00X/004 future nuclear CATOBAR carrier thread
- Thread starter AETHER
- Start date
Just curious, how do people know it's a 076? My amateur eyes can't tell
We don't know it is definitively 076, which is why he described it as "075-mod/076" rather than just "076".
It is definitely an LHD of some sort, and its dimensions appear a bit bigger than 075.
Nowhere have I mentioned that France has a higher military budget than the UK. What I'm saying is that the Royal Navy is suffering from having less money to throw around relative to their plans (or shall I say, ambitions) for having a dual-CV navy.
This is not a contest on whether you or me is correct.
My post is mainly highlighting several other advantages which comes with nuclear-powered CVs over their non-nuclear counterparts, which people tends to miss when dealing with the conventional-vs-nuclear CV debate. Nowhere in my post contains any definite calling that China definitely must go with the nuclear route in the shortest time possible.
If anything (and to be serious here) - Given how things can go down in the WestPac, my only wish here is that China could just pump out carriers ASAP, such that China will be having a minimum of 6x CVs ready in the shortest time possible, with the eventual goal of 9-10x CVs, preferably all CATOBAR, alongside all the supporting ships, facilities and manpower required for their operations, regardless of propulsion type.
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If they match US nuclear naval technology, then the aircraft carrier only needs refueling every 25 years. Effect of refueling speed on readiness in that case is probably not significant since the ship will require regular maintenance far more often than it needs refueling.
The way they increase the refueling interval is by putting more nuclear fuel in the reactor. Which means the refueling period then increases to replace all the fuel. I mean it should still lead to time saved overall, it will decrease total downtime, but the downtime when it is refueled should be greater.
25 years into service the carrier should receive a MLU anyways, most likely a Multi year stint in the drydock where major subsystems are replaced. The refueling would occur concurrently and likely finished long before the actual upgrades are completed.
So by default China should design for at max only a single refuel per life time of a CVN, otherwise having to cut holes in the superstructure to refuel is going to add significantly to downtime.
Oh no you didn't.
And I mean it as a statement of fact.
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Chapter 0:6
The Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy, and State provided comments on a draft of this report. DOD's comments (see app. VII) and GAO's
detailed evaluation are included in the report where appropriate.
Overall, DOD partially concurred with the report. Specifically, DOD concurred there is a life-cycle cost premium associated with nuclear
power. However, DOD believed GAO's estimate of that premium was overstated by several billion dollars because of what DOD believed are analytic inconsistencies in GAO's analysis. DOD also believed the draft report did not adequately address operational effectiveness features provided by nuclear power.
DOD did not agree with GAO's approach of making cost-per-ton comparisons between the two types of carriers currently in the force, believing the conventionally powered carriers reflect 40-year old technologies. DOD believed a more appropriate cost comparison would include pricing conventionally and nuclear-powered platforms of equivalent capabilities. According to DOD, any analysis of platform effectiveness should include mission, threat, and capabilities desired over the life of the ship. Further, it stated the draft report did not adequately address future requirements but relied on historical data and did not account for platform characteristics unrelated to propulsion type. That is, many of the differences may be explained by platform size, age, and onboard systems than by the type of propulsion.
Congress asked GAO to examine the cost-effectiveness of conventionally and nuclear-powered aircraft carrier propulsion. Such an analysis seeks to find the least costly alternative for achieving a given requirement. In this context, GAO used as the requirement DOD's national military strategy, which is intended to respond to threats against U.S. interests. That strategy encompasses overseas peacetime presence, crises response, and war-fighting capabilities. GAO used those objectives as the baseline of its analysis and selected several measures to compare the effectiveness of conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers. Those measures were discussed with numerous DOD, Joint Staff, and Navy officials at the outset. Those measures reflect the relative capabilities of each propulsion type, including the nuclear-powered carrier's greater aviation fuel and munitions capacity and unlimited range.
Notwithstanding the enhanced capabilities of nuclear propulsion, GAO found that both types of carriers share many of the same characteristics and capabilities, that they are employed interchangeably, and that each carrier type possesses certain advantages. GAO also found that both types of carriers have demonstrated that each can meet the requirements of the national military strategy. GAO's analysis shows that conventionally powered carriers can meet that strategy at a significantly lower life-cycle cost.
The primary reason that GAO's analysis shows a higher premium for life-cycle costs of a nuclear-powered carrier is because different methodologies were used. The GAO methodology compared the investment, operating and support, and inactivation/disposal costs of operational carriers. This approach allowed GAO to use historical costs to the extent possible. GAO also used a cost-per-ton approach to develop its acquisition cost estimate. This approach is an accepted method for estimating procurement costs and has been used by the Navy.
