Here's an article critically discussing the value of the Joint Strike Fighter to the future American forces. Maybe it is of interest here, as for me I like the author's systematic approach, starting with the overall geopolitical situation and then moving on to discussing the capabilities of the JSF. I have attempted to extract the most important points.
Air Power Australia Analysis 2005-04
7th August 2005
by Dr Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon
Can Joint Strike Fighter Survive the Quadrennial Defense Review?
"The United States is now grappling with the realities of the twenty first century, a world which has split along the divide of the wealthy and developed, and the poor and the undeveloped. The smooth continuum of wealth and national development which charactertised the world of two decades ago has vanished, as the collapse of the Soviet Empire and economic globalisation have created two distinct strata of nations."
The Dichotomy in Force Structure Needs
The Americans now confront a world in which there are two distinct categories of potential and actual opponent. The first are developed or developing nation states with agendas including Iran, the DPRK and, importantly, the PRC. The second are failed states, failing states, underdeveloped nation states, and associated non-state entities with military or paramilitary agendas. (...)
In practical terms this amounts to a need for a two tier force structure, in which an 'upper tier' exists to deter or defeat nation state threats, and in which a 'lower tier' exists to defeat non-state actors and other 'irregular' threats. In a sense this reflects the Tofflerian paradigm of information age societies confronting industrial age and agrarian age opponents. Two categories of opponent each requiring unique capabilities to defeat inevitably results in a two tier force structure model. (...)
Post 1991 Russia has progressively abandoned all earlier constraints on the export of high technology weapons. As a result we see late Soviet era analogues of equivalent US systems proliferating widely, and in the instance of China, being absorbed by the domestic technology base and locally manufactured...To remain competitive in nation state conflicts the US must have a decisive advantage in upper tier assets, especially air power. If the US attempts to achieve this advantage by using legacy Cold War technologies, it becomes a game of fielding numbers much superior to potential opponents. In the instance of China, this is unachievable given current PLA plans to field a force comparable in numbers of Sukhoi/J-11 and Chengu J-10 numbers to the current US inventory of F-15s and F-16s. As a result the US must match China's numbers but using assets a generation ahead technologically - such as the F/A-22A and MC-2A.
These 'sharp end' pressures are significant, and contrast enormously with the 'lower tier' demands of conflict in the domain of failed states and non state actors. Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, peace enforcement and peace-keeping are most intensive in several areas - rapidly deployable, highly mobile and sustainable ground forces, and supporting, airlift, ISR and networking capabilities. In these conflicts the only threat to air power are small arms, RPGs and MANPADS - air space is effectively uncontested. (...)
The inevitable result of these pressures will be selective culling of capabilities which fall into the gap between the two styles of conflict. This is why the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is highly exposed in the currently developing strategic environment.
Many key design features and capabilities of the JSF reflect late 1980s US Air Force research in enhancing battlefield interdiction and strike aircraft capabilities against Warpac forces, and the now unique experience of Desert Storm, where Saddam opted to pit Warpac style ground forces against US led air power.
In dealing with 'lower tier' conflicts such as failed states, militias, terrorist movements, and insurgents, the costly and unique survivability features of the JSF, such as the spherical coverage DAS (Distributed Aperture [InfraRed] System) and radar stealth are of no value at all. In such environments the existing F-16E/F and F/A-18E/F are more than adequate... At the other end of the spectrum the JSF is also in difficulty. The benchmark 'nation state conflict scenario' for the US will be some form of conflict with China, probably over Taiwan. Given the size of China's air force, and an environment where attacks on the mainland could result in escalation to a nuclear exchange, the US will have to fight a constrained air war aimed at defeating the PLA-AF in the air, and destroying PLA-N surface assets invading Taiwan. (...)
If we test the JSF design unrefuelled combat radius against this environment it becomes evident very quickly that the aircraft's sizing is not well adapted to the environment. Plots 1 and 2 depict, respectively, histograms of great circle distances between PLA runways in mainland China, and Guam and Okinawa. The plots are important for two reasons - the unrefuelled combat radius of the PLA's Su-27/30 fighters is 650-750 NMI and the unrefuelled combat radius of the JSF is similar or lesser.
While basing in Okinawa is viable for the JSF in terms of reach, it is also exposed to the full brunt of any counterforce operations by the PLA. Basing in Guam, or other 'safe' sites, does not suffer this problem, but has single engine JSFs towed by tanker to targets beyond 1,500 NMI, with long legs over water, an environment not unlike that experienced by USAAF P-47s and P-51s during the bombing of Japan in 1945. As the JSF will require F/A-22A escorts in this type of environment, the cost of each bomb delivered by JSF is magnified by the cost of tankers and escorts, and the cost of CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue) assets to cover the routes from Guam. (..)
Most such operations would involve air superiority sorties to defeat PLA strike sorties against Taiwan, US basing in the region and maritime targets in the area, fighter escort sorties for ISR assets and LRMP ASW assets, and anti-shipping strikes against the upper tier of the PLA-N surface fleet. In all of these roles the JSF is of marginal utility compared to the F/A-22A. (...)
The utility of the naval CV JSF is an open question. While incrementally more capable and stealthier than the F/A-18E/F, it is a single engine design which is not a favoured configuration for CV ops... Given that the JSF offers only incremental gains against the F/A-18E/F, the Navy will have a very low pain threshold to JSF delays and cost blowouts. We should not be surprised if the Navy is the first to bail out of JSF.
The future of the JSF in the evolving strategic environment, and evolving US budgetary and force structure debate, is likely to be largely determined by the political clout of the US Marine Corps, and the lobbying power of industrial vested interests. Without these champions the JSF will be fighting for survival."
