Small Arms and Ammunition

Norfolk

Junior Member
VIP Professional
The AR-15/M-16 has generated controversy for over 40 years now, with all its advances and its failings. The original M-16 was quickly withdrawn from service after its introduction in the early years of the Vietnam War. More controversies have pursued subsequent versions. But the one thing about the M-16 that stands out from all the rest, and has arguably generated the most debate, is its calibre, the 5.56mmx45mm cartridge. Originally designed to wound, rather than kill, enemy troops, the 5.56mmx45mm (.223 Remington)round was intended to bring about the collapse of enemy resistance by inflicting serious (but not necessarily lethal) wounds upon those it struck, subsequently necessitating two other enemy soldiers to leave the fight in order to tend to each wounded one. Well, that was the theory.

As it turned out, the theory was wrong on two counts. Firstly, the enemy didn't agree with it, and secondly, neither did the 5.56mmx45mm cartridge. During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army did not typically dispatch two or even a sinly soldier to tend to each wounded man. Not that there were necessarily a lot of wounded, either, at least amongst those shot with an M-16. The M-16 A1, a much improved development of the M-16, became the standard rifle of the US armed services in the Vietnam War, and the round it fired, the 5.56mmx45mm round did not wound, it killed. Though the round was only accurate to about 300 metres, it was an efficient killer out to at least 200 metres. This was due to the M-193 5.56mmx45mm round's high velocity (killing many of its victims instantly by Parapatetic Shock - heartbeat reversal), and its instability (the round tumbled when it struck significant resistance, like a human body, penetrating not in a small, neat hole necessarily, but slamming lengthwise into its hapless victim, penetrating, and finally fragmenting - effectively bursting to be more accurate - inside its victim's body). Many stories were told about the lethality of the new round.

After the Vietnam War, NATO Armies in general, and many more elsewhere, adopted the 5.56mmx45mm round. The Soviets ditched their own tried-and-true 7.62mmx39mm in the AK-47/AKM and developed a new 5.45mmx39mm round for the AK-74 - in Afghanistan, this weapon inflicted similarly appalling wounds as the M-16 A1 did in Vietnam. The small calibre round was displacing almost all other rifle-calibre military rounds.

But there were problems, as it was inaccurate beyond 300 metres, and not very effective much beyond about 200 metres, and it could not penetrate anmour. The US Army had a requirement for a new 5.56mmx45mm round (to go with the "improved" M-16 A2) that was accurate to, and could penetrate a steel helmet at, 500 metres. The new SS-109 5.56x45mm round accomplished this. Since the 1980's, this round displaced the earlier M-193, along with various Light Machine Guns such as the FN Minimi and now the H&K MG-4 joining various rifles and carbines in 5.56mmx45mm calibre.

But again, there have been problems, not the least of which are persistent reports of enemy troops being shot, often repeatedly, but not brought down (or not before they inflicted losses on those who shot them being falling themselves). The problem is that the SS-109 5.56mmx45mm round lost much of its instability (and thus reducing its susceptibility to tumbling when it strikes its target) due to the heavier weight (due in part to the hardened steel penetrator for AP purposes) and slightly lower velocity of the new bullet (and also due in part to its tighter rifling).

Yes, it is much more accurate and can penetrate steel helmets and even body armour up to certain ranges. But it can no longer reliably bring people down when shot. Especially with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, these problems have finally been if not solved, then at least acknowledged, and over the past few years a new 6.8mmx43mm round has appeared and has been used (apparently with much success) by Special Forces.

The new 6.8mmx43mm SPC (essentially equivalent to .270 Winchester) round (from published accounts anyway) is not only claimed to suprapss the 5.56mmx45mm, but in fact more or less ballistically match the NATO 7.62mmx51mm (essentially equivalent to .308 Winchester) out to 500-600 metres.

The problem is that the 5.56mmx45mm round is simply too small a calibre to reliably do both things, that is penetrate body armour up to 500 metres away, while still retaining enough knock-down power to drop a person with a sinlge shot. It can do one, or the other, but not both at the same time, and each requires a different rifling in the barrels they are fired from. And for all the other Armies that have followed the US Army down the small-calibre path, they are stuck with having to replace (in effect) their stocks of 5.56mmx45mm weapons with something that can do both the jobs of penetrating body armour at reasonably long-distance, and knocking down their targets - and keeping them down.

Small-calibre rifle rounds just aren't good enough.
 

The_Zergling

Junior Member
Good post, but I'd like to note that the reason why the AR-15/M-16 was disliked goes beyond the caliber of its ammunition, but just overall poor design.

I think the biggest problem was the gas system. Because of its direct gas impingement system it basically defecated where it ate. Add a tiny gas tube and poor breach design, and you have a rifle that's hard to clean properly as well...

But yes, the 5.56 round did contribute its share of problems as well.
 

crazyinsane105

Junior Member
VIP Professional
I have serious doubts that the 6.8 round will fully enter service with the American military. It means having to replace all weapons that currently fire the 5.56 NATO and it will be a very expensive ordeal (and not to mention that the Department of Defense is pretty broke right now, a switch to another caliber may not happen for quite a while).
 

