New SSN (09X?) thread

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Several days ago Otter joked that it might be a huge nuclear torpedo, and assuming the yield ratio is 3kt TNT per kg, this torpedo's yield would be 27 BILLION TON TNT. It's more than enough to change human history.

He's only joking. In fact, I don't think we need to go that far.

If anything, I'd say that the PLAN 09X SSN having the ability to "turn the tables" on the Americans (i.e., be able to tail USN SSNs and SSBNs in the open ocean, given its expected role as a 21st-century Chinese Seawolf) would be a pretty major milestone in itself. Of course, I'm not saying that this is definitely the case, though it certainly counts as one probable achievement to qualify.

 

[hmmwv]

Just being a future focused high performance SSN is enough to qualify as being able to change human history...

Agreed, as I said couple of days ago from the get go I fully expect this to be dedicated hunter killer, its role is to chase Virginias to 2IC and beyond, and also tail boomers so their only safe bastion areas are the arctic ocean or Puget Sound. That will effectively end US sea control in the Pacific and nuclear first strike as an option.
Regarding future fleet composition I don't see mass producing 09x means PLAN is giving up submarine based land strike capabilities, between 09IIIB and 09V/09VA there should be 14-16 SSGNs, sure 09V/VA numbers are not mass production compare to 09X (say 16-18 hulls), it's still quite bit of firepower for the US West Coast. Plus if 09X has 10+ tubes once all US underwater assets are gone they can turn into strike platforms too, remember torpedo tubes can be reloaded while VLS can't.

 

[Blitzo]

Aren't these two essentially contrasting/conflicting POVs? If not mistaken, aren't we kinda expecting both the 095 and 09X to have ~12 meters of hull diameter at this point?

Yes, I am saying that 09V (and a notional "09VA") and 09X are ~12m hull diameter SSNs

When I say the notion of going for an "all ~12M hull diameter SSN fleet/active production" is ridiculous, I don't mean to say it's unrealistic or outside the scope of reality.
What I mean is that it is something beyond the scope of what we previously expected for PLAN SSN procurement -- i.e.: it's very ambitious and greater than our previous understanding, and when we take a step back and consider this as a possible route for PLAN SSN procurement in the near future it really is well beyond our prior operating assumptions.

Kind of like back in 2020 the idea/rumours of CAC building 120x J-20s per year -- a ridiculous notion at the time.

In that case, the question then becomes how China would be able to conduct massed and sustained standoff strikes against land and sea targets far beyond the reaches of the PLAAF H-6K/J and PLARF MRBMs into the CentPac and EastPac, let alone the West Coast and East Coast of CONUS, in order to degrade the US's war-making and war-waging capabilities, without having a substantial fleet of SSNs that are able to provide massed standoff hypersonic and/or ballistic firepower to the target?

Yes, we do know that there's the DF-27 - But the purported maximum strike range of ~8000 kilometers would only enable the coverage of Hawaii and the northwestern CONUS (e.g., Kitsap), leaving the rest of CONUS untouched. Developing intercontinental-range conventional strike missiles (somewhat similar in a sense to the Global Prompt Strike idea) would mean a lower cost-vs-benefit ratio, alongside an understandably lower number of missiles that can be procured and deployed.

As long as China doesn't have any footholds up to the 2IC (at least), I certainly don't see how PLAN CVs, CGs and DDGs would be freely sailing within the vicinity of Hawaii, Kitsap, San Diego, or even Norfolk and Newport News to launch strikes against the naval bases and shipyards there, in addition to Palmdale (B-21 production site) and Fort Worth (one of the three F-35 production sites), among other industrial and military sites dotting all across CONUS for the foreseeable future. This is in contrast to how China's eastern seaboard is well within range of the 1IC and 2IC (and that there were never any guarantees of 100% defendability against enemy strikes coming from these island chains and beyond).

If the thesis being placed here is "SSGNs would be important for conducting large scape anti-ship and land attack missions outside of 2IC and it would be odd if PLAN pursued a SSN fleet that is heavier on high end undersea warfare rather than multirole/SSGN-esque submarines" -- imo I have two answers to that

A) 09X (if it is indeed a more dedicated undersea warfare submarine) being pursued doesn't mean the PLAN won't necessarily also procure multirole SSNs (e.g.: 09V or a "09VA") or even a more specialized SSGN type in future
B) the viability of SSGNs operating outside of 2IC to conduct longer ranged strike missions, does also depend on a degree of undersea superiority. It would be reasonable to argue that being able to properly attain and compete in undersea superiority is an important prerequisite mission in the same way that attaining and competing in air superiority is a prerequisite mission to utilizing relevant airspace for strike/interdiction.

 

[Aspide]

This is similar to why the Rafale can't be a 5-gen fighter jet

The overall system layout and design surrounding the aerodynamic/hydrodynamic shape are already fixed; you can't modify the 095 into a sailless submarine.

