Hi everybody
I read somewhere a few days ago that China was producing 400 ICBMs every month. To me, this figure seems complete fantasy but does anybody know anything about the rate at which China is expanding its nuclear forces? On this site, I think it says that there is no intention to rapidly raise the stockpile of nuclear warheads.
Obviously, China is trying to catch up with the most sophisticated military powers in the world, in particular the US. To be fair, it seems as though it has fared well so far. This is illustrated by the fact that waging a sustained non-nuclear air campaign à la Kosovo 1999 would today create severe headaches even for the U.S. Airforce. But clearly, the modernisation of China's military is a cumbersome and very complicated process as the American forces are constantly upgrading their weaponry, strategy and training. E. g., there is no use in simply acquiring 2'000 Su-30s if these aircraft are likely to be outdated or rendered useless by critical innovations by the US airforce over the next ten years.
I am layman on military or strategic affairs, but still I would like to raise the following question: Could a strong emphasis on the rapid development and production of long-range nuclear missiles make any sense? This would have to be accompanied by establishing/ significantly upgrading corresponding early warning capabilities (over-the-horizon radar, surveillance satellites etc.) The Soviet Union's vast concentration of assault guns and T-34s appeared rather unimpressive after Hiroshima and Nagasaki - until the Russians managed to catch up on the US by developping its own arsenal nuclear and hydrogen bomb. China does have a nuclear deterrent but it is no match against either the US or Russia's.
Once a potential attacker realises that an attempted nuclear strike against China would be retaliated with equal ferocity, his enthusiasm to launch military interventions in China's sphere of interest would be dulled considerably. Policy makers would take notice if China's nuclear strike capability expanded dramatically and would within a comparably short time cover, say, not merely the American west coast but the whole American mainland.
Does anybody know whether this would be a particularly costly undertaking? After all, China seems to be proficiant at developping and producing ICBMs and nuclear warheads. It does not - unlike in other areas - need help from other powers with this task. This may be less the case when it comes to a setting up an integrated early warning system for this nuclear arsenal (?)
An alternative for China might be to develop its own ABM-system. However, this endavour would probably prove more difficult and possibly less reliable. Not least, the US is already active here, too. What my consideration boils down is that a rapid and massive reinforcement of China's nuclear deterrent could yield comparatively high psychological and diplomatic gains and that this strategy would set a comparably clear roadmap perhaps less prone to set-backs and misinvestments which occur in other services (e. g. submarine fleet). Without doubt, though, the nuclear detterent is not the absolute but rather the ultimative instrument in foreign policy and therefore not very flexible. Therefore, there could be no question that the current modernisation of China's conventional forces has to proceed.
I'm looking forward to reading your thoughts!
With kind regards
Andrew
I read somewhere a few days ago that China was producing 400 ICBMs every month. To me, this figure seems complete fantasy but does anybody know anything about the rate at which China is expanding its nuclear forces? On this site, I think it says that there is no intention to rapidly raise the stockpile of nuclear warheads.
Obviously, China is trying to catch up with the most sophisticated military powers in the world, in particular the US. To be fair, it seems as though it has fared well so far. This is illustrated by the fact that waging a sustained non-nuclear air campaign à la Kosovo 1999 would today create severe headaches even for the U.S. Airforce. But clearly, the modernisation of China's military is a cumbersome and very complicated process as the American forces are constantly upgrading their weaponry, strategy and training. E. g., there is no use in simply acquiring 2'000 Su-30s if these aircraft are likely to be outdated or rendered useless by critical innovations by the US airforce over the next ten years.
I am layman on military or strategic affairs, but still I would like to raise the following question: Could a strong emphasis on the rapid development and production of long-range nuclear missiles make any sense? This would have to be accompanied by establishing/ significantly upgrading corresponding early warning capabilities (over-the-horizon radar, surveillance satellites etc.) The Soviet Union's vast concentration of assault guns and T-34s appeared rather unimpressive after Hiroshima and Nagasaki - until the Russians managed to catch up on the US by developping its own arsenal nuclear and hydrogen bomb. China does have a nuclear deterrent but it is no match against either the US or Russia's.
Once a potential attacker realises that an attempted nuclear strike against China would be retaliated with equal ferocity, his enthusiasm to launch military interventions in China's sphere of interest would be dulled considerably. Policy makers would take notice if China's nuclear strike capability expanded dramatically and would within a comparably short time cover, say, not merely the American west coast but the whole American mainland.
Does anybody know whether this would be a particularly costly undertaking? After all, China seems to be proficiant at developping and producing ICBMs and nuclear warheads. It does not - unlike in other areas - need help from other powers with this task. This may be less the case when it comes to a setting up an integrated early warning system for this nuclear arsenal (?)
An alternative for China might be to develop its own ABM-system. However, this endavour would probably prove more difficult and possibly less reliable. Not least, the US is already active here, too. What my consideration boils down is that a rapid and massive reinforcement of China's nuclear deterrent could yield comparatively high psychological and diplomatic gains and that this strategy would set a comparably clear roadmap perhaps less prone to set-backs and misinvestments which occur in other services (e. g. submarine fleet). Without doubt, though, the nuclear detterent is not the absolute but rather the ultimative instrument in foreign policy and therefore not very flexible. Therefore, there could be no question that the current modernisation of China's conventional forces has to proceed.
I'm looking forward to reading your thoughts!
With kind regards
Andrew