Norfolk

Junior Member
VIP Professional
The_Zergling:

Yes, you're quite right that the M-16 is a piece of trash. I not only remember frequent jams with the M-16 A2, but also trying to clean that tiny space between the gas tube and the ceiling of the receiver. It was extremely difficult even when someone had the right cleaning materials at hand, and out in the field, we were often very short of cleaning squares, not to mention CLP, which was also just garbage. I mean, how are you supposed to clean a weapon properly when the stuff you are cleaning it with is also the lubricant. The weapon perpetually sweats carbon. There were good reasons that the old-timers had separate cleaner and oil (personally I resorted to Hoppes' No.9 powder solvent and gun oil, applied separately of course, and with the old FN rifle, the Canadian Army used to put them in vats of varsol, let them soak even overnight, then just wipe them clean the next day).

That said, the point that I was trying to make in the first post was that, the AR-15/M-16's own unique faults aside, perhaps its most baleful effect was to inspire other countries to adopt the small-calibre round. After, all the Galil/R.4, Stery AUG, some FN and H&K designs, AK-74, as well as others have come out and proven quite reliable (and some of them almost sturdy). But the small-calibre rounds that they fire aren't good - sure the AK-74 is good at dropping its victims, but it can't reliably penetrate body armour except at closer ranges; conversely, all those other designs that use the SS-109 may be able to penetrate body armour, but they can't reliably drop their victims. The AR-15/M-16 started this trend, and now it's the standard.

crazyinsane105:

Yeah, I doubt that the US (and subsequently others) will replace the 5.56mm with the 6.8mm, at least in anything like the foreseeable future. The limited information that is coming out about the 6.8mm's performance is mostly through unofficial channels - which makes sense, since the Special forces bypassed the Pentagon and went straight to Remington and Barrett for the 6.8mm and the M-416 - and the Snakeeaters are rarely in the Pentagon's good graces as it is. So, aside from the costs involved in replacing the US inventory of small arms (though the stocks tend to be old as it is, and weapons are frequently found to be worn out, and as such it needs replacing anyway), being more or less unofficially sanctioned, the 6.8mm probably isn't going anywhere unless Congress itself were to force DoD's hand. Right now, Congress is pre-occupied with other matters.

I forget one other thing: most of the Light Machine Guns that have come out over the last generation also use the small-calibre round introduced by the AR-15/M-16, and that just adds to the problem since these LMGs have become so common. Full-calibre round Medium Machine Guns have had to be retained or even re-introduced to make up for the LMG's shortcomings.
 
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sumdud

Senior Member
VIP Professional
Would it be practical to have both the M193 and SS109 on hand and choose your bullets according to the mission? Tanks crews do this, as Utelore (I think) said.
And the M193 would be very handy in Iraq where you really have just CQB these days, if any, and the insurgents aren't armoured. Also, they don't over penetrate walls.
 

Norfolk

Junior Member
VIP Professional
Would it be practical to have both the M193 and SS109 on hand and choose your bullets according to the mission? Tanks crews do this, as Utelore (I think) said. And the M193 would be very handy in Iraq where you really have just CQB these days, if any, and the insurgents aren't armoured. Also, they don't over penetrate walls.

A lot of the insurgents (though by no means the majority) are turning up wearing body armour (from where, well that's interesting), and some are taking advantage of concrete structures to lay ambushes for US troops. I read about one case in which a US Squad (Marine I think) was lured into the ground floor of a house that had a concrete floor. The Iraqi insurgents who were in the basement took advantage of this, and used AP rounds fired from their 7.62mm weapons to fire through the concrete floor at the US troops above them. The US troops's ammo couldn't penetrate the concrete, so they had to skedaddle and call in air support to take out the concrete basement where the insurgents were. US troops still need a reliable, powerful round that can both take enemy troops down and be fully AP capable.

The SS-109/M855 ammo has to be fired from a weapon with a 1 turn in 7" rifling of its barrel, whereas the M-193 only requires 1 turn in 12", so the latter ammo can be fired in any M-16 A2/M-4 and subsequent variants, although the SS109/M-855 cannot be fired from an M-16/M-16A1 or CAR-15.

The problem is carrying and switching between two different types of ammo. Besides the increased weight factor involved (and it makes a real difference), you're taking your life in your hands every time you have to change your magazine (which is obviously necessary when you run out of ammo, still, you're at much greater risk of getting killed when you do so), so having to change magazines in order to switch between two different types of ammo as the targets change is greatly increasing your risks of dying.

There are two possibilities: 1. Go with the 6.8mmx43mm SPC and get new weapons (or at least get upper receivers in 6.8mm that mate to the lower receivers like what Barret is offering the DoD - thus converting all M-16 A2's and subsequent variants to M-416); or 2. Go with Blended Metal Technology (BMT) rounds in 5.56mmx45mm rounds. These are primarily made from sintered metal (like you find in brass or bronze micron filters for pneumatics or hydraulics systems and lines) and depending upon the composition, can also have AP capability as well as true stopping power.

