New (not totally) sailless SSN (09X?) thread

[para80]

Sorry, what do you mean by Type 041 and "hybrid" aspect?

I was referring to the idea, touched upon again earlier in this thread, that the Wuchang boat has a nuclear battery or some sort of nuclear auxiliary system in addition to conventional propulsion (akin to the presentation from I think 2017 also referenced).

I am not convinced this is the case, and personally I am leaning more towards the notion that it is indeed a fully nuclear powered design (ie a compact SSN).

 

[elevator]

What is the operational support infrastructure in APAC region for these submarines if China understands what's coming & destroys supporting bases in the region?

I think your response misses my point. You are focusing on the practical difficulty of deploying and sustaining large numbers of US submarines in the Pacific theater.

What I am arguing against is the assumption that “USN boats are spread globally” in a meaningful strategic sense during an existential US–China war.

In that kind of conflict, the US would obviously attempt to concentrate as many deployable submarines as possible into the decisive theater. The limiting factors may be maintenance cycles, transit times, logistics, operational support, or survivability of regional bases — but not peacetime-style commitments to other regions.

The same logic applies across the broader US military as well. In an existential conflict, the USAF and other branches would also prioritize concentrating combat power into the primary theater rather than maintaining normal global posture.

So from a Chinese war-planning perspective, it would be a mistake to assume the US would keep its forces globally dispersed during such a war. The safer assumption is that the US would surge the overwhelming majority of its deployable combat power into the Pacific.

 

[latenlazy]

I think your response misses my point. You are focusing on the practical difficulty of deploying and sustaining large numbers of US submarines in the Pacific theater.

What I am arguing against is the assumption that “USN boats are spread globally” in a meaningful strategic sense during an existential US–China war.

In that kind of conflict, the US would obviously attempt to concentrate as many deployable submarines as possible into the decisive theater. The limiting factors may be maintenance cycles, transit times, logistics, operational support, or survivability of regional bases — but not peacetime-style commitments to other regions.

The same logic applies across the broader US military as well. In an existential conflict, the USAF and other branches would also prioritize concentrating combat power into the primary theater rather than maintaining normal global posture.

So from a Chinese war-planning perspective, it would be a mistake to assume the US would keep its forces globally dispersed during such a war. The safer assumption is that the US would surge the overwhelming majority of its deployable combat power into the Pacific.

You have to answer practical difficulty questions first before you can actually realize concentrated deployments. That's not in fact a trivial matter. From a Chinese war planning standpoint you would do sustainment analysis on supportable US deployments to inform your planned counter-posture.

 

[elevator]

You have to answer practical difficulty questions first before you can actually realize concentrated deployments. That's not in fact a trivial matter. From a Chinese war planning standpoint you would do sustainment analysis on supportable US deployments to inform your planned counter-posture.

Already answered: "as many deployable submarines as possible"

I truly think we should stop the back/forth here and talk about 09X?.

 

[tphuang]

I think your response misses my point. You are focusing on the practical difficulty of deploying and sustaining large numbers of US submarines in the Pacific theater.

What I am arguing against is the assumption that “USN boats are spread globally” in a meaningful strategic sense during an existential US–China war.

In that kind of conflict, the US would obviously attempt to concentrate as many deployable submarines as possible into the decisive theater. The limiting factors may be maintenance cycles, transit times, logistics, operational support, or survivability of regional bases — but not peacetime-style commitments to other regions.

The same logic applies across the broader US military as well. In an existential conflict, the USAF and other branches would also prioritize concentrating combat power into the primary theater rather than maintaining normal global posture.

So from a Chinese war-planning perspective, it would be a mistake to assume the US would keep its forces globally dispersed during such a war. The safer assumption is that the US would surge the overwhelming majority of its deployable combat power into the Pacific.

Alright, so I will just restate the bigger point that I made in my reply to you. It's actually kind of annoying you just ignored it.

Both peace and war time ratio matters. Peace time operation allows you to get your boats out into open water and do various missions that PLAN historically has never done. In actual fact, peace time ratio is more relevant here since that's how you get your training, long deployment into a good state. It's how you pre-position your submarines and develop tactics for war time scenario. It gets you into the position to tail Ohio class, for example.

So, USN boats are spread globally actually is a big deal here.

 

[latenlazy]

Already answered: "as many deployable submarines as possible"

I truly think we should stop the back/forth here and talk about 09X?.

Please specify what you number you think “as many deployable submarines as possible” is

 

[Tomboy]

Finally, I think people need to come around on the notional Type 041 and the "hybrid" aspect. Which I think (!) is also vastly overstated. Its entirely possible/plausible/likely that both Wuchang and JN will fully transition to SSN production (or any sorts of nuclear powered designs). As I mention elsewhere, how the supply chain supporting construction works remains to be seen.

I'm still somewhat doubtful of Wuchang starting to produce SSNs though, Yangtze is too shallow to allow boats like 09X and 09V to sail to the open sea from the yard not to mention all the assembly halls are sized and equipped only for SSK sized boats. Unless you count mini nuclear designs like the Type 041 which I'm getting increasingly doubtful of that project's continued existence.

 

[tphuang]

Of all the people, Xi Yazhou seems to be quite optimistic about the sub hunting potential of this new sub. Thinking it’s basically more advanced than Virginia and Seawolf.

how good this sub turns out to be will take some years to find out but the big shrimps seem to be very optimistic about it.

 

[plawolf]

If 09X does have a meaningful speed advantage over traditional SSNs with sails, that actually also opens up a potentially massive peacetime advantage. Where even if they do pick up tails from passing through geographical choke points into the open oceans, they can simply just loose those tails by going faster than the opfor subs trying to tail them.

 

[Maikeru]

Hi Sutton, who apparently has access to higher resolution imagery, says that 09X actually does have a small sail, and that the recent Bohai and new JN boats are the same.

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