Campaigns of the Chinese Civil War

N

Norfolk

Junior Member
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The penultimate phase of the Chinese Civil War that directly led to to the victory of the PLA over the NRA was dominated by the Huai Hai Campaign. The East China Field Army of the PLA, initially seeking to engage in only a limited offensive in the Yangtze Valley, upon grasping the opportunities that presented themselves, quickly converted to a general offensive that resulted in the destruction of the main NRA forces in eastern China. The NRA suffered the loss of its premier field armies, leaving the PLA in a position to mop up the rest of the mainland effectively at will. As the author of "Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign", Dr. Gary J. Bjorge wrote in the Conclusion of the campaign:

Quote:

To a real extent, then, the Huai Hai Campaign can be viewed as the product of The Art of War meeting “operational art.” It was operational art with Sunzian qualities or, some might say, operational art with Chinese characteristics. This raises an interesting issue because, given the completely Chinese origin of The Art of War, some might argue that the Sunzian operational art that Su Yu and Liu Bocheng displayed represents a Chinese way of war. Perhaps it does. But the more important point to be raised is the high standard for executing operational art that Su Yu, Liu Bocheng, and their fellow commanders set. The quote at the beginning of the conclusion expresses Sunzi’s view that in war the only constant is change. It refers to the difficulty of staying in step with the enemy. As this study has shown, Su Yu, Liu Bocheng, and their fellow commanders not only did an excellent job of staying in step with the enemy, but they also were usually a step or two ahead of the enemy. They accomplished this by practicing operational art at the highest level. They accomplished this by being extremely competent professionally. This is another lesson to be learned from the Huai Hai Campaign, especially as the U.S. Army pursues engagement with the PLA. (p. 269).

-Unquote

Here is the link to Leavenworth Papers No. 22 Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge (it would be best to save this book on disk) -

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Scroll down to Leavenworth Papers, and click on No. 22 in PDF. A very good read.
 
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crobato

crobato

Colonel
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Thanks. I seemed to have noticed that as well while looking for the files on the Korean war PVA.
 
N

Norfolk

Junior Member
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Su Yu's conception of, planning for, and execution of the greater part of the Huai Hai Campaign was astounding. To have seen what he saw was Operationally possible in the East China Theatre of Operations when few others did in 1948, and especially when the PLA was only into the second or third year of a five-year long Strategy the CMC had estimated would be necessay in order to achieve final victory, takes not just pure talent, but hard-core professional integrity.

Until Su started beating the drums for the Huai Hai Campaign, no-one else, even those with greater rank, experience, and prestige, was willingly to openly question (albeit completely respectfully) the CMC's Strategy. Other, very senior and powerful officers and officials agreed with him, and in the event backed him after he pressed his case because they saw that he was totally correct in his professional judgement, but they were not willing to broach the matter themselves to the High Command. Even in a military meritocracy like the wartime PLA, that must have taken some kind of moxy, especially when other, superior officers were apparently reluctant to raise the matter themselves with the CMC.

I mean, when you, as an Operational-level officer, and a Chief of Staff rather than a permanent formation Commander, are able and willing to get the High Command to change its basic Strategy for the war while the entire PLA is simultaneously reorganizing its entire Main Force for conventional warfare, that's something that happens only a few times in a century. Su Yu was something very special militarily.

And if Su had not been chief of staff of the ECF, and subsequently acting commander for the Huai Hai Campaign, the original mission that the ECF had been given - crossing the Yangzi and establishing a bridgehead there not all that far from Nanjing itself -, even if it had been successful, would have achieved nothing except the sustainment of needless losses. And this in turn could have allowed the NRA to have subsequently defeated or destroyed the ECF or substantial elements thereof, regaining the Strategic intitiative for the NRA. Instead, with Su in his position, he turned the situation into the decisive campaign of the Civil War.

The PLA had some superb generals in the Civil War, but it would seem that Su Yu its "Manstein". The Korean War may have turned out quite differently with someone of Su's calibre at the helm.
 
H

hanqiang1011

New Member
Norfolk said:
Su Yu's conception of, planning for, and execution of the greater part of the Huai Hai Campaign was astounding. To have seen what he saw was Operationally possible in the East China Theatre of Operations when few others did in 1948, and especially when the PLA was only into the second or third year of a five-year long Strategy the CMC had estimated would be necessay in order to achieve final victory, takes not just pure talent, but hard-core professional integrity.

Until Su started beating the drums for the Huai Hai Campaign, no-one else, even those with greater rank, experience, and prestige, was willingly to openly question (albeit completely respectfully) the CMC's Strategy. Other, very senior and powerful officers and officials agreed with him, and in the event backed him after he pressed his case because they saw that he was totally correct in his professional judgement, but they were not willing to broach the matter themselves to the High Command. Even in a military meritocracy like the wartime PLA, that must have taken some kind of moxy, especially when other, superior officers were apparently reluctant to raise the matter themselves with the CMC.

I mean, when you, as an Operational-level officer, and a Chief of Staff rather than a permanent formation Commander, are able and willing to get the High Command to change its basic Strategy for the war while the entire PLA is simultaneously reorganizing its entire Main Force for conventional warfare, that's something that happens only a few times in a century. Su Yu was something very special militarily.

And if Su had not been chief of staff of the ECF, and subsequently acting commander for the Huai Hai Campaign, the original mission that the ECF had been given - crossing the Yangzi and establishing a bridgehead there not all that far from Nanjing itself -, even if it had been successful, would have achieved nothing except the sustainment of needless losses. And this in turn could have allowed the NRA to have subsequently defeated or destroyed the ECF or substantial elements thereof, regaining the Strategic intitiative for the NRA. Instead, with Su in his position, he turned the situation into the decisive campaign of the Civil War.

The PLA had some superb generals in the Civil War, but it would seem that Su Yu its "Manstein". The Korean War may have turned out quite differently with someone of Su's calibre at the helm.
Click to expand...

Both Su Yu and Lin Biao were unable to be the supreme commander of PVA because due to the aliments subtained in the fightings with the Japanese. Su Yu had old aliments of shell fagments in his body and Lin biao was sick. But it is rumoured so no one really knows. Thus, Peng Dehuai was made the commander of PVA.
 
H

hallo84

New Member
hanqiang1011 said:
Both Su Yu and Lin Biao were unable to be the supreme commander of PVA because due to the aliments subtained in the fightings with the Japanese. Su Yu had old aliments of shell fagments in his body and Lin biao was sick. But it is rumoured so no one really knows. Thus, Peng Dehuai was made the commander of PVA.
Click to expand...

translation: no one wanted the job.
note: Lin was Mao's protege and yet he avoided the job with bogus excuses.

Look into the political infighting of the era.
Peng was an outsider. Not a part of Mao's command during and after the Civil war.
 
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