot afford to.

Type 100 is an example of this, a whole new design philosophy. Sacrifice traditional large caliber gun in exchange for electronics and active protections. US would not be pulling the same. They would not be able to afford to build a whole new tank design twice as expensive, or willing to if they could. Teaching every frontline soldiers to familiarize with drones is very cheap, Ukrainian operators are available to teach them. Does US show willingness to learn? It seems not.

The Type 100 tank design is one thing, but it reflect more on who is invested to adapt. Personally I think Type 100 is just a stop gap. The future of informationized warfare would require even more drastic of a change in tank design, but that would be another debate.

US and Israel are not remotely in the same league lmao. Israel relies very heavily on its reserves for mass, and suffers from lack of strategic depth + the need to protect population centres. And don't let the memes fool you, Israel gets lots of US support but only in limited areas (intel, missile defense, and so forth), not across the board.

In any case, Israel was not conducting maneuver warfare against anyone recently so you are comparing apples to oranges.