The GAO methodology showed that the life-cycle cost premium associated with nuclear propulsion was about $8 billion per carrier over a 50-year life versus about $4 billion using the Navy's approach. GAO's and the Navy's estimated life-cycle costs for a nuclear-powered carrier were very similar even though different methodologies were used. However, the life-cycle cost of a conventionally powered carrier using the two methodologies varies significantly--$14 billion versus $19 billion. Several factors account for the variance. For example, a different universe of ships was used to determine the estimated cost for a Service Life Extension Program. In estimating procurement costs, the Navy used actual labor hours for the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CV-67), adjusted to reflect current labor, overhead, and material rates for a nuclear shipbuilding facility, Newport News Shipbuilding. Operating and support costs varied, in part, because DOD used fully burdened fuel delivery costs and a different methodology for estimating personnel costs.
GAO believes its methodology of reviewing a historical perspective covering a wide range of peacetime presence, crises response, and war-fighting scenarios that both types of carriers faced during the past 20 years is sound. A full discussion of GAO's methodology can be found in appendix I. GAO continues to believe that this assessment will be helpful to the Navy as it assesses design concepts for a new class of aircraft carriers.
The Energy Department concurred with DOD's comments addressing estimates of costs associated with nuclear reactor plant support activities and storage of naval spent fuel. These comments and GAO's evaluation of them are discussed in appendix VII. The State Department noted that the entry of nuclear-powered vessels into Japanese ports remains sensitive in Japan and there would have to be careful consultations with the government of Japan should the U.S. government wish to homeport a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan.
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You can also read Appendix I of the report which has several other statements which are equally damning, provided you understand the political language being used.
Even in the section I cited the report quite explicitly states that its aim was to establish minimum cost of meeting vague political goals rather than specific performance metrics. This same approach is repeatedly being used to promote the light carrier (LHA converted into a CVL) as "objectively" cheaper despite abundance of data demonstrating that such approach fails DoD's tactical requirements.
GAO is proposing a solution where carriers being used for "threatening small defenseless countries" is as equal in weight to a full scale peer conflict. GAO was riding the "end of history" while DoD consistently rejected it (and was proven right).
GAO reports are not objective data-based analyses of select issues. GAO is an office of the Congress with the express mission to audit the actions of the President and subordinate departments like DoD. GAO is a political tool of legislative oversight of the executive branch and its reports serve that purpose.
This report has been commissioned by a Congress with House and Senate under Republican control (234-199 and 55-45 respectively) at a time when reducing DoD budget was on Republican agenda. It was also written when three Kitty Hawks (CV-63, 64 and 67) were still in service, ninth CVN (Truman, CVN-75) was just commissoned and tenth CVN (Reagan, CVN-76) had its keel laid. Therefore it was hardly a meaningful exercise of oversight but part of the messy politics of DC and should be understood as such.
And it probably doesn't help that you likely haven't even been alive in 1998, let alone an adult capable of understanding the political dynamic at the time which was very different from either post-2001 or post-2011 reality.
All in all this report is useless. It is an opinion which is equal to the DoD's. You can only use it for the data which can be sourced and then only used within proper context.
I used a GAO report for my Desert Storm thread but only because it is a more convenient source for data from the Gulf War Air Power Survey which I also have read so I wasn't quoting GAO out of context.
Nobody disputes the higher cost of CVNs but that cost must be measured against objective metrics of their peformance at different levels and it is precisely those most extreme conditions that allow CVNs to outshine CVs. USN in the 1990s may have had the luxury of not thinking of peer warfare but PLAN of 2030s musn't think that way.
Otherwise we're in a situation where J-7s are perfectly viable air defense fighters until they aren't, but a GAO report still presents them as a more "cost-efficient" option.
EOT. (Really, there's nothing to add unless you have genuinely good new data, and good luck with that. Most likely the new data won't get here until PLAN puts both a modern CV and a CVN to sea.)
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Refueling is an implementational constraint of PWR. US also went with highly enriched fuel rods thus all the necessary added costs and time. Like the debate between steam and EMAL, CMC/PLAN sitting on this issue for another decade is all good. CV is just a platform. Given money doesn't grow on trees, a deeper reservoir of trained/experienced personnel and planes far wiser investments than a new type of toy which by its nature, will be experimental for at least a decade from inception. 003 is not even in sea trial yet and it is China's first flat-top. 003's operational doctrines alone will take years to flesh out. Reliability applies to both hardware and also people and all takes time to mature. This is why I don't think 003 is just transitional. Still hoping two more 003A's can be floated before 2030.
Wouldn't we spot first signs of CVN construction from a new mast mock-up in Wuhan or shipyard modifications? If no such hints yet, 004 sounds like years away. Also in any team competition, would you rather have a single rank amateur or several seasoned professionals on your side?
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