Striker or Interceptor? Assessing commentary on J-20's role

I wrote a brief paper on why J-20 isn't a striker or interceptor, and weighed up the evidence and logic suggesting it's actually an air superiority fighter. Useful for throwing at anyone who still doesn't believe that J-20's actually a fighter.

Open for critiques etc etc.

Link is here:

Will be posting the full thing below. Didn't post in the J-20 thread because didn't want to clog it

Striker or Interceptor? Assessing commentary on J-20’s role
Rick Joe


Background:
The Chengdu J-20 has been a source of great speculation and discussion in the defence community and general media almost immediately after prototype no. 2001 made its first flight on the 11th of January, 2011 (Waldron, 2011). The emergence of what was clearly a large, stealthy fighter aircraft from a country not traditionally seen as a serious high-technology military competitor to the United States prompted a range of reactions in western news media and defence experts, encompassing an extensive range of emotions from surprise and anxiety, to hostility and dismissal.

Interestingly, most reports of J-20 eventually came to speculate that its role and associated capabilities either revolved around acting as a dedicated strike aircraft (Reed, 2011b; Trimble, 2011), or as a dedicated interceptor (Axe, 2011b). Needless to say, proper assessment of the J-20’s intended role is vital for an accurate projection of the future capabilities of the Chinese Air Force.

This paper intends to sample commentary and relevant news media of J-20’s potential roles as a striker, an interceptor, and an air superiority fighter, and critically examine the potential viability and sensibility of J-20’s design for those roles as well as the place of such roles in context of the Chinese Air Force’s potential requirements.

This paper is not intended to address J-20’s role in context of any substantive aerodynamic analyses given the complexity of aerodynamic design and the inability to properly assess this without access to a wind tunnel, an accurate model, and a few experienced aerospace engineers.



J-20 as a striker:
J-20’s potential striker role has been emphasized greatly in the defence watching discourse, often in context of the larger perceived Chinese military doctrine of “Anti Access/Area Denial” or “Counter Intervention” capabilities (Barnes, Hodge, & Page, 2012). In many cases, J-20 is even described not only as a simple stealthy striker but also as a naval striker for specific targeted use against United States supercarriers (Reed, 2011b; Trimble, 2011).

There are compelling reasons to believe why the Chinese military may be interested in fielding a stealthy strike aircraft, and the requirement to attack United States carrier battlegroups are also well accepted. But whether J-20 is the plane to fulfil such tasks is another question.

Any stealth aircraft intended for the strike role should optimally field a large diameter weapons bay so as to deploy a variety of munitions, including non-powered guided bombs or glide bombs, but also to deploy powered guided weapons such as air launched cruise missiles, which are typically of a larger diameter than unpowered counterparts. For instance, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was designed from the outset with large diameter weapon bays (Figure 1.0), to accommodate powered guided weapons such as the Joint Strike Missile (Kongsberg), while the F-22 is limited to Small Diameter Bombs and 450kg class Joint Direct Attack Munitions as a consequence of having a weapons bay with less depth (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.0: F-35 weapons bay; note its bulbous geometry, large volume and great depth



Figure 1.1: F-22 weapon bay armed with AIM-120 air to air missile and Small Diameter bombs




J-20’s weapon bay is less deep than that of the F-35, and from picture evidence, it appears most similar to F-22’s weapon bay in overall size and dimensions not to mention configuration (Figure 1.2). The configuration of J-20’s air intakes are also possibly indicative as to the maximum depth of its main weapons bay: stealthy aircraft such as the J-20, F-22, and F-35 all feature air intakes which partially “overlay” their main belly weapon bays, restricting the maximum possible depth of the bays due to constraints of a minimum functional air intake/duct area to supply their engines. Other stealthy aircraft such as the YF-23 and Russian T-50 feature air intakes which do not overlay their belly weapon bays and instead run parallel (Figures 1.3 and 1.4), permitting the bays to potentially feature a substantially greater depth.


