it will be be better to stick to inetrviews and articles by veterans who fought the war
the vets are found to be very truthful (mostly)
I will start with a post by post by Brigadier (retd.)Bhullar , then a young captain captain of the Gharwal regiment.
read the follow up post too which will be post number 4, which is as interesting
shows a letter the Brigadier got from a Pakistani
be advised to read the comments section too,at the links , if found
the vets are found to be very truthful (mostly)
I will start with a post by post by Brigadier (retd.)Bhullar , then a young captain captain of the Gharwal regiment.
read the follow up post too which will be post number 4, which is as interesting
shows a letter the Brigadier got from a Pakistani
be advised to read the comments section too,at the links , if found
This is a personal account of a moderately intense battle by a young Capt who himself was wounded while commanding B Coy, 8th Garhwalis. This battle lasted two days,16 and 17 Sep ’65 and saw three commanding officers killed. First there was Col Taraporewala of Poona Horse and then there was Col Jerry Jhirad of 8th Garhwalis blown to pieces by a direct tank shot just after they had finished conversing on the afternoon of Sep 16. Then on the afternoon of Sep 17, Maj Abdul Rafey Khan, who had assumed command of the Garhwalis the previous day ,was killed again by a direct hit from a tank when he was personally with his Intelligence Officer and the RMO, loading casualties onto a tank on the after noon of Sep 17. Col Taraporewala was awarded an immediate PVC while Col Jhirad was given a Mention in Despatches and Rafey was given a VrC. A Story Straight from the hip – without frills or cover ups.
Buttur Dograndi is a small inconsequential village lying off the road between Chawinda and Pasrur in Pakistan. On Sep 16, Poona Horse and the Eighth Garhwalis, minus even their own supporting weapons, were tasked to capture it as it lay behind Chawinda and on the road to Pasrur because 6 Infantry Division under Gen SK Korla, would be attacking Chawinda from the front.
Typical sledge and hammer tactic to isolate Chawinda from its rear while it was hammered from the front. Sadly while the attack on Chawinda was a pathetic fiasco, the outflanking move to block it also ended in tragedy. In Churchill’s ‘My Ealy Life’ I ha read that it is near impossible to be twice wounded on the same day. This was to be proved wrong in capitals because I was twice wounded within a couple of hours and both times pretty nastily – once while repulsing the morning Counter attack and then while lying patched up near the Doc who was attending to the wounded
Funnily on 16 Sep, while my company was the Van Guard, with Poona Horse busy fighting their own battle, we had to come to a halt as we found that no one was following us. Thus with my three platoons spread eagled holding a broad front, with Lt Gurmukh Balis’ 5 Platoon near a sugar cane field on my Right and Hav Sarweshwar’s 6 Pl near a tube well on my Left, I was with Gabar’s 5 Pl also near a well – waiting for the rest of the unit to catch up. A while later, quite alone and all by himself and without so much as informing me, Maj Abdul Rafey Khan, the unit 2I/c who is now the CO as Jerry has been hit and evacuated in a 3 ton truck, comes from the rear and takes Gurmukh’s platoon without my knowing anything. He goes on to take the outskirts of the village of Buttur Dograndi, all by himself. The platoon suffers some eight casualties from the fire of a Recce and Support Battalion. End of Story!
The war had started on Sep 1 and the armored division had been launched a week later. In that time, the Indian Army had accomplished little. The Pak offensives in Chamb Jaurian had been blunted. Their offensive in the Khem Karan Sector had got mired in the post monsoon wet fields when their Pattons became sitting ducks. Hence defensively we had done better than Okay.
Our offensive on the Lahore front had been stopped by the Ichogil Canal. The one in the Sialkot sector had failed to make headway. Which speaks much about our professional competence at the time.
Six years later in ’71, Sam Manekshaw was to wrap up the Bangla Desh war and capture over 90,000 POWs in under two weeks. The Israelis took a week in the ’67 war and two weeks, even when they were caught on the wrong foot, to rally from behind to claim the ‘73 Yom Kippur War.
Armor offensives are supposed to do one of two things. Either, by passing around strongly held nodes, they drive deep into enemy territory and capture lightly held important areas to make the enemy react and fight by our rules. Or they destroy enemy armor in mobile fast moving tank battles prior to going in for the soft underbelly.
