Floating Idea: Looking for Input, Criticism

I've been reading the research by Andrew Erickson, Ph.D., Lyle Goldstein, Ph.D., & William Murray who have at least two papers out discussing PLAN sources and discussions. Winter 2007 undersea warfare, and Winter 2008 naval war college review, both of which focus on the PLAN.

I've also been observing the rapid development of the Type 039s (all types) and Type 022s.

In the photography from Chinese New Year, there is a class of ships with the 830s hull number, not sure what class that is, but they have rocket launchers in the rear and what looks like a crane. That ship looks like a mine layer.

I've also been hearing several rumors about short range UAV activity in the South China Sea from commercial traffic mariners. I'm not very familiar with Chinese UAVs nor how many might be active, or even deployable from naval vessels.

I also keep reading about multi submarine training and exercises, which is traditionally what is called wolf packs.

So if China is building up and training with large numbers of conventional submarines, large numbers of small, fast, well armed attack craft, deploying numerous UAVs, and building shore based communication networks throughout the coast and island regions, with plenty of maritime recon and electronic aircraft, what is the strategy?

To me, this strategy sounds a hell of a lot like the Streetfighter concept. Does anyone else see that, am I missing something? As best I can tell the PLAN is building massive numbers in the exact profile of what Streetfighter called for: low cost, reduced capability, large numbers, and joint training.

Appreciate any opinions or insights, thoughts, or pieces of the puzzle I might be missing.

This sounds to be somewhat akin to the approach that LtGen Carl VanRiper, USMC (ret'd.) used to defeat and destroy the Blue Force in Exercise MILLENIUM CHALLENGE '02. It don't think it's your imagination, Galrahn; the US Navy may have turned away from Streetfighter, but the PLAN seems to have adopted it fairly enthusiastically. The PLAN obviously paid attention to the lessons of MILLENIUM CHALLENGE. Streetfighter appears to be alive and well in the PLAN; while LCS is having problems in the USN, and does not even meet the Streetfighter criteria.

Goll himself has an interesting counterpoint, but he made this post in the CDF, not in the SDF.

"actually, the antique way of dealing coastal defences, are infact the network mentality, eq. having sinlge purpose FACs operating as a part of bigger complex in unity with in the other aspects of coastal defences, such like shore based artillery batteries and naval aviation. That has been the way of the Soviet navy since the 30's and it effectly still is the same in PLAN toaday, Type022 beeing prime example of such. My thesis has always been that PLAN doesent want to go on for large scale reforming of its coastal defence doctrines whit the current generation of FACs, becouse the likely future will make that generation last of its kind. I wouldn't be suprised, if there wouldnt be any follow ups to Type022, once they reach obsolence.

In china's perspective, the higlhy centralised and networked way of dealing the coastal defences are in fact quite affordable as the organisation, mentality and doctrines to effectively conduct such operation allready exist and the latest thecnology in terms of communication suddenly repairs most of the past defects of this concept. Also the advent of the Stealth and catamaran desing for high speeds makes the cheap, small one purpose crafts even more effective and thus you don't have to make up 300 of such to make the force leathal (as it use to be in the past.) In effect Type022 is actually the most logical platform if yuo look out the requirments that PLANs coastal defence concept demands. Its fast, its catamaran desing makes it stable in fast speeds, its sthealth and its cheap to build in vaster numbers that any Western concept of FAC would be with expensive AAW/EW/Multipurpose main armament fit. (PLA must have tested those with the Houjian class) But in the end, those western FACs are products of totally different way of seeing coastal defences, and what is good for others isent always good for rest.
One has to see the ships in their context, not just blindly compare them to others.

In US and other nations, armschair generals have been having grey hairs over the Type022 as they dont see the enverioment where the ship was desinged for. Thus they take out the map and try to figure what on earth would modern navy make such odd boats? And as they lack their own experience and tradition of modern coastal defence orientation, they see only Taiwan, and in global perspective, that pretty near Chinese coastline so they came up assumtion that Type022 must be made according to local conditions and then they came up with their idea that Type022 must be mented against Taiwan. (Stereothypically, in western military fans minds, every PLA aspect is made against Taiwan)

Unfortuanetly many of chinise naval fans, that lacks the approach to naval matters from coastal defences perspectives (in same way that PLAN itself still looks things, or use to look in only few years back) and they only see Aegis Destroyers, and building up Aircraft carriers. When they share the same unfamiliriaty to coastal defences, expecially to the odd old Soviet/Chinese way of conducting it, they become equally confused and thus stick to the "Type022 are mented against Taiwan" -mantra that gets repeated by some unmentioned sources that claims Type022 be par with US LCS.
Type022 isent mented against Taiwan, but against intruders into Chinese home waters."