Both of these are SF or ex-SF initiatives. As I said in an earlier post, SF approached both Remington and Barret to develop and produce the 6.8mmx43mm SPC cartridge and the M-416 rifle. As for the BMT, an ex-Navy SEAL working for a private security contractor started using them in Iraq in his '16, and he found that the 5.56mm BMT rounds simply dropped insurgents with a single shot. The Pentagon isn't exactly brimming over with enthusiasm about either of these developments over the last few years it seems, and the BMT bullets raise legal questions about their use. I do not know if a legal opinion has been given on the use of these bullets.

Basically, for infantry one-size-fits-all has to be the way to go for small arms ammo (tracers, usually, though not always, pre-assembled on belts of link excepted). It's not really practicle, given the unique circumstances of the infantry's role, to have to switch between two different types of ammo.
 
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Nethappy

NO WAR PLS
VIP Professional
Would it be practical to have both the M193 and SS109 on hand and choose your bullets according to the mission? Tanks crews do this, as Utelore (I think) said.
And the M193 would be very handy in Iraq where you really have just CQB these days, if any, and the insurgents aren't armoured. Also, they don't over penetrate walls

It's not really practicle, given the unique circumstances of the infantry's role, to have to switch between two different types of ammo.

I agree with Norfolk, no matter how well train u are it will still take a few sec to change between clip. in situation like an ambushes or certain terrian, you just dun have the time.
 

Norfolk

Junior Member
VIP Professional
Try this article I found on World Affairs Forum:

The Last “Big Lie” of Vietnam Kills U. S. Soldiers in Iraq
August 24th, 2004


At a Vietnam Special Forces base during 1964, I watched a U. S. soldier fire 15 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition into a tethered goat from an AR-15 rifle; moments after the last round hit, the goat fell over. Looking at the dead goat, I saw many little bullet entry-holes on one side; and when we turned him over, I saw many little bullet exit-holes on the other side. Over time, those observations were confirmed and reconfirmed, revealing that the stories we were told on the lethality of the .223 caliber cartridge were fabrications. Those false reports drove the adoption of the .223 caliber cartridge as the 5.56mm NATO cartridge and, ever since, Americans have been sent to war with a cartridge deficient in combat lethality; a deficiency that has recently caused the deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.



What is efficient combat lethality? The book Black Hawk Down quotes SFC Paul Howe’s description of SFC Randy Shughart, a soldier who elected to carry the 7.62mm M-14 into the urban battlefield of Somalia in 1993 rather than the 5.56mm CAR-15 (M-16-variant):



“His rifle may have been heavier and comparatively awkward and delivered a mean recoil, but it...sure knocked a man down with one bullet, and in combat, one shot was all you got. You shoot a guy, you want to see him go down; you don't want to be guessing for the next five hours whether you hit him, or whether he's still waiting for you in the weeds.” [1]



With the wisdom of a combat veteran, Howe describes the lethality necessary for a cartridge in combat—one-round knockdown power.



How did we get from military cartridges with proven one-round knockdown power such as the 30-06 and 7.62mm to the 5.56mm? The journey starts with the term “tumbling.” This term has been associated with the .223 cal./5.56mm cartridge, since early in its marketing as a potential military cartridge to this day. The very word, tumbling, prompts images of a bullet traveling end over end through the human body in 360-degree loops: in reality, it does not move this way at all.



Dr. Martin L. Fackler, COL., USA (Ret.) served as a surgeon in Vietnam during 1968 and, subsequently, pursued the research of terminal ballistics by observing the effects of bullets fired into blocks of ballistic gelatin. In “Wounding patterns for military rifle bullets,” he reports the observation that “all” non-deforming pointed bullets—this included the 30-06 and 7.62mm military full-metal jacket bullets-- “yawed” 180 degrees while passing through the gelatin to exit base-forward; i.e., heaviest end forward. The 5.56mm projectile acted in the same manner with a very precise exception: These rounds “yawed” to 90-degrees, and then fragmented at their weakened serrated band (cannelure) into two or more pieces when fired into ballistic gelatin. However, the 5.56mm projectile does NOT always yaw or fragment. Under field conditions, the probability of these effects is reduced by the following factors:



--The round strikes the target at less than 2700 feet per second. That velocity is reduced by: the farther the range to the target, the greater reduction in velocity; shortened weapon barrel length as is the case with the shorter M-4 carbine; and/or, manufacturing variances in the cartridge.



--Variances in human body thickness and flesh density and consistency.



In those cases, the bullet neither yaws nor fragments and causes only a pencil size hole through the body; i.e., small hole in, small hole out. Neither Dr. Fackler nor anyone else has provided any empirical data or estimate on the incidence of the 5.56mm yaw/fragmentation effect on enemy soldiers. Conversely, since first used by Americans in combat, there has been a consistent observation from the field—enemy soldiers continue to fire their weapons after being hit by multiple 5.56mm bullets; evidently, no yaw/fragmentation effect. Nevertheless, the term “tumble” was apparently derived from idealized yaw action and, as suggested by the following, was chosen in lieu of the word yaw because it would “sell” better. [2]



The book, The Black Rifle, M16 Retrospective by Edward C. Ezell and R. Blake Stevens, “ . . . is, so far as [the authors] could make it so, the truth about the controversial 5.56mm caliber AR-15 (M16)—what it is, what it is not, where it came from, and why.”



