I totally agree. I was just quoting this genius below.
Welp turns out these 2 geniuses are banned so I rest my case for now
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PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
In reality, the Tomahawk would be used as anti-ship ammunition; the anti-access objective is to stop the PLAN at the First Island Chain.
According to Yankeesama’s latest podcast they already are factoring in combat losses in production lines for Type 055.
Everything needs to be considered at a system of systems level.
The quantity of fires, defenses, networking, sensors, EW, and geographical basing and mobility of all requisite systems operating in coordination with each other is more important than the individual systems in isolation.
That isn't exactly the best counter argument to the whole idea -- the problem is one of in theater relevant combat mass, coordination/mutual supports.
And what difference does that make? Is PLAN AD so much worse than ground AD that measly Tomahawks can punch through? At least air launched LRASMs might have a chance to oversaturate. But at that point USN really need to commit air squadrons against any PLAN targets that are destroyer flotillas and above, not one or two Marine Littoral Regiments.
In a Taiwan contingency, Tomahawks might be only good enough against transports without AD escorts. But realistically no transports would be stupid enough to move out of 1IC uncovered in wartime.
In theory, although tomahawks, NSMs, etc. are technologically outdated, they're not more "outdated" than any tech that's used in UCAVs such as Iran's Shahed. In sufficient numbers & when used properly (e.g. with sufficient volume of fire), they are still a threat that can't be ignored. This situation is roughly analogous to Iranian Shaheds or Russian Gerans, just because you can easily shoot them down, doesn't mean you can just ignore them, especially in large volumes.
However, in the present context, one of the flaws I see with the US approach is that they trying to essentially fight an "island-hopping guerilla war" in the Pacific, where they quickly insert into some lightly defended or undefended island, fire off a few missiles, then retreat before the PLA's own "counter-battery fire" hits them. The problem here then is that the US will have a trade off between speed & volume of fire. The larger the salvo, the bigger the footprint, the slower it is in the setup-shoot-scoot process. Also, the bigger the salvo, the most space constrained they become, & the fewer choices they have for islands selection. Too large of a salvo is vulnerable & might be preempted by PLA hypersonic assets even before they fire off their missiles. Too small of a salvo & it either won't have enough volume of fire to overwhelm PLA IADS, or is too small to deal meaningful damage.
However, in the present context, one of the flaws I see with the US approach is that they trying to essentially fight an "island-hopping guerilla war" in the Pacific, where they quickly insert into some lightly defended or undefended island, fire off a few missiles, then retreat before the PLA's own "counter-battery fire" hits them. The problem here then is that the US will have a trade off between speed & volume of fire. The larger the salvo, the bigger the footprint, the slower it is in the setup-shoot-scoot process. Also, the bigger the salvo, the most space constrained they become, & the fewer choices they have for islands selection. Too large of a salvo is vulnerable & might be preempted by PLA hypersonic assets even before they fire off their missiles. Too small of a salvo & it either won't have enough volume of fire to overwhelm PLA IADS, or is too small to deal meaningful damage.
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The other issue is that the PLA’s counter batteries are much faster than marines trying to offload equipment of an island. Planes and missiles are just much faster than boats.
Yes, I think the optimal assets to deal with these types of "guerilla" missile launch units is a combination of space-based surveillance & long endurance stealth drones (GJ-X comes to mind, if we can make a large number of them cheaply). Space based surveillance to see where such units are sailing to, & a stealthy “察打一体" type of long-range UCAV to strike ships with YJ-19 (or some comparable air-launched variant thereof) ideally before they land to minimize munitions expenditures.
I agree. The Marines would be divided into small, highly mobile units, operating autonomously and in a distributed manner. For the EABO to work, it needs to be supported by advanced communication technologies, air defense, cyber warfare, and drone surveillance. US forces would use interconnected systems to share information in real time, ensuring superior situational awareness and coordinated operations.
It remains to be seen if it will actually work in practice.
The Tomahawk is just one component part of the anti-access system they're creating in the Pacific. You don't always have to interpret things literally. The debate was about the use of Tomahawks and which targets would be appropriate.
I reiterate that the US has decided to diversify its anti-ship capabilities:
Ship-launched:
Harpoon
NSM
SM-6
Tomahawk MST
–
Submarine-launched:
Harpoon
Tomahawk MST
Mk-48
–
Air-launched:
Harpoon
SLAM-ER
LRASM/LRASM-ER
JSOW-C1
Storm Breaker
Quicksink
JSM
–
Land-launched:
NSM
Tomahawk MST
SM-6
–
Anti-ship weapons in advanced stage of development:
SM-6 Block IB
PrSM/S2
SiAW
Their objective is clear: to avoid being exposed, avoiding employing their naval assets within a Task Force in the weapons engagement zone, as they did in the Pacific theater of World War II. They will bypass the Chinese anti-access bubble and create their own anti-access zone against the PLA. Of course, it will be difficult to determine the survivability of the connector ships, because they will be fundamental to the logistics of this concept.