Given that 095 and 09X share the same tailplane layout, I wouldn't be so adamant. We know that few years ago a small-sail sub was observed. Test results may have suggested to build a modified 095.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

By taking footholds, obviously. History already shows us how you fight a major war across the Pacific. Time has not changed the laws of physics, nor has it changed the fundamental need to control territory by putting boots on the ground. The fact that ground is so scarce in the vast Pacific only makes each scrap of it more precious. So if you want to send ships into the vicinity of Hawaii, Kitsap, San Diego, or even Norfolk and Newport News, then you need to island-hop your way over there.

That's easier said than done.

Of course, I'm not saying that China should never go for island-hopping campaigns eastward (provided she is fully equipped with such capability, and that ending the war on Chinese terms mandates taking such measures).

However, if there are methods and pathways that would assist/enable such adventures to be easier and/or more advantageous to China (say, for instance, launching strikes against facilities of the Joint Pearl-Anderson Base to deny reliable and/or in-time resupply and reinforcement coming from CONUS to transit through and conduct R&R before continuing onwards to the theater of war in the WestPac, even if that doesn't put that base out of commission on an extended/permanent basis) - Then I certainly don't see how that's going to be a bad thing at all (especially if these SSN/SSGNs can be used in conjunction/together with other strategic strike platforms/assets in the PLA).

And this is just one of the many capabilities that general-purpose SSNs/SSGNs like the 095 can bring to the table.

Relying on fires alone to achieve decisive outcomes, be they standoff or stand-in, delivered by bombers or ballistic missiles or submarines, is exactly how you end up in the mess the US is stuck in now with Iran.

I'm not saying that China should solely depend on standoff fires coming from the SSN/SSGNs. I'm talking about how to be able to reliably contribute towards degrading America's war-waging and war-fighting capabilities while China is engaged in a full-scale, all-out war with the US (which might even qualify as WW3 at this point).

What the US did in Iran (i.e., "We we could just b1tchslap Iran's president and they would come kneeling the next second") is never a textbook case on how to do wars against a capable (let alone a peer) opponent, and I'm confident that the PLA is smart and wise enough to understand (and not repeat) that.

If the thesis being placed here is "SSGNs would be important for conducting large scape anti-ship and land attack missions outside of 2IC and it would be odd if PLAN pursued a SSN fleet that is heavier on high end undersea warfare rather than multirole/SSGN-esque submarines" -- imo I have two answers to that

I'm saying the notion of the PLAN completely giving up on land-attack/anti-ship capabilities in exchange for anti-sub capabilities for her subsurface fleet is ridiculous, not that the notion of the PLAN having more Sino-Seawolfs (i.e. 09Xs) than Sino-Virginias (i.e. 095s) is ridiculous.

A) 09X (if it is indeed a more dedicated undersea warfare submarine) being pursued doesn't mean the PLAN won't necessarily also procure multirole SSNs (e.g.: 09V or a "09VA") or even a more specialized SSGN type in future
B) the viability of SSGNs operating outside of 2IC to conduct longer ranged strike missions, does also depend on a degree of undersea superiority. It would be reasonable to argue that being able to properly attain and compete in undersea superiority is an important prerequisite mission in the same way that attaining and competing in air superiority is a prerequisite mission to utilizing relevant airspace for strike/interdiction.

Sorry, I don't really see how the procurement of the 09X would lead to the preclusion/cancellation of further procurement of the 095.

Is China going to just sit around and wait until much of the entire Pacific is cleared of American, British, Japanese, and Australian SSNs and SSKs with their 09X SSNs before they start sending out the 095s (or worse, just starting to develop and build general-purpose SSNs/SSGNs) to conduct standoff strikes against far-flung theater/strategic targets on the 2.5IC, 3IC, and CONUS? I don't think so.

China certainly didn't stop the H-6K/J/Ns from being developed and rolled out until the J-20 and J-35 families are available in numbers that would enable the PLAAF to have the capability of gaining and securing aerial superiority and supremacy in the East and Southeast Asian regions, either.

 

[Blitzo]

I'm saying the notion of the PLAN completely giving up on land-attack/anti-ship capabilities in exchange for anti-sub capabilities for her subsurface fleet is ridiculous, not that the notion of the PLAN having more Sino-Seawolfs (i.e. 09Xs) than Sino-Virginias (i.e. 095s) is ridiculous.

I think there's a misunderstanding here.

When I used the phrase "what is the actual, more ridiculous notion" in post #227, it wasn't in relation to anything you wrote, it was a way for me to punctuate how we've all just accepted the idea of the PLAN procuring two distinct ~12m pressure hull SSN designs as their mainstay SSN fleet in the near future, and that in the near future.

Sorry, I don't really see how that would make the procurement of the 09X would preclude/lead to the cancellation of further procurement of the 095.

Again, I think there is a misunderstanding here.
I am saying that I think it is likely that the procurement of 09X will co-occur with further procurement of 09V (or a further variant of it).
I've never suggested that procurement of 09X will lead to cancellation of 09V (or a further variant of it), in fact I'm saying the opposite.

Is China going to just sit around and wait until much of the Pacific is free of American, British, and Australian SSNs before they start sending out the 095s to conduct standoff strikes against far-flung theater/strategic targets on the 2.5IC, 3IC, and CONUS? I don't think so.

