PLA Anti-Air Missile (SAM) systems

[Blitzo]

That doesn't relate to my question. I asked if something changed since. Those same images with 4 tubes in a row were posted in October 2022 and were labaled as hq16fe, and pretty much everyone back Then accepted that. So what happened since, that those particular images stopped being referred to as hq16fe?

It was initially labelled as HQ-16FE because we didn't know better and it looked like it might fit an evolved HQ-16 TEL profile, but then we saw HQ-16FEs with actual 6 tube TELs at Zhuhai 2022 so we reverted to not definitively knowing what the 8 tube TEL was.

I think you even asked about it back in Nov 2022 during Zhuhai that year.

2022 Zhuhai Airshow Land Systems

Also post here: HQ-16FE:

www.sinodefenceforum.com

 

[BoraTas]

Anyone know if there have been rumours on a SM-3 IIA/B equivalent that's ship based?

There has been a single photo of a DDG launching something big. Maybe someone will have that one. Though, I would argue that China doesn't really need a naval exo-atmospheric ABM. In a non-nuclear context, 90% all of the threat to the Chinese mainland is by cruise missiles. 100% of all threat to PLAN is from non-BM munitions. The PrSM will have an anti-ship version. But that missile too will be quassi-ballistic. It won't be leaving the atmosphere in any phase. That said I would like to see a naval HQ-19. It would be useful against the PrSM and also would enable the fleet to contribute to the defense of the mainland against the Dark Eagle and CPS.

Guessing HQ-26?

Looks smaller, TBH. I am not very confident with this statement

They aren't comparable in spec, but both are meant for the same role which is terminal phase ABM.

I dream of a new multi-purpose SAM that fully uses the UVLS. It could even have a strike-length-cell version with an added booster.

 

[Totoro]

It was initially labelled as HQ-16FE because we didn't know better...

2022 Zhuhai Airshow Land Systems

Also post here: HQ-16FE:

www.sinodefenceforum.com

Thanks for the link!

 

[Neurosmith]

Those images of smaller launcher on the train were at the time widely accepted to be of hq-16fe. What events since then changed the consensus concerning those particular images ?

These were spotted at a PLAAF air defense site; the PLAAF does not operate HQ-16s.

 

[BasilicaLew]

To put it simply - The PLAN is facing different operational realities than the USN.

For the PLAN, they are mostly concerned with operations within and around the 2IC (i.e. her front-yard) for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the USN is operating worldwide, meaning that their warships are often forward deployed farther from their homeland - And often times, within proximity of their adversaries' homelands/front-yards.

In order words - Until China is able to solidify her hold and presence along and around the 2IC, there actually aren't a lot of chances for the PLAN DDGs to mid-course IRBM and ICBM interceptions. And sailing their DDGs off the CONUS's western seaboard in order to be able to intercept ICBMs during the early mid-course phase certainly is a fool's errand, too.

Therefore, partially similar to what @Cloud_Nine_ has mentioned - Instead of pure ASEV ships that the JMSDF is building right now to defend Japan against missile threats from North Korea and China, the PLAN would better off be procuring successor classes to the 055 DDGs as "true cruisers/CGs" (regardless of whether the PLAN still wants to refer them as DDGs), with greater focus in fleet-wide/region-wide defenses against anti-ship (and perhaps also land-attack) cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles.

TL; DR - The PLAN might as well go with actual CGs that are suited for high-intensity naval conflicts in the "true blue" Pacific, which are balanced in terms of both offense (anti-ship and land-attack with cruise and hypersonic/ballistic missiles) and defense (fleet/region-wide SAMs against the enemy's anti-ship/land-attack cruise and hypersonic/ballistic missiles), rather than having a mobile "offshored-AEGIS Ashore" platform.

Having BMD's for China is key, as it allows it to train its own PLARF against their top of the line systems, and thus have a higher chance of getting though American systems. Eventually it could be assumed that the BMD of the Chinese would get better than Americans due to them not having an existing ballistic missile system to train against (unless you count Iran lol). Of course, Americans have their own systems to train against (like their air dropped BM targets), but these take a lot more prep and could be less realistic. Say the PLARF wants to test how good they can hit a ship in a training mission against the PLAN, it helps if they have equipment comparable to the Americans when they do so.

 

[totenchan]

These were spotted at a PLAAF air defense site; the PLAAF does not operate HQ-16s.

Is this confirmed?

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Having BMD's for China is key, as it allows it to train its own PLARF against their top of the line systems, and thus have a higher chance of getting though American systems. Eventually it could be assumed that the BMD of the Chinese would get better than Americans due to them not having an existing ballistic missile system to train against (unless you count Iran lol).

(Contrary to international conventions/classifications, in this discussion, I would refer IRBMs as having ranges of 5000-8000 kilometers, and ICBMs as having ranges of >8000 kilometers.)

Well, to be frank, I'm not exactly against having SM-3-counterparts on Chinese DDGs (and perhaps CGs in the future PLAN).

However, what I actually meant in my previous post is that given the expected operational reach of PLAN DDGs for the foreseeable future (namely, up into the 2030s), the chances of PLAN DDGs being able to conduct mid-course interception of IRBMs and ICBMs is rather low. In this purview, it would be better for PLAN DDGs (and future possible CGs) to be armed with ABMs/AHMs that are suited for high-intensity combat scenarios in the true-blue Pacific where both conventional and high-end anti-ship threats are the norm.

This means for instance, having navalized variants of the HQ-19 (THAAD-ER-equivalent) and the HQ-26 (assumed PAC-3 MSE-counterpart) to complement the HHQ-9s on the 052D/DG and 055 DDGs.

(Did I hear calls for more VLS cells per hull on future DDGs and CGs?)

Of course, once China manages to gain a solid + permanent presence in the CentPac region, then having the capability to conduct midcourse interception of IRBMs and ICBMs would naturally become a necessity for PLAN DDGs and CGs.

Of course, Americans have their own systems to train against (like their air dropped BM targets), but these take a lot more prep and could be less realistic. Say the PLARF wants to test how good they can hit a ship in a training mission against the PLAN, it helps if they have equipment comparable to the Americans when they do so.

Personally, I don't think China lacks the missile types (whether that be cruise, ballistic or hypersonic) that are already in service right now and are expected for service entry with the US military in the coming years for the PLAN to be trained upon - Whether those missiles come from the PLARF, PLAAF or even the PLAN themselves.

 

[Nautilus]

Do we have any estimates for how many land-based AA systems China has in service right now? Clearly China is not in the same realm as e.g. Iran, but it raises the question - how much damage can China's IADS network take before the US could start bringing massed strikes to bear closer to the mainland/inland?

 

[gelgoog]

The thing is Iran lacks a fully integrated IADS. They do not have modern fighter aircraft to cover gaps in SAM coverage. They don't have AEW&C aircraft, etc. And they lack China's satellite recon complexes.

 

[by78]

A new SAM breaks cover. Per @bsdnf, this is the

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