In the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis waited for Egyptian armor to move beyond its SAM umbrella and then made mince meat of it in a fast moving fluid tank battle. In fairness to the Egyptians, they moved forward only because the Syrians were yelling for them to do so in order to take pressure off them.
In our case, whatever the plans in the Sialkot sector, we seemed to have done neither as we neither penetrated deep nor destroyed any armor – most probably because there was none.
After the first week of drift, a decision seemed to have been made to use 6 infantry Division to capture Chawinda. While attacking Chawinda, it would be cut off from Pasrur by Poona horse and the Garhwalis. While Poona Horse was from the armored brigade, the Garhwalis were from the Lorried brigade. They had never trained nor worked together, so essential while fighting alongside.
We had mostly trained with Third Cavalry but they were still in the Khem Karan Sector where they won laurels shooting up the bogged down Pattons of the First Armored Division of Pakistan.
The Everest of professional stuidity was when the Garhwalis were launched without any transport (other than the CO’s jeep) and without even their own integral supporting weapons ie antitank guns, machine guns, mortars. The only other vehicle was the Battery Commander Maj Kochar’s jeep. This guy was awarded a VrC but since he was mostly with me on 16 Sep, I can vouch safe that he was never ever in contact with his guns. And the guy never even gave his jeep for the CO’s evacuation!
As Slim writes, ‘the most pathetic people in the world are Gunners w/o Guns’ Now the story of ‘B’ Company 8 Garhwal Rifles.
The Garhwalis harbored at Chak Deo Singh on night of Sep 15. I had a couple goats, found in the village, slaughtered for a Company Bara Khana. Dear Bakhtawar laid out roast hen for me.
After mid night, I led a strong patrol to near Jassoran. While checking out some dilapidated houses, we found a patrol of 9 Dogra resting. We just managed not to shoot up one another. This was the motorized unit of the armored brigade, which a year back, had returned from a stint in Gaza and with its outstanding athletes, it had out shone in various events. But now these guys certainly did not know what the hell they were doing there.
That night, Som’s Alpha and Suresh’s Delta were used by Jerry to do a recce in force. They went up to the railway line, took some casualties and fell back.
Morning of 16th, Jerry looked happy as he gave his orders. He was wearing a jungle hat and for the first time had on a holstered pistol. Most of us wore steel helmets. I preferred using only the inner part which was very light but which gave no protection. As regards a weapon, I slung an SLR as the carbine was prone to stoppages.
Jerry, cheerful as ever, ordered Bravo to lead behind the Poona Horse Centurions. Bravo was to form the firm base for the attack on Buttur Dograndi. I asked, rather cheekily, as to where exactly he wanted the firm base. Jerry smiled and said I was not to worry as he would be there right beside me. Alas!
Around 9 am the tanks of Poona Horse, with their pennants fluttering, took off, two abreast, charging full steam ahead and raising clouds of dust. It was an impressive, memorable sight. After that I only saw two tanks, one of Maj Ghorpade’s and one of Capt Ajay Singh, who was, to become the Armd Div GI in mid 70s.
As the last of tanks disappeared and the dust settled, I followed with Gabar‘s platoon in the van. Morale was very high. To my surprise and shock I found Som (OC Alpha), Sindhu, the Adjutant and some others, alongside. Most everyone was urging me on despite the fact that there was some arty and mortar shells coming our way. This was specially as we crossed the Chawinda – Jasoran road.
As I haveobserved enemy employment of arty was super duper. There seemed to be some observation guys watching us as we advanced and they were directing accurate fire on us. There was also some air activity which showed that Pakistan was now serious and no longer amused by our antics.
There was as usual no sign of our air despite a divisional attack having been launched and our mission going in deep. Sindhu was lugging one of my LMGs, ready to poop off at any Pak plane. Som was saying I must at least get an MVC for capturing enemy mortars which he swore were just around the next grove.There was a lot of euphoria. I had to tell myself that I was the joker in command, others being mere guests and that I must not get carried away.
It was in such spirits that we swung along. After a while our speed slowed as we had been advancing under a blazing sun. It was around then that I got a message from my rear that there seemed to be no one following behind us. To take stock, I cried halt next to a well which had a few trees. I swung Sarweshwar Prasads platoon to another well with a broken down hut and with a scraggly clump a couple hundred yards to my left. There was a sugar cane grove a hundred or so yards to my right and I ordered Gurmukh Bali’s platoon to that area. We were about 1500 meters short of Buttur Dograndi.
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