The JSF and 21st century air combat

Andrew

New Member
Once again, I'd like to quote from an article by Dr. Carlo Kopp which may be of interest here. It seems as though the utility of JSF which, together with the F/A-18E, will form the mainstay of US Navy and Air Force assets in the East Asian theatre, is doubtable in the author's view (the author tries to advocate the F/A-22 for the RAAF).

F/A-22As, JSFs and 21st Century air combat

By Dr Carlo Kopp

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The hard reality is that kinematics has always mattered in air combat, and always will matter. No amount of information or networking can make a fighter which is significantly slower, and less persistent at high speeds, consistently prevail over an aerodynamically superior opponent, especially if that opponent is also fed by an AEW&C aircraft via networking. If the ”networking beats kinematics” argument were to be true, then the F/A-22A program would not exist.

Of no less concern is the implicit assumption of a persistent long term asymmetric advantage in information gathering and distribution capability on the part of the JSF supported by the Wedgetail and MIDS/JTIDS/Link-16 datalinking. AEW&C aircraft have been ordered by India, China is test flying a demonstrator, and Malaysia has them on its shopping list. By 2020 nations without AEW&C will be the exception in the region, rather than the rule. No less importantly, the Russians have actively marketed the APD-518 and TKS-2 datalinks on their Sukhoi fighters – the latter capable of networking up to sixteen fighters. (...)

No differently, the assumption that AEW&C aircraft and networks can operate unchallenged in the region over the longer term is also completely unrealistic. India and Russia are currently negotiating joint development and production of the Novator R-172 (formerly KS-172) RVV-L”AWACS Killer” missile, built to destroy AEW&C, JSTARS, RC-135V/W and tanker aircraft at ranges up to 215 nautical miles. (...)

The ADM article then argues that stealth is ”one of the features that discriminates it [the JSF] from its competitors", neglecting to mention that the principal competitor to the JSF, the F/A-22A, is actually built for significantly higher stealth capability than the JSF will have. While the JSF will be much stealthier than evolved third generation fighters and opposing Sukhois, its stealth shaping has been optimised for the upper X-band and forward hemisphere, a viable design choice for a battlefield strike fighter, but not for an air superiority and deep strike fighter. (...)

No mention is made of the F/A-22A’s supersonic cruise capability, totally absent in the JSF due to its transonic performance optimised wing and engine design. Supersonic cruise allows the F/A-22A to remain at supersonic speeds without using afterburner – the performance envelope of the F/A-22A in dry thrust is designed to cover the performance envelope of the F-15 in afterburner. To put this in context, the JSF is designed to fit the performance envelope of the F-16 and F/A-18, both inferior
to the F-15 series and the Sukhois the JSF will have to defeat.
(...)

An issue in its own right is the inevitable emergence of supercruise in the Russian technology base, as the AL-41F series engine matures. We should not be surprised to see a supercruising Flanker variant in the region before the end of the decade. With a performance envelope competitive against the F/A-22A, the JSF would have little chance of successfully engaging such an aircraft, or indeed evading it. (...)

The important distinction is between the F/A-22A and JSF radars, as the former has much higher power-aperture performance using the same generation TR module technology – the F/A-22A radar covers around twice the area footprint of the JSF radar, and will provide greater standoff range and jam resistance in hostile environments. (...)

No less curious is that no mention is made of the Russian Vympel R-27P and
R-77P/MP X-band anti-radiation missiles – variants of standard BVR missiles carried on the Sukhoi Su-27, Su-30 and Su-35 series fighters. Equipped with 9B-1032 series passive RF homing seekers rather than the standard active radar 9B-1103M / 9B-1348E or heat-seeking MK-80M seekers, these missiles would find a high power jamming waveform from the APG-81 to be more useful than a search/track waveform as a homing signal source.
Equally curious is that no mention is made of the X-band interferometers used on more recent Russian S-300 SAM system radars, the aim of these being precise angular measurement of X-band jamming sources to facilitate SAM guidance. Clearly an inbound Mach 6 class 9M83 SAM is not a consideration for JSF planning, despite regional exports of S-300 systems. (...)

The reality of regional strike operations will be different – high value targets
defended by a mix of semi-mobile long range low band radars, and mobile long
range area defence SAM systems such as the S-300PMU-2, S-400 and S-300VM, equipped with Aegis class high power phased arrays such as the 30N6E2, 64N6E2 and 9S32M. Passive detection systems will be used to supplement high power search radars. (...)

If we put an F/A-22A into this scenario, it kinematically defeats nearly all opponents, and with all aspect stealth and supercruise can engage and disengage at will. The F/A-22A will have the capability to bypass defending CAPs and destroy opposing AEW&C aircraft and jamming platforms. Its large radar and capable passive detection system will allow it to operate autonomously with little or no support from an AEW&C aircraft, should the latter be threatened. The F/A-22A’s supersonic cruise will allow it to intercept supersonic bombers and cruise missiles, a kinematic challenge for the JSF at the best of times."
 
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