So in his view, and to some measure, the 022 FAC strategy is the classic network FAC strategy inherited from the Soviets juiced up with modern features like stealth and datalinks. Although I think he overstated the last statement since the 022s did move out away from the coast and joined the main fleet in fire exercises the north and south of the Taiwan straits last November.

This strategy is not exclusive or contradictory with Street Fighter but rather complementary with it, and in fact, Street Fighter can be seen as an adaptation of the FAC strategy.

The submarine part of the equation is not as simple though. A perfect Streetfighter sort of sub would be like the Russian Amur 950s, packing Klub AshMs in VLS arrangement on the back. But the PLAN subs like the 039s are not as small as Amurs or even Kilos. Their sizes and lengths---up to 75m for the Song, 78m for the Yuan---suggest more of an ocean type SSK, with greater endurance and equipment than you have with typically "small" coastal SSKs. Their sizes compare similarly with other large SSKs, like the Upholders, Collins, Harushio and Oyashio classes.

And then again, there is also the PLAN's growing nuclear sub fleet, and as many as three subs may have been launched last year, compared to which the number of SSKs launched last year may also only be three. So last year may be a watershed, where nuclear subs reached 50% of the launchings. Obviously SSNs and SSBNs portend to concepts that don't mesh with Streetfighter.

The FAC production may have had a massive burst in 2006 and 2007, and may continue in 2008, but once the shipyard reorganizations are finished, it has been said that big ship production, from 052X to 054X, will resume. Large ships have only taken a hiatus, they will be back.

From my point of view, the PLAN is following two strategies simultaneously. The first is a networked coastal-brown water defense that can regroup and extend into an anti-foreign interference-in Taiwan operation that will also involve land based aircraft, older ships like the Jiangweis and Luhus, the Russian imports like the Kilos and Sovremmannies, and older FACs as well, which there remains plenty.

The second is in pursuit of a blue water power projection navy, and here is where the nuclear subs, the carrier project, the LPD, the new destroyers and frigates fall into. The large SSKs like Songs and Yuans transverse between the two doctrines. To support them, the PLAN is also launching large modern replenishment ships to serve as a logistical backbone. They have made even large hospital ships for humanitarian missions around the world. Here the PLAN is looking beyond a myopic Taiwan doctrine and looks to form a navy that will support China's geopolitical ambitions.

You will find that most western navies indeed had experience with small FAC's and found them unsatisfactory outside constrained coastal waters. In actual prectice FAC's like the Ashville class or the PGH's proved difficult to use in deep water. They require frequent refueling, resupply, cannot support their own laundries and must take fresh water from larger ships. They are a drag on a modern surface force.
A modern destroyer is usually faster in absolute terms than any FAC, and the advantage only grows as the swell increases in size. Even the outstanding Austal wave piercing cat such as China is using for those FAC's mentioned is slower in calm water than a Spruance. Put both in a nice north Pacific swell and the FAC will struggle, the crew will be in misery, just operating the craft will be physically difficult, while the DD will be unaffected. Seas that slow down a Spruance force that FAC to seek the shelter of a port. How useful is that? Bigger ships with taller masts have larger radar horizons as well, aiding in target detection and facilitating longer range strikes by surface to surface missiles.
For the USN, the LCS is an attempt to have a shallow draft very fast surface combatant able to enter constrained local waters and fight enemy FAC's while retaining the qualities of a large surface ship. One then has to wonder why China for example would build such FAC's that will not be able to fight outside the immediate coastal environment of China.

man overbored said:

You will find that most western navies indeed had experience with small FAC's and found them unsatisfactory outside constrained coastal waters. In actual prectice FAC's like the Ashville class or the PGH's proved difficult to use in deep water. They require frequent refueling, resupply, cannot support their own laundries and must take fresh water from larger ships. They are a drag on a modern surface force.
A modern destroyer is usually faster in absolute terms than any FAC, and the advantage only grows as the swell increases in size. Even the outstanding Austal wave piercing cat such as China is using for those FAC's mentioned is slower in calm water than a Spruance. Put both in a nice north Pacific swell and the FAC will struggle, the crew will be in misery, just operating the craft will be physically difficult, while the DD will be unaffected. Seas that slow down a Spruance force that FAC to seek the shelter of a port. How useful is that? Bigger ships with taller masts have larger radar horizons as well, aiding in target detection and facilitating longer range strikes by surface to surface missiles.
For the USN, the LCS is an attempt to have a shallow draft very fast surface combatant able to enter constrained local waters and fight enemy FAC's while retaining the qualities of a large surface ship. One then has to wonder why China for example would build such FAC's that will not be able to fight outside the immediate coastal environment of China.