Figure 1.2: J-20’s main underbelly weapons bay



Figure 1.3: YF-23 cutaway displaying main weapons bay; note the stacked air to air missiles



Figure 1.4: T-50’s underside, note the distinctive engines and air intakes encased within dedicated nacelles which do not intrude upon the volume of the two main belly weapon bays



In the likely event that J-20 does lack a sufficiently deep weapons bay to field large diameter powered weapons, J-20 will be limited to deploying relatively short range glide bombs, and in relatively few number given the length of its weapons bay appears little greater than that of an F-22. While modern glide bombs such as the SDB feature extended ranges of over 100km compared to legacy guided bombs and supersonic deployment speeds may extend that range even further, there remains the question as to whether the Chinese Air Force would consider developing such an expensive asset such as J-20 which is limited to deploying only a likely maximum of 12 SDB class weapons at a distance of less than 200km of its target, well inside the engagement envelope of advanced surface to air missiles which may also be defended by AEW&C vectored combat air patrols. This therefore casts great scepticism over J-20’s potential role as a striker.

Of course, it may be viable to envision development of dedicated small diameter, powered weapons able to fit within J-20’s weapons bay (such as a reduced diameter JSM-esque weapon or a SPEAR III equivalent; or the folding wing Kh-58UshKE missile which some western media claim China has purchased from Russia, but for which there is no indication of in the Chinese military watching community) if an air launched version of the relatively large diameter YJ-8 family anti ship/land attack missile cannot be developed (Carlson, 2013). However such missiles would only make the best of a poor strike aircraft design, as the weapons would feature small warheads, relatively short range compared to full sized powered weapons, and in the naval strike role will be unable to compare to weapons such as the new YJ-12 (Lin & Singer, 2014). Therefore if J-20 were to field even a token naval strike role, it would require development of a new generation of small sized powered missiles, all for J-20 to carry a small number (likely two at most) of small sized anti ship missiles, whose efficacy against a well defended United States carrier battlegroup may be very doubtful at best.

Considering the above, it becomes difficult to envision J-20 was designed primarily as a stealthy striker. Indeed the reasons for suggesting J-20 was a striker had debatable logic. Some commentary have suggested J-20 may be a striker due to its supposedly large size (Figure 1.5), however later satellite analysis have shown J-20 is almost certainly under 20.5 meters in length (Figure 1.6), which is meaningfully smaller than early assertions of J-20 being in the same class as the 22.4 meters long F-111 (Axe, 2011b; Kopp & Goon, 2011).

Figure 1.5: an initial incorrect judgement of J-20’s size compared to other existing and notional fighters


Figure 1.6: one of the most highly circulated and well conducted size analyses of J-20, based on satellite images which compares J-20 to the known length of a J-15/Su-33



This is not to say that J-20 cannot be a viable and capable strike aircraft – for instance, the F-22 has demonstrated that even carrying a relatively light strike load of only JDAMs or SDBs, it is able to produce very potent strike capability by leveraging supercruise, sensor fusion and a very low observable design. But F-22’s primary role is that of an air superiority fighter, with a weapons bay designed to match that purpose, and it is most accurate to say F-22’s respectable strike capability arises despite the inherent limitations of the design of the actual airframe and its weapons bay dimensions rather than flourishing as a result of its design. In other words, if the Chinese Air Force truly desired a stealthy aircraft for strike and naval strike, there are a variety of other more sensible airframe designs and weapons bay configurations that could have been pursued first.




J-20 as an interceptor:

J-20’s other major role as speculated by mainstream defence media, is that of an interceptor. In such a role, it is suggested that J-20s would leverage their stealth, high speed, and long range to attack various United States airborne force multipliers such as vital tanker aircraft (Figure 2.0), airborne early warning and control aircraft, and electronic warfare aircraft, (Axe, 2011a; Kopp & Goon, 2011).

Such actions, if successful, could cripple the ability of the United States military to conduct an effective air campaign in the western pacific, and the design of J-20 certainly does not rule out such a role for J-20 within an integrated offensive air campaign. However, as with the strike fighter debacle, the hard question which arises is whether J-20 is designed primarily (or in other words, “only”) as a long range interceptor aircraft or if its role as an interceptor is just one of many possible roles as a result of its design.


Figure 2.0: a USAF KC-135 refuelling a flight of F-22s. In the great expanse of the western pacific, tankers will be vital to allow shorter ranged combat aircraft to perform missions at long ranges



Dedicated interceptor aircraft were a common fixture of air forces during the early to mid Cold War, where the threat of massed nuclear bombers and the constant need to dissuade opposing reconnaissance aircraft required fighters which could fly at high altitude, with high speed with long range to reach and engage an opposing aircraft before it is able to launch its (potentially nuclear) payload. However, as the intercontinental ballistic missile succeeded the strategic bomber as a nation’s primary means of delivering nuclear weapons, the need of the interceptor also subsided.