Air Power Australia Analysis 2005-04
7th August 2005
by Dr Carlo Kopp and Peter Goon
Can Joint Strike Fighter Survive the Quadrennial Defense Review?
"The United States is now grappling with the realities of the twenty first century, a world which has split along the divide of the wealthy and developed, and the poor and the undeveloped. The smooth continuum of wealth and national development which charactertised the world of two decades ago has vanished, as the collapse of the Soviet Empire and economic globalisation have created two distinct strata of nations."
The Dichotomy in Force Structure Needs
The Americans now confront a world in which there are two distinct categories of potential and actual opponent. The first are developed or developing nation states with agendas including Iran, the DPRK and, importantly, the PRC. The second are failed states, failing states, underdeveloped nation states, and associated non-state entities with military or paramilitary agendas. (...)
In practical terms this amounts to a need for a two tier force structure, in which an 'upper tier' exists to deter or defeat nation state threats, and in which a 'lower tier' exists to defeat non-state actors and other 'irregular' threats. In a sense this reflects the Tofflerian paradigm of information age societies confronting industrial age and agrarian age opponents. Two categories of opponent each requiring unique capabilities to defeat inevitably results in a two tier force structure model. (...)
Post 1991 Russia has progressively abandoned all earlier constraints on the export of high technology weapons. As a result we see late Soviet era analogues of equivalent US systems proliferating widely, and in the instance of China, being absorbed by the domestic technology base and locally manufactured...To remain competitive in nation state conflicts the US must have a decisive advantage in upper tier assets, especially air power. If the US attempts to achieve this advantage by using legacy Cold War technologies, it becomes a game of fielding numbers much superior to potential opponents. In the instance of China, this is unachievable given current PLA plans to field a force comparable in numbers of Sukhoi/J-11 and Chengu J-10 numbers to the current US inventory of F-15s and F-16s. As a result the US must match China's numbers but using assets a generation ahead technologically - such as the F/A-22A and MC-2A.
These 'sharp end' pressures are significant, and contrast enormously with the 'lower tier' demands of conflict in the domain of failed states and non state actors. Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, peace enforcement and peace-keeping are most intensive in several areas - rapidly deployable, highly mobile and sustainable ground forces, and supporting, airlift, ISR and networking capabilities. In these conflicts the only threat to air power are small arms, RPGs and MANPADS - air space is effectively uncontested. (...)
The inevitable result of these pressures will be selective culling of capabilities which fall into the gap between the two styles of conflict. This is why the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is highly exposed in the currently developing strategic environment.
Many key design features and capabilities of the JSF reflect late 1980s US Air Force research in enhancing battlefield interdiction and strike aircraft capabilities against Warpac forces, and the now unique experience of Desert Storm, where Saddam opted to pit Warpac style ground forces against US led air power.
In dealing with 'lower tier' conflicts such as failed states, militias, terrorist movements, and insurgents, the costly and unique survivability features of the JSF, such as the spherical coverage DAS (Distributed Aperture [InfraRed] System) and radar stealth are of no value at all. In such environments the existing F-16E/F and F/A-18E/F are more than adequate... At the other end of the spectrum the JSF is also in difficulty. The benchmark 'nation state conflict scenario' for the US will be some form of conflict with China, probably over Taiwan. Given the size of China's air force, and an environment where attacks on the mainland could result in escalation to a nuclear exchange, the US will have to fight a constrained air war aimed at defeating the PLA-AF in the air, and destroying PLA-N surface assets invading Taiwan. (...)
If we test the JSF design unrefuelled combat radius against this environment it becomes evident very quickly that the aircraft's sizing is not well adapted to the environment. Plots 1 and 2 depict, respectively, histograms of great circle distances between PLA runways in mainland China, and Guam and Okinawa. The plots are important for two reasons - the unrefuelled combat radius of the PLA's Su-27/30 fighters is 650-750 NMI and the unrefuelled combat radius of the JSF is similar or lesser.
While basing in Okinawa is viable for the JSF in terms of reach, it is also exposed to the full brunt of any counterforce operations by the PLA. Basing in Guam, or other 'safe' sites, does not suffer this problem, but has single engine JSFs towed by tanker to targets beyond 1,500 NMI, with long legs over water, an environment not unlike that experienced by USAAF P-47s and P-51s during the bombing of Japan in 1945. As the JSF will require F/A-22A escorts in this type of environment, the cost of each bomb delivered by JSF is magnified by the cost of tankers and escorts, and the cost of CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue) assets to cover the routes from Guam. (..)
Most such operations would involve air superiority sorties to defeat PLA strike sorties against Taiwan, US basing in the region and maritime targets in the area, fighter escort sorties for ISR assets and LRMP ASW assets, and anti-shipping strikes against the upper tier of the PLA-N surface fleet. In all of these roles the JSF is of marginal utility compared to the F/A-22A. (...)
The utility of the naval CV JSF is an open question. While incrementally more capable and stealthier than the F/A-18E/F, it is a single engine design which is not a favoured configuration for CV ops... Given that the JSF offers only incremental gains against the F/A-18E/F, the Navy will have a very low pain threshold to JSF delays and cost blowouts. We should not be surprised if the Navy is the first to bail out of JSF.
The future of the JSF in the evolving strategic environment, and evolving US budgetary and force structure debate, is likely to be largely determined by the political clout of the US Marine Corps, and the lobbying power of industrial vested interests. Without these champions the JSF will be fighting for survival."