Edward C. Ezell, Ph.D., now deceased, was the Curator/Supervisor of the Division of Armed Forces History, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC and the editor of perhaps the world’s most famous gun book, Small Arms of the World. The Black Rifle contains one of the earliest characterizations that the .223 cal. bullet tumbled in a brochure produced by Colt’s Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, Inc. The caption written by the book’s authors reads, “From the first Colt AR-15 brochure, produced in a desperate attempt to interest somebody – anybody - in the merits of the AR-15’s ‘unmatched superiority.’” In one of the three internal brochure illustrations is text reading, in part, “On impact the tumbling action of the .223 caliber ammunition increases effectiveness.” [3]



In 1961, Colt’s did get somebody’s attention. The Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense (DoD) was enjoined by the Kennedy Administration to explore how the United States could support a foreign ally in a “limited” war. In the spring of 1961, ARPA’s Project AGILE was implemented to supply “research and engineering support for the military and paramilitary forces engaged in or threatened by conflict in remote areas of the world.” In October of 1961, ARPA provided ten Colt’s AR-15’s to Vietnamese Forces in Saigon to conduct a limited test. The Black Rifle remarks of this test, “The number of rifles might have been small, but the enthusiastic reaction of the Vietnamese and their American advisors alike who handled and fired the AR-15s was just as [Colt’s marketing agent] had predicted.” Armed with these positive results, ARPA succeeded in expanding the Project AGILE study by procuring 1,000 AR-15s for distribution among select Vietnamese units for field-testing. Ezell & Stevens write that this approval resulted in “ . . . saving Colt’s from almost sure financial disaster and also setting the stage for the most influential yet controversial document so far in the history of the already controversial AR-15.” [4]



The purpose of this test, as set forth in, ARPA, “Report of Task 13A, Test of ArmaLite Rifle, AR-15,” dated 31 July 1962, was “ . . . a comparison between the AR-15 and the M2 Carbine to determine which is a more suitable replacement for shoulder weapons in selected units of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).” The Project AGILE results were summed up, in part, by ARPA as follows: “The suitability of the AR-15 as the basic shoulder weapon for the Vietnamese has been established. For the type of conflict now occurring in Vietnam, the weapon was also found by its users and by MAAG advisors to be superior in virtually all respects to the M1 Rifle, M1 and M2 Carbines, Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, and Browning Automatic Rifle.” NOTE: This study and its recommendations concerned the suitability of the AR-15 for Vietnamese soldiers, who were described by the testers to be of “small stature, body configuration and light weight,” NOT larger stature United States soldiers. [5]



In any case, the report was widely read and some of its components came under serious question, especially those purporting to describe the demonstrated lethality of the .223 caliber cartridge. The following are three such examples from the Project AGILE report:



Example 1. “On 160900 June, one platoon from the 340 Ranger company was on a ground operation . . . and contacted 3 armed VC in heavily forested jungle.. . . At a distance of approximately 15 meters, one Ranger fired an AR-15 full automatic hitting one VC with 3 rounds with the first burst. One round in the head took it completely off. Another in the right arm, took it completely off. One round hit him in the right side, causing a hole about 5 inches in diameter.. . . (Rangers)”



Example 2. “On 9 June a Ranger Platoon from the 40th Infantry Regt. Was given the mission of ambushing an estimated VC Company.. . .



Number of VC killed: 5 [Descriptions of the one-round killing wounds follow.]


Back wound, which caused the thoracic cavity to explode.
Stomach wound, which caused the abdominal cavity to explode.
Buttock wound, which destroyed all tissue of both buttocks.
Chest wound from right to left; destroyed the thoracic cavity.
Heel wound; the projectile entered the bottom of the right foot causing the leg to split from the foot to the hip.


These deaths were inflicted by the AR-15 and all were instantaneous except the buttock wound. He lived approximately five minutes. (7th Infantry Division)”



Example 3. “On 13 April, a Special Forces team made a raid on a small village. In the raid, seven VC were killed. Two were killed by AR-15 fire. Range was 50 meters. One man was hit in the head; it looked like it exploded. A second man was hit in the chest, his back was one big hole. (VN Special Forces)” [6.]



The above “field-reports” are incredulous on their face and some in DoD requested that these results be duplicated scientifically. The Army Wound Ballistics Laboratory at Edgewood Arsenal attempted to do just that. Using .223 caliber Remington ammunition provided by Colt’s representative, they conducted their “standard lethality trials that consisted of measuring the cavitational and other effects of firing at known distances into blocks of ballistic gelatin, and where necessary, anaesthetized goats.” They failed to duplicate the explosive effects reported by Project AGILE. In November 1962, the Army initiated “Worldwide” tactical and technical tests of the AR-15 using U. S. soldiers. Edgewood was tasked to perform further lethality tests using modified .223 caliber ammunition. Ezell and Stevens describe the modifications: “They had modified some 55-grain .223 caliber ball bullets of Remington manufacture by cutting approximately 1/4 inch off the nose and drilling a 3/32-inch-diameter hole about 1/4 inch deep into the lead core of each bullet.” The results? The authors continue, “As it turned out, even the hollow-points failed to duplicate anything like the spectacular effects recorded by the Vietnamese unit commanders and their American advisors, which had subsequently been taken as fact and much used as propaganda.” [7.]