Few air forces today operate dedicated interceptor aircraft, and those which do exist are typically increasingly obsolete and slated for replacement (such as China’s J-8 and J-8II interceptors), or feature unique speed and range characteristics allow them to cross vast distances for countries with expansive geography (such as Russia’s Mig-31s). Such examples of dedicated interceptors may be upgraded with newer avionics and weapons systems in the air forces they serve in, however such aircraft are a dying niche breed, and have been succeeded in the interceptor role by general air superiority aircraft (Figure 2.1), which are not only capable of aggressive air combat manoeuvring, but may also feature competitive performance in parameters such as speed, altitude and range.

Figure 2.1: an F-22 intercepting a Tu-95. Like many air superiority aircraft, F-22 also fulfils duties as an interceptor



If dedicated interceptors are being almost internationally slated out, why is J-20 suspected of being a “dedicated” interceptor, rather than a general air superiority fighter which is also able to perform interceptor functions? (Note: it is generally a good rule of thumb that modern airframes designed for air superiority can be repurposed to make an effective strike aircraft or perform interceptor functions, but an airframe designed for strike will fare far worse as an air superiority fighter, with the same applying for airframes designed for dedicated interceptor function)

J-20’s possible role as an air superiority fighter will be addressed in the next section of this paper, so here we will consider the plausibility of J-20 being a dedicated interceptor in role.

Similar to the strike aircraft fallacy, initial estimates of J-20’s size vastly overshot its actual dimensions and helped propel a discussion that such a large aircraft of “over 22 meters” must surely be too cumbersome to properly function as a nimble air superiority fighter and therefore logically must be an interceptor (or a striker). Now that J-20’s length is determined to be only slightly greater than 20 meters, the prerequisite logic for its dedicated interceptor aerodynamic characteristics are significantly reduced. (Note: of course, a large aircraft does not mean an aircraft must necessarily lack manoeuvrability with the Su-27 being the largest modern fighter aircraft which is also regarded as very capable in air combat manoeuvres)

A subsequent argument for J-20’s dedicated interceptor role is related to its “relatively great length” and its “small wings”. While not described using such obtuse terms, this is effectively the base of many arguments, and is not itself illogical. Attempts to extrapolate J-20’s manoeuvrability based off estimating its weight, wing area, wing loading, thrust, have been made through numerous aviation and defence watching forums, but ultimately the lack of anything as essential as definitive dimensions of J-20, let alone lack of access to a wind tunnel, a wind tunnel model, and the relevant computers and software (and engineers), will hamstring the credibility of virtually all armchair aerodynamic estimates of the aircraft. The Mig-25 is the classic lesson from history (Figure 2.2), warning observers to not use mere pictures to assess an aircraft’s aerodynamics and just as the Mig-25 was suspected to be a manoeuvrable air superiority aircraft but turned out to be a cumbersome interceptor, it is hardly out of the question for J-20 to be suspected of being an interceptor but actually perform as an air superiority fighter (Figure 2.3).


Figure 2.2: Mig-25, first thought to be an air superiority fighter but later discovered to be a dedicated interceptor



Figure 2.3: J-20 may now be facing the reverse of what the western intelligence community suspected for the Mig-25



However, it is worth noting that certain publications have alluded to the possibility that J-20 may be intended for competitive air combat manoeuvring (Kopp & Goon, 2011; Sweetman, 2014). Such performance however, is rightly specified as contingent on J-20’s powerplant. As of August, 2015, all J-20 prototypes are suspected to be powered by a variant of the Russian Al-31 engine (Figure 2.4), possibly highly modified for greater thrust. Therefore if projections of J-20’s aerodynamic performance assumed the aircraft would be powered by an Al-31 variant, this may partially justify the limited scope of J-20’s predicted roles. Of course, Chinese military watchers were aware of the WS-15 (Figure 2.5), a 17 ton class supercruise-capable turbofan which was intended to be the powerplant for J-20 (known in the mid 2000s and earlier as the “J-XX”). A J-20 equipped with WS-15 would feature much enhanced thrust compared to an Al-31, and would have accompanying consequences for its aerodynamic performance and thus its roles. Therefore, it may be worth specifying just what kind of powerplant a J-20 is equipped with when speaking of its potential roles. For instance, a J-20 equipped only with Al-31s may well be less competitive in air combat manoeuvring and may be slated for “only” interception and strike duties instead, a J-20 equipped with WS-15s may be far more competitive and excel as an air superiority fighter.


