Fuel needs limit China's combat ability
By calculating the amount of fuel oil required by the Chinese navy and air force in a large-scale attack across the Taiwan Strait under high-tech conditions, it becomes apparent that such an assault could not be sustained for an extended period.
For an attack on Taiwan, China would likely mobilize 10 fighter divisions of the PLA Air Force. In fact, only one to two regiments under each division are armed with third generation fighter aircraft. According to reliable sources, the total number of Su-27, J-11A and Su-30 fighters now stands at 281.
Each Su fighter can carry up to 9.4 tons of fuel, with a maximum combat radius of 1,500 kilometers. Since the Su series are mostly deployed at second-front airports, it can be roughly estimated that each sortie would consume about 9.4 tons of oil. As a result, sorties by the full third-generation fighter fleet would consume 2,641.4 tons of fuel. In a high-intensity confrontation, if China launched two rounds of large-scale air raids, fuel consumption by the Su aircraft alone would likely double to 5,282 tons.
As for the 117 Tu-16 (H-6) serial bombers, one H-6 is usually loaded with 45,450 liters of fuel, each liter equivalent to 0.86 kilograms of gasoline so that the total capacity is approximately 39 tons to meet the combat needs of its maximum 6,000-kilometer flight range. If three H-6 divisions undertook large-scale transfer operations, the required round-trip flight to the opponent's targets would be around 2,000 kilometers. Each H-6 sortie would consume over 13 tons of fuel and the whole H-6 fleet would consume 1,524 tons.
The number of J-10s in the PLA air force fleet may reach 100 in 2008. These planes have a fuel capacity equivalent to that of the F-16 fighters, approximately 3.24 tons, and a combat radius of 925 kilometers. Photos of the J-10 published in official Chinese media show that it has external oil tanks. The J-10As are mainly deployed at second-front airports; thus it can be calculated that the J-10 fleet would consume 324 tons of fuel in its sorties.
Launching a large-scale assault operation would also involve the transport of a large number of troops. The Il-76 airlifter's internal fuel capacity is 70 tons, which can sustain approximately six hours in the air. If half of the fuel capacity were consumed in each sortie, the existing 20 Il-76s would need 700 tons of fuel for each operation. At least three to four strategic air transport operations would be required each day, requiring a daily maximum fuel consumption of 2,800 tons.
The JH-7A fighter-bomber's internal fuel capacity is approximately 9 tons, calculated with reference to similar Su-24 fighter-bombers. Suppose each sortie involved two regiments, or 48 JH-7A, the total fuel consumption would be 432 tons. Two rounds of air raids each day would bring overall consumption to 864 tons. These calculations are based on the minimum standard and do not take into consideration the fuel capacity of external fuel tanks fitted on these aircraft.
Regarding fuel consumption by the navy's fleets there are no exact figures. As the tonnage standard of the PLA Navy fleets is comparatively small, it can be calculated that the daily average fuel consumption of the fully mobilized South Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and North Sea Fleet would be roughly equivalent to the daily minimum consumption of the U.S. Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier battle group, or approximately 400 tons for each fleet.
Based on these calculations, should high-intensity warfare break out across the Taiwan Strait, the daily fuel consumption of the PLA Air Force would be a minimum of 10,794 tons, taking into consideration only the third-generation fighters and H-6 bombers, JH-7A fighter-bombers and attackers. Actual consumption would be far greater if the large number of J-7E and J-8F serial fighters and Q-5 attackers currently in service are figured in.
The three major fleets of the PLA Navy would have a daily fuel consumption of 1,200 tons. As a result, the navy and air force would consume a total of 11,994 tons of fuel each day on average.
An initial large-scale landing operation against Taiwan would likely involve 20 divisions or brigades of amphibious, light and heavy mechanized troops. If each mechanized division or brigade needed fuel reserves for 500 kilometers, and one division or brigade consumed an average of 200 tons of fuel each day, the daily total of the 20 divisions and brigades would be 4,000 tons. Here, helicopters deployed by the ever-growing Army Aviation Forces have not been included.
The combined fuel needs of all combat forces engaged in an assault on Taiwan would amount to a minimum of 15,994 tons each day, not including the Second Artillery Forces and logistic support troops. These calculations alone indicate that the PLA forces would need a total of 240,000 tons of fuel to sustain 15 days of assault operations against Taiwan.
What is the total annual fuel consumption of the Chinese armed forces? A report published by the PLA General Logistics Department in 2007 says that the PLA forces saved 55,000 tons of oil in 2006, approximately 5.1 percent of their total consumption. Based on this figure, the total would be over 1 million tons, about 2,954 tons on average per day. It can be concluded that fuel consumption in a 15-day large-scale assault operation would surpass 20 percent of the annual total consumption of the Chinese military.
The hard fact is that China has only 7 million tons of oil reserves available for a period of conflict. The country has set its 30-day oil reserves at 10 million tons for civilian consumption, an average of 330,000 tons per day. During a 15-day assault, the country would require 4.96 million tons. The conclusion is that China's current oil reserves could sustain a high-intensity assault operation against Taiwan for no more than 15 days.