That's not what I'm saying -- in actual war time of course they will send out whatever they have in the most sensible way possible.

I wrote two answers in my last post -- A) and B), and they are complementary in nature.

For the PLAN of course ideally they would prefer to have a balanced fleet of 09X as well as a fleet of 09V/09VA/other notional SSGN design (which would be answer A) that I wrote) -- and in actual wartime, regardless of whether they have a balanced SSN fleet or not, they would prefer to deploy whatever multirole SSNs/SSGNs they have (i.e.: 09V/09VA/other notional SSGN) with a significant fleet of 09X (or other SSNs in a more dedicated undersea superiority role) to either escort their multirole SSNs/SSGNs, or to try and best pacify the area of operations as best possible, to maximize the survivability of the multirole SSNs/SSGNs when they employ their payload.

Such a deployment pattern wouldn't necessarily wait for the pacific to be free of hostile SSNs before sending out 09Vs, but rather a recognition that if they want to send out 09Vs/09VAs/SSGNs in a land attack/strike role, that maximizing the survivability of that force would and the viability of that strategy depends on having a significant fleet of undersea superiority SSNs (alongside multi-domain ASW as best possible) as well.



===

Overall I think it's worth re-reading my post #227 again, because everything I wrote there actually is not in disagreement with anything you wrote.
The first two paragraphs of #227 is me agreeing that if the PLAN procures 09X at scale, the PLAN would still want to continue production of 09V (or a future 09VA variant as a SSGN or something like that) because they would still want to have a sizeable fleet of land attack/anti-ship capable SSNs.

The last two paragraphs of #227 is me writing on the separate notion that the very idea of procuring two distinct ~12m pressure hull SSN designs is something that is a notion that feels ridiculous because it blows our prior expectations of PLAN SSN procurement out of the water.


===

Given that 095 and 09X share the same tailplane layout, I wouldn't be so adamant. We know that few years ago a small-sail sub was observed. Test results may have suggested to build a modified 095.

We actually don't know if 09V and 09X share the same tailplane layout.

We actually don't have clear imagery of the tails of either of those two classes lol

 

[Aspide]

We actually don't know if 09V and 09X share the same tailplane layout.

We actually don't have clear imagery of the tails of either of those two classes lol

The available imagery shows X-plane tail on both of them, doesn't it?

 

[Blitzo]

The available imagery shows X-plane tail on both of them, doesn't it?

Yes.
However, all we know is that they are X tails, but we are talking about the idea of 09X being a 09V variant -- merely sharing X tails as a layout is like saying that all cars with four wheels have the same wheel configuration.

Instead, if we wanted to suggest that 09X could be a 09V variant based on tailplane layout, we need to confirm if they have the same specific design (geometry, size, positioning, control mechanism and flaps etc), and that is something we do not know based off imagery.

 

[Wrought]

That's easier said than done.

Of course, I'm not saying that China should never go for island-hopping campaigns eastward (provided she is fully equipped with such capability, and that ending the war on Chinese terms mandates taking such measures).

However, if there are methods and pathways that would assist/enable such adventures to be easier and/or more advantageous to China (say, for instance, launching strikes against facilities of the Joint Pearl-Anderson Base to deny reliable and/or in-time resupply and reinforcement coming from CONUS to transit through and conduct R&R before continuing onwards to the theater of war in the WestPac, even if that doesn't put that base out of commission on an extended/permanent basis) - Then I certainly don't see how that's going to be a bad thing at all (especially if these SSN/SSGNs can be used in conjunction/together with other strategic strike platforms/assets in the PLA).

And this is just one of the many capabilities that general-purpose SSNs/SSGNs like the 095 can bring to the table.



I'm not saying that China should solely depend on standoff fires coming from the SSN/SSGNs. I'm talking about how to be able to reliably contribute towards degrading America's war-waging and war-fighting capabilities while China is engaged in a full-scale, all-out war with the US (which might even qualify as WW3 at this point).

What the US did in Iran (i.e., "We we could just b1tchslap Iran's president and they would come kneeling the next second") is never a textbook case on how to do wars against a capable (let alone a peer) opponent, and I'm confident that the PLA is smart and wise enough to understand (and not repeat) that.

While I don't necessarily disagree with your argument in an abstract sense, the quantitative SSN disparity between PLAN and USN is such that it makes a great deal of sense to prioritize contesting undersea control. Hunting US subs is likely to be far more relevant for the foreseeable future than conducting cross-Pacific strike missions.

 

[hmmwv]

While I don't necessarily disagree with your argument in an abstract sense, the quantitative SSN disparity between PLAN and USN is such that it makes a great deal of sense to prioritize contesting undersea control. Hunting US subs is likely to be far more relevant for the foreseeable future than conducting cross-Pacific strike missions.

This. Just like China prioritized J-20 and J-35 for air superiority roles, we need to control the air and the sea first before thinking about utilizing them. Kinda like you have to do At-Sea before From-Sea.