Figure 2.4: Al-31s power all existing J-20 prototypes



Figure 2.5: the only photo of WS-15 known, here depicted is the turbofan’s core

J-20 as an air superiority fighter:

Air superiority is a crucial possible role for J-20 which no western defence publication (to the author’s knowledge) has sought to seriously consider it for.

There are various possible reasons which may explain this glaring absence. One reason could be scepticism and hostility at the idea of the Chinese aerospace industry producing a fighter aircraft that may prove to be competitive with the western world’s “golden fighter,” the generation defining F-22 – indeed there have been many articles displaying dismissal of J-20’s design or speculating if its design was merely a “re-hash” of other fighters with superficially similar arrangements such as cockpit appearing similar to the F-22 (Lee & Johnson, 2012), or featuring a similar aerodynamic configuration to the Russian Mig 1.44 (Figure 3.0) (Reed, 2011a). This of course ignores despite the fact that the delta-canard-twin tail configuration had been investigated by Chengdu Aircraft Company in the early 1970s as part of the VI variant of the J-9 project (Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3), not to mention the logical fallacy of suspecting common heritage simply on the broad basis of aerodynamic configuration – otherwise the case could be made that Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, and Gripen must all be copies of each other due to their canard-delta-single tail configurations, despite each aircraft featuring their own unique and independent development paths.


Figure 3.0: Mig 1.44, a Russian prototype aircraft with a generally similar aerodynamic configuration to J-20, but speculation of J-20 being derived from the aircraft are presently unfounded at best



Figure 3.1: a wind tunnel model of CAC’s 1970’s era J-9VI project, with its distinctive canard-delta-twin tail arrangement that would later find its way on the J-20



Figure 3.2: a drawing three view of the J-9VI, further illustrating its aerodynamic configuration



Figure 3.3: and just for laughs, a CGI of what J-9VI would have looked like



Other reasons for doubting J-20’s role as an air superiority fighter may be related to the aforementioned engine question, where the aircraft’s potential differing powerplants may determine the aerodynamic performance in significant ways. Such a reason is logically sound and worthy of further observation and investigation.

But what of the support for J-20 being an air superiority fighter?

There does exist a small – but arguably credible – base of literature which may suggest that J-20’s design is intended to be aerodynamically competitive in air combat manoeuvring.

One such source is from the Chinese Air Force itself, a Colonel Daixu, by a Global Times state media article from 2009, who states that the upcoming “Chinese 4th generation aircraft” will feature “4 S characteristics” (Deng, 2009), of which one of the “S” is super-manoeuvrability, an accepted term that has been applied to various highly manoeuvrable aircraft such as the Su-27 family to the F-22. (Note, in Chinese parlance, “4th generation” is equivalent to the rest of the world’s “5th generation” and Chinese “3rd generation” is equivalent to the rest of the world’s “4th generation”. E.g.: an F-22 would be described as “4th generation” in Chinese articles and an F-16 would be described as “3rd generation”)

While Chinese state media is not always a reliable source for Chinese military matters, in this author’s experience, when state media write original articles surrounding certain military subjects, there is a good likelihood of authenticity especially if there are other corroborating new facts. In this particular news release, the new generation of fighter aircraft is said to enter service within 8-10 years (from time of its publishing in 2009), logically placing its inevitable first flight sooner rather than later. Less than two years later, J-20 made its first flight.

Another valuable source that may shed light on J-20’s intended role, is from a paper published in 2001 by Dr. Song Wencong (Song, 2001) (Figure 3.4), a Chinese aircraft designer responsible for the J-10’s design and who mentored Yang Wei, the designer of JF-17 and J-20. In this paper, Dr. Song illustrates the demands a fighter aircraft faces if it seeks to achieve significant radar cross section reduction (radar stealthy), while also seeking to achieve supercruise, high manoeuvrability and unconventional manoeuvres such as post-stall manoeuvres, finally settling on an aerodynamic configuration including delta wings, canards, leading edge root extensions, with lifting body and all moving vertical stabilizers (Siegecrossbow, 2012). This of course, is the almost a word for word description of J-20’s exact aerodynamic configuration.


Figure 3.4: Dr. Song WenCong, designer of J-10 and mentor of Yang Wei



Altogether, these two sources are not irrefutable proof that J-20 is an aircraft with excellent or competitive manoeuvrability, however in this author’s opinion, they do together provide indication that J-20 was designed with intention to be aerodynamically competitive at the very least. Whether its performance will match its design goals is another matter entirely and that performance is not one which can be judged at this time.