Click to expand...

There's a simple answer for that... China doesn't intend to fight a foe on the calibre of the JMSDF or, much, much worse, USN, anywhere outside her immediate coastal waters. God knows taking on said forces is a risky enough prospect, without having to fight in grounds where the prospective hypotheticul foe has even greater advantage. Take for example mentioned North Pacific... I can't think of any realistic scenario in immediate future where PLAN will confront USN there, much less with FACs.

I think it is mistake to look at buildup of PLAN from USN's perspective of blue-water power projection force capable of realistically contending against USN surface assets in the open sea. That is impossible goal in the short to medium term... and the PLAN, being clear-sighted, knows this. Their own vision call for blue-water force in the 2050 timeframe. As they say, in the long term, lots of things change.

I think you will find the USN doesn't need to come within range of most FAC's to do an adequate job of defending Taiwan ( the only credible scenario where US and Chinese forces engage in combat ). The ships will stay well out to sea where FAC's will be out of their element and use airpower to do the job of fighting. No one is seriously considering landing a force on any Chinese shore or even fighting close inshore. FAC's will have very little effect on how the USN operates. I imagine the first thing the US will do in such a conflict is to sew the Taiwan straits with mines delivered from aircraft, slowing the advance of a notional Chinese invasion long enough to buy the US the necessary time to bring it's power to bear. Better hope those FAC's can sweep mines in a hurry because the USAF can deliver them quickly and in large numbers.

man overbored said:

I think you will find the USN doesn't need to come within range of most FAC's to do an adequate job of defending Taiwan ( the only credible scenario where US and Chinese forces engage in combat ). The ships will stay well out to sea where FAC's will be out of their element and use airpower to do the job of fighting. No one is seriously considering landing a force on any Chinese shore or even fighting close inshore. FAC's will have very little effect on how the USN operates. I imagine the first thing the US will do in such a conflict is to sew the Taiwan straits with mines delivered from aircraft, slowing the advance of a notional Chinese invasion long enough to buy the US the necessary time to bring it's power to bear. Better hope those FAC's can sweep mines in a hurry because the USAF can deliver them quickly and in large numbers.

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Again, you are not looking at the situation from the PLAN's perspective, they are looking for a cost-effective way of doing a nigh impossible job - building a credible deterance to the USN with the technological and economical resources available to her in order to secure the objective (Taiwan). FACs offer cheap, heavy firepower on a mobile and survivable platform (when with land-based air defence envelope). Let's put it that way, it's certainly cheaper than building large combatants such as DDs, or expensive combatants such as naval bombers [022s clock in at about 13 million dollars US apiece, and carry 4-8 heavy AShMs]. It's all operational analysis, and you don't just wish for something (oh, say, a fleet that can keep the USN from approaching within 500 nm of the Chinese coast), you do the best with what you have.

In any event, the reply was to your questioning of the efficacy of FACs in the open sea, which I think is adequately answered. One doesn't measure the effectiveness of a rifle by its ability to shoot down planes. The FACs are supposed to do a job, and it does that job adequately. Whether that job itself makes sense in terms of wider operational and doctrinal elements, that's anoter question entirely of course.