The .223 caliber cartridge was morphed into the 5.56mm NATO cartridge and adopted for the United States Service Rifle M-16 (formerly, AR-15) replacing the 7.62mm M-14. How could such propaganda have convinced the Department of Defense to adopt the .223 caliber cartridge? “All this was inspired by the principle -- which is quite true in itself -- that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper stata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods.”

Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf [8.]



As is usually the case, a judgment based on lies was to adversely affect those at the “pointy end of the spear.” American warriors reported enemy soldiers continuing to close and fire their weapons after sustaining multiple hits by 5.56mm bullets. This happened as early as 9 December 1965 in the official “After Action Report of the Ia Drang Valley Operation . . ..” popularized by the movie and book We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young. The commanding officer of the battalion engaged there, Col. Harold G. Moore, USA, writes of assaulting enemy soldiers being hit by 5.56mm rounds: "Even after being hit several times in the chest, many continued firing and moving for several more steps before dropping dead." [9.]



Later in that war, a similar experience is voiced by Col. John Hayworth, USA (Ret.): “In one fire-fight, I saw my RTO place three rounds [of 5.56 mm] in the chest of a charging NVA regular at 50 yards. He kept firing his AK and never slowed down. At 30 yards, I hit him with a blast of double ought buck. It picked him up off his feet and he didn't get up again.” [10.]



In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the DoD increased the weight of the 5.56mm 55-grain bullet (M193) to 62-grains, replaced some of its lead core with a tungsten steel core, painted the bullet tip green and designated the new cartridge M855. In 1991, the Pentagon sent its warriors to the Gulf War with this new green-tip cartridge. Maj. Howard Feldmeier, USMC (Ret.) was there: “ . . . several Marines commented that they had to shoot Iraqi soldiers 2-3 or more times with the 62-grain 5.56mm green tip ammo before they stopped firing back at them . . ..” That report is exemplified by one of an Iraqi officer who was thrown from his vehicle and set afire by an explosion: “Somehow he managed to hold on to his AK-47. He also got up, still on fire, faced the firing line of Marines and charged forward firing his weapon from the hip. He didn't hit anyone but two Marines each nailed him with a three round burst from their M-16A2s. One burst hit him immediately above his heart, the other in his belly button. [He] . . . kept right on charging and firing until his magazine was empty. When he got up to the Marines two of them tackled him and rolled him in the sand to put out the fire. . . . He was quickly carried back to the battalion aid station . . .. The surgeons told me he certainly died of burns, but not necessarily from the six 5.56mm wounds . . ..” [11.]



In spite of the above “lesson learned,” the DoD dispatched its warriors to combat in Somalia in 1993 with the same flawed “green tip” cartridge as testified in Mark Bowden’s book Black Hawk Down: “His weapon was the most sophisticated infantry rifle in the world, a customized CAR-15, and he was shooting the army's new 5.56mm green tip round. . . . The bullet made a small, clean hole, and unless it happened to hit the heart or spine, it wasn't enough to stop a man in his tracks. Howe felt he had to hit a guy five or six times just to get his attention.”



The Pentagon remained unmoved by that experience of its warriors and continued to send them to war underpowered. On 4 April 2002, I received an e-mail from a trooper in Afghanistan who appeals, in part: “The current-issue 62gr 5.56mm (223) round, especially when fired from the short-barreled, M-4 carbine, is proving itself (once again) to be woefully inadequate as [a] man stopper. Engagements at all ranges are requiring multiple, solid hits to permanently bring down enemy soldiers. Penetration is also sadly deficient. Even light barriers are not perforated by this rifle/cartridge combination.” [12.]



Additional observations of the impotence of the 5.56mm round soon appeared in official and professional publications. In their official briefing “Lessons Learned in Afghanistan” dated April 2002, LTC C. Dean, USA and SFC S. Newland, USA of the U. S. Army Natick Soldier Center reported: “Soldiers asked for a weapon with a larger round. ‘So it will drop a man with one shot.’” In the October 2002 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette magazine, Capt Philip Treglia, USMC reflected on his Afghanistan experience in December 2001 by reporting that, “the 5.56 mm round will not put a man to the ground with two shots to the chest.” Capt Treglia’s men were trained to fire two bullets into an enemy’s chest and if that did not knock him down, they were to shift fire to the head. This is the corrective action implemented for these Marines and many others in the Armed Forces for the impotent 5.56mm cartridge rather than equipping them with a rifle that fired a bullet with one-round knockdown power. And, as Capt Treglia reported, multiple hits with the 5.56mm bullet didn’t work any better in Afghanistan than it did anytime in the past.



In a 3 March 2003 written briefing, LCdr. Gary K. Roberts, USNR recommended to RAdm. Albert M. Calland, Commander, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command that he upgrades his command’s 5.56mm weapons to the 6.8mm cartridge. That briefing, entitled, “Enhancement of NSW Carbine & Rifle Capability,” opens by observing:



Recent combat operations have highlighted terminal performance problems, generally manifested as failures to rapidly incapacitate opponents, during combat operations when M855 62gr. “Green Tip” FMJ is fired from 5.56mm rifles and carbines. Failure to rapidly incapacitate armed opponents increases the risk of U.S. forces being injured or killed and jeopardizes mission success. [13.]