A final thought which should be considered, is that when the requirements for J-20 were considered, the Chinese Air Force almost certainly recognized that the F-22 would be the most dangerous combat aircraft that it will face in any situation where they need to contest air superiority against the United States Air Force. Therefore it is worth pondering if the Chinese Air Force would have requested an aircraft that could directly compete with the F-22 rather than merely seeking to strike at the support elements of the F-22 (such as tanker aircraft). Putting it bluntly, one has to ask if the Chinese Air Force would have accepted that their future high end fighter aircraft would have to run if it encountered the F-22 (or any other opposing stealth fighter for that case) or if it should be able to hold its own and have the ability to win in a confrontation as well.

There is a sensible case to be made that a confrontation between opposing stealth fighters may be decided at within-visual-ranges, where classic dogfighting and close in air combat manoeuvring apply. Therefore if one does entertain the possibility that Chinese Air Force brass required their next generation fighter to be able to fight opposing stealth fighters, then it is natural to ask whether the performance necessary for dogfighting would be part of its demands. Of course, the logical answer to the question should be almost a resounding yes.

It is worth noting, that if J-20 really were an air superiority fighter, it would also be capable of performing the interceptor role and acting as a striker as well, which dramatically broadens the scope of its utility in potential conflict scenarios if the aircraft were merely an interceptor or striker.

Conclusions:

This paper has briefly summarized the western defence media’s speculation regarding the J-20’s possible combat roles. I conclude that there is little evidence and little logic to support popular notions that J-20 is designed or intended to function a dedicated strike aircraft or a dedicated interceptor, although it is acknowledged that J-20’s role is dependent upon its final powerplant.

Instead, this paper suggests that J-20 may instead be designed and intended to be an air superiority fighter due to various credible Chinese sources, as well as the logical requirement for a next generation fighter aircraft to be capable of performing air combat manoeuvres.

This paper does not make any claims about J-20’s aerodynamic performance relative to other specific aircraft beyond the suggestion that it is likely intended to compete with other air superiority aircraft in the air combat manoeuvring domain.




References:


Axe, D. (2011a, 7th January 2011). China's Over-Hyped Stealth Jet. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Axe, D. (2011b, 26th July 2011). Stealth Fighter or Bomber? Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Barnes, J., Hodge, N., & Page, J. (2012). China takes aim at U.S. naval might. Retrieved 7th August 2015, 2015, from

Carlson, C. (2013). China's Eagle Strike-Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Deng, J. (2009, 10th November 2009). New generation of fighter jets on horizon. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Kongsberg. Joint Strike Missile. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Kopp, C., & Goon, P. (2011, April 2012). Chengdu J-XX [J-20] Stealth Fighter Prototype: A Preliminary Assessment. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Lee, E., & Johnson, R. (2012). China's J-20 And The American F-22 Raptor — You Are Not Seeing Double. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Lin, J., & Singer, P. W. (2014, 18th October 2014). Want to know what it's like to be blown up by a Chinese missile? Ask this ship. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Reed, J. (2011a, 19th August 2011). Did the J-20 come from this Mig? Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Reed, J. (2011b, 9th February 2011). Is China's J-20 Stealth Jet a Carrier Killer? Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Siegecrossbow. (2012, 13th March 2012). Translation of J-20 Article by Dr. Song Wencong. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Song, W. (2001). 一种小展弦比高升力飞机的气动布局研究.

Sweetman, B. (2014, 10th November 2014). J-20 stealth fighter design balances speed and agility. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Trimble, S. (2011, 9th February 2011). J-20: China's ultimate aircraft carrier killer? Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Waldron, G. (2011, 11 January 2011). Video: China's J-20 completes maiden flight. Retrieved 6th August 2015, 2015, from

Very nice job! Was a good read

Very sound and very true. This theory that the J-20 is a strike fighter could also be seen as an reflection, and the bias it carries, of the fear among western analysts for what the aircraft means for the US military in Asia, with aircraft carrier groups being the cornerstone of American power in the Asian pacific region. This is why many western articles speculate so much that the J-20 is a specialist at naval strike missions as such of scenario would implicate enormously for defence planners. However does such fears identify what the J-20 aircraft really is?

