At ~10,000 tons in displacement, the Hunter class is practically the size of a Cold War era CG.
The CEAFAR2 can't possibly require that much room, so guessing the Hunter class is intended for extended patrols far from Australian shores, especially if it's only armed with a 32 cell VLS?
All the indications are that the program was simply
from the beginning, with the pitfalls of an immature design exacerbated by the mandated domestic CEAFAR2 radar as the "tail wagging the dog", leading to considerable unanticipated weight growth and corresponding reduction in performance.
Before the review that recommended truncating the program from 9 ships to 6 was released, there were rumours that it was going to be cut off at the
three ships that are presently under detailed construction contracts. Indeed, one suspects that the major reason why a second batch of three
Hunter-class frigates has been
notionally retained at this juncture is to hold out the prospect of maintaining continuous shipbuilding in Adelaide (or rather, to avoid the political implications of being seen to abandon it) with the Batch 2
Hunters notionally bridging to a future
Hobart-class successor (while Perth builds the Tier 2 frigates).
Some years ago now, Australia was struck by the same revelation that struck the UK regarding the need to maintain a continuous naval shipbuilding sector in order to maintain the associated workforce and therefore to avoid the massive start-up costs associated with reconstituting skills atrophied in the interim between major construction programs. Of course, implementing that continuous naval shipbuilding strategy is considerably more challenging for a nation of Australia's size than it is for the UK, and is made more challenging by (a) now splitting the work across two yards some 2500km apart and (b) importing the first three Tier 2 frigates directly from abroad in order to alleviate a self-induced schedule crunch.
Don't think anyone will know for sure without some level of insider knowledge, at least for a while, but from the verbiage, there is a possibility that the AUKUS submarine will be a "distant cousin," "Australianized version," or otherwise (arguably) a derivative of a late block of the Virginia class considering all the common systems that they will share.
I don't think there is any intention for SSN-AUKUS to be a "Virginia by stealth", however it is certainly the case that the incremental, pragmatic response to delays will be to shift further in the direction of the Americans (from the "very beleaguered" to the merely "beleaguered"). To the extent that there is a gap between rhetoric and what appears practical, that is more plausibly accounted for by the politically-infused dreamland that birthed and sustains the entire enterprise, rather than some unseen 4-D chess move.
Back in December 2023 I put forward my own
prediction as to how all this is likely to unfold, and I don't see any reason to revise it at this stage:
(1) Australia's acquisition of two second-hand Virginia-class submarines is pushed back or cancelled owing to a combination of lack of enthusiasm in Washington to transfer them and our lack of readiness to receive and operate them.
(2) The AUKUS nuclear submarine program is ultimately thrown in the bin and a new conventional program is pursued with local shipbuilding.
(3) A limited number of Virginia-class submarines (say, four) are eventually acquired from the American production line at ruinous expense and maintained at low readiness, partly to make the Americans happy and partly just to say that we did it.
Recent developments furthering this skeptical view include a recent Congressional Research Service
that publicly floats the idea that, instead of transferring SSNs to Australia, maybe USN could just operate SSNs from Australia on Australia's behalf instead:
Under a U.S.-Australia military division of labor for performing SSN missions and non-SSN missions the forward rotations of U.S. and UK SSNs to Australia planned under Pillar 1— SRF-West—would still be implemented; up to eight additional Virginia-class SSNs would be built, and instead of three to five of them being sold to Australia, these additional boats would instead be retained in U.S. Navy service and operated out of Australia along with the five U.S. and UK SSNs that are already planned to be operated out of Australia under Pillar 1 as SRF-West; and Australia, instead of using funds to purchase, build, operate, and maintain its own SSNs, would instead invest those funds in other military capabilities—such as, for example, long-range anti-ship missiles, drones, loitering munitions, B-21 long-range bombers, or other long-range strike aircraft—so as to create an Australian capacity for performing non-SSN military missions for both Australia and the United States.
Needless to say, any such pathway would be ruinous for maintaining even the barest pretense that Australia is still a sovereign nation.
There is also the British government's own Infrastructure and Projects Authority which has
the nation's ability to produce naval nuclear reactors to meet requirements (i.e. Dreadnought and SSN-AUKUS) as "unachievable" for three years running now (p. 15 & p. 43).