US Marine Corps Gazette said:
The key characteristics of an amphibious operation are close coordination and cooperation. JP 3–02 also states that the tenets of successful amphibious planning are commanders’ involvement and guidance, unity of effort, and a tightly integrated planning effort. Except in emergencies, no significant decision contemplated by a commander in the chain of command that affects the plans, disposition, or intentions of a corresponding commander in another chain of command will be made without consultation with the commander concerned. These sound and time-tested principles consistently rang out during the planning, coordination, and execution of the BOLD ALLIGATOR (BA) exercise.
BA 12 was a live and synthetic exercise designed around a MEB-sized amphibious assault from a seabase in a medium-threat antiaccess/area denial environment, showcasing Navy-Marine Corps amphibious operations as the Nation’s most viable offshore option. It was executed from 30 January through 10 February and utilized east coast operating areas and training ranges off of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida. RDML Kevin Scott of ESG–2 was designated as the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and BGen Chris Owens of 2d MEB was designated the Commander, Landing Force (CLF).
An important highlight was the successful integration of a carrier strike group (CSG) in support of ESG-MEB operations. The USS Enterprise (CVN 65) CSG (EntCSG) was able to effectively integrate its aviation and surface capabilities in support of ESG–2/2d MEB. Initially the EntCSG was tasked to provide fixed-wing sorties to assist the combined forces maritime component commander (CFMCC) with establishing and maintaining local air and maritime superiority in the CFMCC area of operations. This was crucial for the initial shaping operations, consisting of supporting operations, advance force operations, and preassault operations, which ultimately supported the ESG-MEB mission. The EntCSG became even more critical and essential when it provided strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; electronic warfare; and command and control sorties in direct support of the CATF/CLF during the actual amphibious assault. This enabled the MEB’s aviation assets to be utilized primarily for supporting the ship-to-shore movement. This is paramount, especially for close air support missions, where integrated, habitual relationships are highly desired between ground combat forces conducting operations and aviation combat units supporting them.
Also, the complete integration of 12 coalition countries was an outstanding highlight and training opportunity for the ESG-MEB team. Countries participating included Canada, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, New Zealand, and Australia. They brought ships, helicopters, landing forces, ship-to-shore connectors, staff augments, and exercise observers; in total, over 1,200 coalition servicemembers participated in BA 12. This is significant in today’s operating environment where it is believed by many that future military operations will almost always involve some sort of coalition or team of the willing coming together to plan, coordinate, and execute the mission.
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This is a fairly detailed analysis of the largest amphibious assault training exercise performed in well over the last 10 years. Gives a lot of detail on the policies and standards the US Marines and Navy have established, as well as highlighting the various goals and achievements of the operation as a whole.
Very interesting and valuable reading for anyone wanting to better understand US amphibious operations and how they are so well orchestrated.
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