That statement was prophetic.



On 12 September 2003, in Ar Ramadi, Iraq elements of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group engaged enemy forces in a firefight. An insurgent was struck in the torso by several rounds of 5.56mm ammunition from their M-4 carbines (this is the current shortened version of the M-16 Service Rifle). He continued to fire his AK-47 and mortally wounded MSgt Kevin N. Morehead, age 33, from Little Rock, Arkansas. The engagement continued with the same insurgent surprising SFC William M. Bennett, age 35, from Seymour, Tennessee from a hiding place and killing him instantly with a three-round burst to the head and neck. SSgt Robert E Springer, threw away his M-4 carbine, drew an obsolete WWI/WWII vintage .45 caliber pistol and killed the insurgent with one shot. A close inspection of the enemy's corpse revealed that he had been hit by seven 5.56 mm rounds in his torso. Also, in this engagement, these soldiers were provided with a commercially produced 5.56mm round of 77-grain weight vice the 62-grain bullets in use by general-purpose forces. Obviously, the larger 5.56mm round was of little consequence. [14.]



These reports are consistent with my own experience during three tours of duty in Vietnam from the goat incident in 1964 described above to service with the 3rd Marine Division in 1968-69; experience that repeatedly reminded me that this 5.56mm cartridge was nothing more than the full-metal jacket military version of the commercial .223 caliber Remington cartridge. The .223 caliber Remington was and is today commercially advertised and sold as a “varmint cartridge” for hunting groundhogs, prairie dogs and woodchucks. The cartridge is offered with soft point, hollow point, fragmentation, or projectiles incorporating two or more of these attributes to enhance its lethality and assure a “clean kill”: one-round knockdown power on varmints. States such as the Commonwealth of Virginia do not permit it to be used for hunting deer or bear because its lethality—with or without those enhancements--does not assure a “clean kill” on big game. [15] Yet, its full metal jacket military counterpart continues to be issued to American warriors in spite of almost 40 years of Lessons Learned that enemy soldiers continue to fire their weapons and have even killed our soldiers after sustaining multiple hits from 5.56mm bullets.



The lethality of the 5.56mm cartridge, sold on lies, cannot be fixed in truth. It is time the Department of Defense recognizes this “Big Lie” from the Vietnam War and in the names of MSgt Kevin N. Morehead and SFC William M. Bennett replaces this varmint cartridge with one that gives our warriors that critical capability described by SFC Paul Howe above--one-round knockdown power!


The author's 25-year Marine career included service as an infantryman and intelligence officer with highlights of three tours of duty in Vietnam and, ultimately, representing the Defense Intelligence Agency as a briefer to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and other Washington area decision makers. He currently manages MILINET an Internet forum on international political/military affairs.

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1. Bowden, M, Black Hawk Down, Penguin Books, 2000, p. 208.


2. Fackler, ML,"Wounding patterns of military rifle bullets," International Defense Review, January 1989, pp. 59-64.



3. Ezell, EC & Stevens, RB, The Black Rifle, M16 Retrospective, Collector Grade Publications, Inc., 1994, p. 98.



4. Ibid. pp.99-100.



5. Ibid. pp.101-106.



6. Ibid. pp. 106-107.



7. Ibid. p. 116.



8. Hitler, A, Mein Kampf. James Murphy, translator. London, New York, Melbourne: Hurst and Blackett Ltd; April 1942; page 134.



9. Moore, Col. HG, “After Action Report, Ian Drang Valley Operation 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 14-16 November 1965,” dated, 9 December 1965, p. 8.



10. Hayworth, Col. J, E-Mail to author, 23 April 2002.



11. Feldmeier, Maj. H, E-Mail to author, 21 May 2002.



12. Anonymous, E-Mail to MILINET, 26 March 2002.



13. Roberts, USNR, LCdr. Gary K., Brief to RAdm Albert M. Calland, CMDR NAVSPECWARCOM, “Enhancement of NSW Carbine & Rifle Capability” brief, 3 March 2003.



14. Jones, Bruce L., “MILINET: Case Studies in Combat Failures of 5.56mm Ammunition,” 3 November 2003



15.
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Maj. Anthony F. Milavic, USMC (Ret.)

Now, the World Affairs Forum boys didn't necessarily like what this guy had to say, and some of them claim to be trigger-pullers themselves; that said, one of them still posted this article anyway, and it is interesting.
 
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Norfolk

Junior Member
VIP Professional
I found this article at Chuck Hawk's. It's balanced, thoguh I don't agree with all of Mendez's points, especially having two different types of ammo for two different calibres of weapons carried within the same squad/section:

Quote:

Replacing the 5.56mm NATO Cartridge

By Nelson Mendez



For now it might be more useful to keep both the 5.56mm and 7.62mm NATO rounds. It may be cheaper in the long run to have only one cartridge, but by forcing the military to use only one cartridge, it could limit the tactical capabilities of the infantryman's weapons.

