Given that sufficiently small and cheap drones can and are distributed down to the platoon or even squad level, the task of identifying and eliminating so many distributed targets in a timely fashion is not realistic. Rather, the emphasis needs to be on disrupting their ability to communicate and coordinate so as to mass drones from many different units into a single strike package. Fortunately, there is a great deal of overlap with this mission profile and preexisting efforts to disrupt and degrade enemy C&C.
Dealing with a few drones at a time is easy for any halfway competent air defense. The trick is to keep that number down.
Sure jamming will play a part, it already is in Ukraine, but already FPVs are adapting with fibreoptic guidance.
It is perhaps telling that you are trying to make this into a pick one from the list kind of deals when the correct response is to pick every kind of counter drone option available and then create even more brand new methods and options. The reason why unintentionally needlessly boxed yourself into thinking you can only pick one solution is because you are still thinking of countering drones on an individual vehicle basis.
You can’t tick the ‘select all’ option for countering drones if you limit yourself to having to be able to retrofit your solution into a single tank or IFV.
This is why I keep hammering the point that the best strategy to deal with FPVs and other future cheap drone swarms is to use dedicated entirely new platforms. That way you can largely free yourself of many of the constraints that limit your imagination and solutions.
You can have a tethered duct fan heavy drone armed with AESA radar, options and lasers acting as persistent over-watch to armoured spearheads to massive extend your detection and engagement horizon against enemy drones; You can have mobile lasers to snipe drones; You can have microwave vehicles that can fry drone swarms en mass; you can have interceptor drones flying a CAP perimeter around your armour; you can have airborne jammer drones disruption enemy satellite comms to drones; you can have EW hunter-killer drones homing in on enemy control signals to go after the pivots; you can have similar optics based hunter killers with optics specially tuned to spot fibre option cables hunting pilots. You can have gun based air defence vehicles and others carrying swarms of interceptor drones. That’s just on a completely different level to defences you can realistically fit on a single vehicle in terms of the scale and scope of countermeasures available, and that’s before you even get to the most killer issue of cost.
Having dedicated systems will be a big capital outlay, but even a modestly priced solution for individual vehicles will cost vastly more if you look to outfit it across your entire armoured vehicle fleet.
The reason the Russians are reduced to individual vehicle level solutions in Ukraine is because of their systematic and chronic under-investment across the board in support assets has meant that they only have a vast fleet of tanks and IFVs. They lack basically everything else needed to allow large armoured formations to rapidly punch through enemy minefields and other obstacles, and they also lack effective rapid counter-battery capabilities and most critically, air superiority to allow them to suppress Ukrainian mobile artillery.
It is Ukraine’s NATO supplied artillery that is the reason Russia has been forced to abandon massed armoured formations and instead use their armour piecemeal, which in turn is what is making FPVs so disproportionately effective there.
People have just got it in their heads that armoured formations are over from the Ukraine experience without really critically drilling down to the root cause of why to see if that is a truly universal paradigm shift in armoured warfare, or just a Russian case special issue.