EDIT: Forgot to note that the notion of mining the straits with aircrafts during an invasion scenario is a bit much... you'd have to clear the straits of enemy aircrafts AND the shore of SAMs for that to be an actually non-suicidal idea... but the point is moot anyway. PLA does not at present or in near future has the sealift capability to invade Taiwan.

man overbored said:

You will find that most western navies indeed had experience with small FAC's and found them unsatisfactory outside constrained coastal waters. In actual prectice FAC's like the Ashville class or the PGH's proved difficult to use in deep water. They require frequent refueling, resupply, cannot support their own laundries and must take fresh water from larger ships. They are a drag on a modern surface force.
A modern destroyer is usually faster in absolute terms than any FAC, and the advantage only grows as the swell increases in size. Even the outstanding Austal wave piercing cat such as China is using for those FAC's mentioned is slower in calm water than a Spruance. Put both in a nice north Pacific swell and the FAC will struggle, the crew will be in misery, just operating the craft will be physically difficult, while the DD will be unaffected. Seas that slow down a Spruance force that FAC to seek the shelter of a port. How useful is that? Bigger ships with taller masts have larger radar horizons as well, aiding in target detection and facilitating longer range strikes by surface to surface missiles.
For the USN, the LCS is an attempt to have a shallow draft very fast surface combatant able to enter constrained local waters and fight enemy FAC's while retaining the qualities of a large surface ship. One then has to wonder why China for example would build such FAC's that will not be able to fight outside the immediate coastal environment of China.

Click to expand...

This is the most common mistake of people trying to analyze the PLAN. You seem to think they're in a hurry to develop a blue water fleet to challenge the USN.

1. They're not looking to challenge the USN, at least for now.

2. They're not in a hurry to develop a blue water fleet, at least for now.

Another mistake is that you assume that the sea is clear once you leave the Chinese coast. It's not. Its coast, then water, then coast again. There are natural island barriers around China, in the form of Japan, the Ryukus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, called the First Island Chain. You have a situation where you have littoral barriers facing you from the other side. You got a long continental shelf dotted with islands. For that matter, the prizes---oil and gas reserves---are within that shelf.

The way the 022s are being exercises, do not tie them to the immediate coast. In Australia, these type of catamarans have an ocean range of up to 300 miles. In this context, they would have the range all the way to the first island chain, and given the range of their missiles, have the ability to strike anywhere within it. And they're not slow, they can easily go past 35 knots. They don't operate in the north pacific, they operate in the mid to south Pacific where everything is a lot calmer, and the ocean even more so than the coast. But they also have managed to operate and exercise in water conditions that have a typhoon nearby, such as in November 2007.

This is not to say, there are clear disadvantages of a FAC reliant strategy and every criticism against the concept is valid. They got too short of legs, they don't sustain, and so on and on. But then, that's why they're also pumping out frigates and destroyers. Just how many destroyers, frigates and long range replenishment ships the PLAN has commissioned alone since the year 2000?

Look at all the immediate scenarios and territorial disputes, all the hypothetical conflicts from Korea to Indonesia feature a strong littoral component. I guess the best place to understand all this is to take a detailed map of Asia or go to Google Earth.

crabato I really appreciate your thoughts on this.

The way I see this as a "streetfighter" concept is in the context of an anti-access/area denial strategy for the first and second island chains. The Tpe 022s, with limited range and formidable firepower represent the surface action force within the first island chain, while the SSKs which are noted as being larger represent a capability to exploit in both the first and second island chain, both of which can be protected by land based aircraft and supported by land based missile systems.

In other words, where the US looked at "Streetfighter" in the context of a strategic offense for influence within an enemy littoral, I believe the PLAN looks at it in the context of a strategic defense within the first and second island chain.

I don't buy into the theory that Type 022s will be easily identified once they put to sea, this appears in direct contradiction to the environment. There are some 40,000 boats that register the same RCS as a Type 022 at sea within 100 nautical miles of the Chinese coast every day, when someone can point out the magic technology that identifies and classifies each one quickly, I'll buy into the easy to track Type 022 theory, but because that technology doesn't exist, I believe it will be much more difficult than some are suggesting to discriminate targets off the Chinese coast. Even if war reduced that number by half, the odds of identification drop to 1/200 in an area that will likely be contested (if not denied initially) for air and space recon systems.

Crabato I noticed on DT you appear to have bought into the theory of wolf pack tactics in use by the PLAN SSKs. Do you have any information (or theories) regarding their communication strategies? From my point of view, it is difficult to model these PLAN multi-submarine tactics without better information regarding the communication strategy.

By the way, I agree with the analysis there is a two fold strategy, one in the context of a strategic defense (What I call PLAN Streetfighter) and a blue water strategy for strategic offense later. I also agree the strategic offensive strategy has nothing to do with the US Navy (although I'm sure some see that differently), rather with a future globalization strategy for securing lines of communication at sea. I see the SSN force as a key to that strategy, but also platforms like the Hospital ship and the LPDs.