Each round has its benefits. I think that they complement each other very well. Tanks use different types of rounds depending on the target type, e.g. HE rounds for soft target and AT rounds for armored ones.

I think that a dismounted infantry squad needs to have both rounds for the best overall effectiveness. This could be done by assigning 1-.30 caliber SAW and 2-.30 caliber semiautomatic high capacity rifles to each squad, plus the usual M16 (.22 caliber) armed troops, while also receiving support from a vehicle mounted .50 caliber machine gun or 20mm cannon.

The 5.56mm cartridge is very efficient at wounding tissue at short range because light, high velocity bullets have a tendency to destabilize in tissue, making for wounds that may seem out of proportion to their caliber, but of course your mileage may vary. As a result of the light bullets used in the 5.56 cartridge, though, they are more prone to ricochet or under penetrate when used against vehicles, buildings, or other types of cover.

Penetration is where the 7.62mm shines. It doesn't tumble or fragment to the same extent as the 5.56 in tissue but it penetrates much better than the 5.56mm.

Some folks want to replace the 5.56mm outright with the 7.62mm, but I think that this would be a mistake. There are other alternatives available.

1. As already stated, use both cartridges to complement each other. Just as tanks use specialty ammo and the Air Force can call on specialized aircraft to perform specific roles, the infantry squad should be able to make use of both cartridges.

2. Convert to a caliber/cartridge (6.8mm SPC?) somewhere between the 5.56 and the 7.62 and then issue magazines with mixed bullet types (a mix of high velocity fragmentary and higher penetration rounds) in a ratio most appropriate to the mission type.

I understand that point of impact would change when firing bullets of different weights and velocities, but isn't that already the case with the ammo that we are using now? My magazine has two kinds of ammo in it right now; a slower, lighter tracer and a faster, heavier ball cartridge in a ratio of 1:2. Anti-aircraft guns mix HE, AP and tracer rounds without compromising effectiveness.

The ideal caliber, in terms of recoil, penetration and wound potential is probably somewhere between 6mm (.243") and 7mm (.284"). By moving to an intermediate caliber and using mixed ammo magazines, say 1-penetrator:2-frangible rounds, I think it might be possible to combine the strengths of both NATO rounds into one package.

I realize that the army is a very traditional organization, and that change is always resisted at all levels, but it is not because of tradition that we have the best military in the world; it is because of innovation. We adapt and we overcome. Tradition makes us the best soldiers but innovation makes us the best equipped.

Conclusion

To survive, we need to be able to adapt. There are two ways to make a squad adaptable: through the use of two complementary specialists, giving tactical flexibility at the squad level, or by incorporating a multi-role round, providing for tactical flexibility at the individual soldier level.

The Air Force has struggled with the use multi-role aircraft vs. the use of complementary specialized aircraft, and it appears that they are turning more and more to the use of multi-role aircraft. Perhaps this could be a model to be emulated by infantry? We can't all be fighters, we can't all be bombers, but perhaps we could be fighter-bombers?

I don't claim to have all the answers, but I do believe that to remain successful in combat we need to be flexible. Which direction the army will go? Only time will tell, but hopefully it will be for the best.

-Unquote

I'm trying to find a good article to post on the merits of the 5.56mm. When I find it, I'll post it here. I do agree with Mendez that ultimately, something in the area of a 7mm short cartridge would probably be best for carbines, rifles, and light machine guns at the squad/section level. There are good reasons that the 5.56mm should be replaced (persitent questions about take-down power and cover penetration - but not AP penetration) but also good reasons that the 7.62mm was replaced as the squad/section cartridge (too much recoil in automatic fire for rifles, and very heavy ammo, not to mention very heavy light machine guns and a lot of very heavy ammo at squad/section level - though no-one complains about the firepower!).
 

Norfolk

Junior Member
VIP Professional
Here's the 5.56mm article, and it makes the vital point hat no matter what cartridge is used, it can't be expected to make up for poor markmanship or loss of control due to (perfectly understandable) emotional reactions under fire. You've got to hit the right spot on the target.

This article is from Strategy Page:

Quote:

September 9, 2004

Since the 1960s, when the U.S. began using two calibers for its rifles and machine-guns (5.56mm and 7.62mm), there has been a debate over the effectiveness of the lighter 5.56mm bullet. Initially, U.S. Army officials took it on faith that the 5.56mm round could do the job. Hunters, however, rarely used the 5.56mm (.22 caliber) round on game that weighed as much as a man. Nearly all hunters used bullets of at least 6.8mm (.270 caliber), and most preferred 7.62mm (.30 caliber) or a shotgun firing an 18.5mm (12 gauge) solid slug (a deer slug.) The advantage of the 5.56mm weapon (the M-16) was weight. Not so much the weight of the weapon (only a pound or two lighter than 7.62mm rifles), but in the weight of ammo. Troops going out carrying 200 rounds of 7.62mm ammo would be carrying 12.2 pounds of bullets. But with an M-16, they could carry 700 rounds for the same weight. Actually, they would carry less, because of the weight of the magazines, but that still gave an infantryman more than twice as much ammo for the same weight carried.