It could also be added that the dimensions especially the ratio to length and wingspan of the J-20 'puts off' some western analysts from suggesting the J-20 as a multi-role/air superiority fighter as they have familiarized too much with what an fifth generation aircraft is, to only the few fifth-gen fighter programs that exist today, notably for western analysts, being the F-35, being a relatively small single-engine aircraft.

Beside the J-20 there are very few fifth-gen aircraft programs that are active or ongoing, being the F-22, F-35, and PAK-FA. Compared to the J-20 all of these aircraft have a "conventional" configuration where as the J-20 is after a delta-canard wing configuration, which is a first among the existing fifth-generation jet fighter programs that are ongoing today. Another notable difference is the length-wingspan ratio of the aircraft, the J-20 is certainly a long aircraft but not by much as the speculation exaggerated by western analysts. In reality this aircraft is only about 20 meters long, about the same length of a Su-27 but still not much longer than other fifth-gen aircraft, (F-22 is 18.92 meters long while the PAK-FA is 19.8 meters long, the F-35 will likely be considered a 'small' fifth gen aircraft as more types of fifth gen jet fighters emerge in the future)

Further this illusion that the J-20 is an over-lengthed fighter aircraft stems from the fact (in the sense of exterior aerodynamic design) that the extended body fuselage is needed to accommodate the leading extensions near the mid section of the plane. Watever advantages of this extra bit of length, whether its for the aerodynamic efficiency of the LERX, greater fuel load or payload, the designers made the decision to keep it. However it is very likely for the goal, as explained by Song, that the J-20 program prioritises the high-alpha capability of the aircraft, being very useful for close to mid range engagements. By effectively using cannards and the LERX in synchronisation, allows the aircraft to fluently achieve high angles of attack, giving the J-20 a huge advantage in such confrontations.

People should remember fundamentally, jet fighter design has varied throughout all generations, especially the previous forth-generation of world fighters, which there are fighters in an abundant of different configurations and sizes today. The only reason of the abundant speculation of the J-20's design is because the fifth-generation of world jet fighters has only just begun, and for now there is not many types of fifth-gen fighters to go by.

Excellent write up Blitzo.

Funnily enough I (and I am sure many others) have arrived at the same conclusion but via a different method.
I think simply looking at the other platforms that the PLAAF operates and a basic understanding of both Force Packaging and likely mission designation, quickly identifies the capability gap that the PLAAF otherwise has and the clear suitability of the J-20 to fill it.

China has other Aircraft to perform the Strike Mission - H6-K J16 and even J10, what it needs is something else to open the corridor for these aircraft to fly in and attack.

It would be sobering I think for any opponent to know that for all the enemy strike aircraft it can see, there will be also very capable fighters protecting them, that it cannot.

Bltizo said:

[...]It is worth noting, that if J-20 really were an air superiority fighter, it would also be capable of performing the interceptor role and acting as a striker as well, which dramatically broadens the scope of its utility in potential conflict scenarios if the aircraft were merely an interceptor or striker.[...]

Click to expand...

Ultimately, for me, this is your most cogent argument/consideration. It is unlikely that any organization would place operational constraints upon a project that is intended to achieve the state-of-the-practice, at least, if not the state-of-the-art. It is more likely that the philosophical approach to such a project would be to achieve the most capable product possible, and then develop the set of operational objectives this product could fulfill.

Additionally, would an either interceptor or an interdictor platform neccesitate the additional investment of resources required to incorporate high AOA facilitating canards or moveable vertical stabilizers into the design?

Your ideas and arguments are presented clearly. I do suggest a re-read in order to achieve a smoother flow of ideas. Also, be careful to not end clauses or sentences with prepositions.
Example 1, flow:

Bltizo said:

The Chengdu J-20 has been a source of great speculation and discussion in the defence community and general media almost immediately after prototype no. 2001 made its first flight on the 11th of January, 2011 (Waldron, 2011)

Click to expand...

might read: Ever since its January, 11th, 2011maiden flight, the Chengdu J-20 has been a source of great speculation and discussion in the defence community and general media. Just a suggestion, but this seems, to me, to flow into the subsequent sentence better.

Example 2, final preposition:

Bltizo said:

Air superiority is a crucial possible role for J-20 which no western defence publication (to the author’s knowledge) has sought to seriously consider it for

Click to expand...

might read: Air superiority is a crucial possible role for J-20 to which no western defence publication (to the author’s knowledge) has given serious consideration.
Actually, there were only 2 instances of prepositions at the end of either a clause or sentence.

Just a couple of observations!