And so it begins, the looong acquisition process
This is not so much a new beginning as the continuation of a campaign that has been running for more than two decades now, i.e. the IAF's attempt to secure a large scale procurement of modern western combat aircraft. What has changed recently are:
1) Indian Navy contract to acquire 26 Rafales.
2) Operation Sindoor: lessons learned + losses.
3) Trump's hostility towards India and attempted coercion thereof, contrasted with apparent embrace of Pakistan.
Going back some months prior to these developments, the IAF's preference for more Rafales was clear enough, but there was also the American angle to consider, and the broader point that there appeared to be little appetite at levels above the IAF for an acquisition of the magnitude contemplated by MRFA.
Today, the experience of Operation Sindoor has undoubtedly allowed IAF to press the case for more foreign combat aircraft more convincingly. Simultaneously, the Americans have all but eliminated themselves from contention, while the approval of Rafale for IN has deepened India's overall investment in that platform and makes further investment more attractive in terms of training, logistics, future integration and upgrade paths, recent losses notwithstanding.
That said, there are reasons to be skeptical that the MRFA program will ever go anywhere in the form that is officially contemplated, i.e. a triple digit order with domestic assembly and robust ToT. The basic roadblock that brought down the MMRCA program in the early 2010s remains: cost. While extraordinary costs can perhaps be justified to obtain certain exceptional returns, it is difficult to argue that Rafales rolling off a domestic production line in the 2030s would fall into this category. In terms of comparative technology, the notion is not dissimilar to an earlier prospect that never eventuated: that of transferring the Mirage 2000 production line to India in the early 2000s. But whereas India was arguably foolish not to take up that earlier offer, the situation today is rather different, in that LCA (allegedly) now exists in a more or less production-ready state. Rafale is undoubtedly a superior combat platform across most if not all relevant dimensions, but it remains a fundamentally fourth-generation platform that sits alongside both production-ready LCA and hundreds of existing Su-30MKI that are crying out for upgrades. The equation of extraordinary costs that are justified by extraordinary returns now applies more appropriately to the
next generation of combat aircraft, of which only F-35 and Su-57 present as credible options.
The earlier IAF acquisition of 36 Rafales ultimately worked because it bypassed MMRCA requirements for domestic production and ToT. Rather than the full-fat MRFA process, I think it is more plausible that we could see a repeat order in that vein, i.e. lesser numbers of aircraft delivered directly from France, perhaps in the range of 30-60 aircraft. Beyond MRFA there is talk of small-scale acquisition of fifth-generation fighters from abroad. I would flip these proposals around: FGFA should be reborn at a scale sufficient to justify domestic production, with deliveries extending into the 2040s. The objective would be to induct limited numbers of VLO combat aircraft by early-2030s, with production continuing over time to ultimately replace a significant fraction of the current Su-30MKI inventory, perhaps 100-150 aircraft. Maintaining this production line from the early 2030s would also guard against capability and/or schedule shortfalls in the LCA Mk. 2 and AMCA programs.