In the last four decades, there have been constant complaints from the troops about enemy soldiers hit by 5.56mm bullets, who kept on coming. These accounts were not urban legends, but they were not unique either. As far back as 1900, during the fighting against Moslem rebels in the Philippines, there had been complaints of enemy fighters getting shot and continuing to attack. From this experience, the then standard army pistol, a .38 caliber (9.65mm) weapon, was replaced by a .45 caliber (11.4mm) one. In the 1990s, the .45 was in turn replaced by a 9mm pistol. There were a lot of complaints about that, but 90 years experience demonstrated that you should not depend on a pistol in the heat of combat. If you want protection against fanatics, take a shotgun with you.

Examining the experience of hunters, and soldiers in many other wars over the past century, one can conclude that caliber is not as important as where the bullet hits, and what state of mind the target is in. The Russians, and professional assassins, frequently use .22 caliber pistols or rifles to take out victims at close range. Two in the head, you know hes dead, is their mantra. At the other extreme, there have been cases of troops losing a limb to a .50 caliber or 20mm shell, and continuing to fight, for a while at least. This points out that, if you shoot someone in the brain, or spinal column, they will go down, no matter what caliber the bullet is. But if the target is energized, with the adrenalin pumping, you can shoot them several times, in non-vital places, and they wont immediately notice the injury. Such incidents were widely reported during both World Wars, when most bullets fired were equivalent to the current 7.62mm.

Some hunters go after deer, especially white tail deer, with 5.56mm weapons. But most prefer a larger 7.62mm weapon, or a shotgun firing solid shot. If you are a very good shot, you can regularly bring down deer (who weigh about as much as a human, between 100-300 pounds, but with a lot more muscle and speed) with a 5.56mm round. But the key is getting the heart or lung shot. An additional advantage of the 5.56mm rifle, is that the lower recoil enables you to get two or more shots at the same aiming point, because the first one wont knock you off your aim. However, the majority of hunters are not sharpshooters, and prefer the harder hitting 7.62mm rifles, or 12 gauge shotgun.

American infantry are much better trained than they were in the 1960s. Many of the troops back then were draftees, in for only two years. Today, most grunts are in for three or four years. A year or two of additional training makes a big difference, especially with the better scopes and marksmanship training methods used today. For that reason, theres a movement within the army to switch from 5.56mm to 6.8mm. This would mean that ammunition would be heavier (almost twice as heavy as current 5.56 rounds), but the feeling is that the heavier bullet would be more accurate at longer ranges, and more likely to take down whoever it hits. The problem is, there has never been a scientific study of this issue. You cant get people willing to be shot, in different places, while at different levels of agitation, to see how long they can continue to move or fire their weapons. The anecdotal evidence is, well, anecdotal. It is a fact that shots in the brain and spinal column will definitely take down your target. The 6.8mm round will probably be more likely, than the 5.56mm, to stop most enemy troops. But will it be worth the risk of carrying less ammo? Often troops use ammo just to make the enemy keep their heads down, or prevent them from moving. In these situations, volume is more important that accuracy. No studies have been done of this aspect of combat, although there is much anecdotal evidence showing how important this kind of fire is.

But one thing is certain, when it comes to bullets, its not caliber or hitting power that counts as much as where it hits.

-Unquote:

The 5.56mmx45mm SS109 is an efficient killer, for the most part, below 200m (in weapons that have at least an 18" barrel) and suited for QCB and automatic fire when necessary (like clearing trenches). But it lacks stopping power beyond 200m (even though it can penetrate armour at 500-600m) and to drop targets up to 800m, either most or all the rifles of a squad or section have to engage an area target simultaneously, or resort to LMGs of this calibre to do so (and for which they are designed). This requires a very great deal of ammo and a lot of uninterrupted ammo resupply.

Similarly, there are those who advocate either bringing back the full-length & 7.62mmx51mm cartridge for assault rifles on the one hand, or replacing all carbines, rifles, and LMGs and MMGs with 6.5mm to 7mm short cartidges on the other. Both are mistakes. The reason that the 7.62mm full power catridges were dropped from assault rifles in the first place was that they could not be controlled on automatic, wasting their ammo (the Germans discovered this problem in WWII with their 7.93mmx57mm Mauser cartridge used in the FJStG 42, and resolved in with the 7.92mmx33mm K short cartridge in the Stg 43/44/45/MP-44 assault rifles, which the Russians developed into the AK-47 with the 7.62mmx39mm short cartridge).

On the other hand the full length 7.62mmx51mm round is needed by medium machine gunners to reach and drop their targets at long ranges (and deal with light armour). Short cartridges (as opposed to long, never mind Magnum cartridges) in 6.5mm or 7mm may be effective for LMGs and riflemen to hit out and drop their targets to 600-800m as well as providing superior AP penetration over 5.56mm with short bursts or single shots, but not to the 1,800m of MMGs. Full-length cartridges are necessary here.

I still maintain that a 7mm short cartidge (or perhaps even a 6.5mm) would constitute an effective and happy medium to be used for all squad/section small arms (carbines, rifles, LMGs). The 5.56mmx45mm round and its ilk would best be replaced outright. The full-length cartidges like 7.62mmx51mm should be retained for MMGs.
 
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