The War in the Ukraine

solarz

Brigadier
Please keep in mind of this quote from the first post of the thread:

It is a Military Operation thread dealing with:
Strategy
Tactics
Events/Movements on the Battlefield
Equipment used and its performance
Debunking propaganda and false claims using actual battlefield based evidence

Based on that alone, “armchair generaling” is allowed. However the super mods who are typically and willingly involved in this thread can look into it since that falls outside of the thread moderators’ jurisdiction. @SampanViking @tphuang do you think we should reduce the strategy part to just allowing people to discuss things on the operational and tactical levels?

View attachment 101853
So that means no discussions about things such as the impacts of the Shahed drone strikes on Ukraine’s power supply or how Russia’s mobilization is being conducted. Only discussions about military actions on the theater level and below are allowed. Fully cutting out discussions in general is just not possible without killing the thread.

I don't think we should be disallowing discussions based on topics, but we should cut down on these back-and-forths that have already been discussed ad nauseum.

Some kind of warning that this horse is already dead and we should stop beating it.
 

Anlsvrthng

Captain
Registered Member
Now the dust has settled with Kherson, there's a few important points

1. There was no evidence of a Ukrainian offensive against Kherson.
2. There is evidence (rumours) the Russians had been withdrawing from Kherson for weeks prior to the announced withdrawal.

It even appears to have caught the Ukrainians by surprise as they didn't seem to believe the Russians really were withdrawing initially.

Kherson should be much easier to defend compared to small settlements like Lyman, we know how long the Ukrainians held out in Mariupol.

Either the current situation for Russia is so bad that they didn't feel they defend the city or they are still operating on a policy of avoiding a large scale confrontation with Ukrainians. Neither one is a good for Russia right now.
This is quite simple case.

Kherson has a very hard to supply frontline, the logitstic maybe ebought to supply it for defense, but has no capability to transport enought material for offensive.


If it is not possible to start an offensive from there , then what is the whole point?

At the moment of the withdraval , the Antonovski bridge was close to loose one or two bridge element. There is one more railway link, and the dam.


All of this eonought to supply defense, but nothing more than that.

And from that point of time, keeping that area is nothing else just a token trophy, without any military significance.
 

Abominable

Major
Registered Member
This is quite simple case.

Kherson has a very hard to supply frontline, the logitstic maybe ebought to supply it for defense, but has no capability to transport enought material for offensive.


If it is not possible to start an offensive from there , then what is the whole point?

At the moment of the withdraval , the Antonovski bridge was close to loose one or two bridge element. There is one more railway link, and the dam.


All of this eonought to supply defense, but nothing more than that.

And from that point of time, keeping that area is nothing else just a token trophy, without any military significance.
If Russians were actually capable of supplying Kherson for defence, then they wouldn't be leaving.

According to Russian law, Kherson is Russian territory now. What other Russian cities are considered to be token trophies?
 

B777LR

Junior Member
Registered Member
It's great that you are aware of that. Then let me clarify what I meant: any western aircraft capable of carrying modern weapons, from F16 or F15 to Gripen or Typhoon, they have appropriate long-range BB missiles, that's why I mentioned the meteor.
Optimal, of course, would be the F15/F16 bundle, and a year ago there were mentions of Ukrainian pilots training in the USA on them. It takes experienced pilots a couple of months to get the hang of it.
For JDAMs and high-speed bombers * SDB , flying over the target is not necessary, and Ukrainian pilots perform regular approaches at 30÷50 km distance.

You are making the mistake of assuming that a single western weapons system is going to be the golden bullet that is going the break the Russians. It won't. Reality is that Ukraine is up against an enemy with overwhelming air superiority at the front, with massive amounts of long range air defence, large numbers of intercepters and fighters, all supported by airborne early warning systems. It won't make any difference if the Ukrainians are flying F-15s or Su-27s if they don't have the entire package to back them up. Ukrainian Flankers and Fulcrums already have long range air-to-air missiles, F-15s or F-16s won't add anything new to the equation apart from slightly better but still much shorter ranged missiles than what will be fired at them by an enemy that knows where they are.

There is a reason the Ukrainian Su-27s and MiG-29s are hugging the ground so closely in most videos. Giving them western jets won't change that reason.
 

Anlsvrthng

Captain
Registered Member
If Russians were actually capable of supplying Kherson for defence, then they wouldn't be leaving.

According to Russian law, Kherson is Russian territory now. What other Russian cities are considered to be token trophies?
Your reasoning built onto POLITICAL reasons, not MILITARY.

By this logic any military protecting homeland should die for any meaingless plot.


Anyway, this decision on its own showing that the Russians doing this whole action with cold blood and head, and don't care the opinion of anyone.
 

Sheleah

Junior Member
Registered Member
You mean, every picture and tweet posted here of HARM hitting empty lots, parks and aparmments?

AGM-88 in the middle of an aparment in Kherson
View attachment 101852

AGM-88 hits an emtpy stadium in Kramatorsk



Is that what you call a statistic???

Let me laugh xD!....


If you have no idea of the attacks carried out by the HIMARS, nor have you any idea of their established targets, where the hell can you ensure that MOST of their attacks are against civilians???

Aren't you exaggerating a bit, assuming that your 5 tweets are the entire universe of attacks carried out by HIMARS??

More serious please...
 

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
If true it doesn't make sense why even put troops there since the area is in Ukraine arty rage unless Russia pulled back to a point its arty can't hit the area. :confused:
The Guardian citing Russian sources are claiming that Ukrainian troops launched an amphibious attack and captured the town on the peninsula southwest of Kherson, Herois'ke.
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found-zelenskiy-says?page=with:block-63723add8f089dfd847c0511#block-63723add8f089dfd847c0511

My opinion:
This is interesting. This demonstrates a certain permissive environment for SOF units from Ukraine to carry out amphibious diversionary attacks on the coast of the left bank of the Dnieper to keep Russian troops engaged while carrying out the new offensive through Zaporizhzhia to free Kherson, this is not very difficult to do considering the assets ISR that NATO provides considering another factor which is Russian weakness in the same surveillance and reconnaissance assets
 

reservior dogs

Junior Member
Registered Member
Now the dust has settled with Kherson, there's a few important points

1. There was no evidence of a Ukrainian offensive against Kherson.
2. There is evidence (rumours) the Russians had been withdrawing from Kherson for weeks prior to the announced withdrawal.

It even appears to have caught the Ukrainians by surprise as they didn't seem to believe the Russians really were withdrawing initially.

Kherson should be much easier to defend compared to small settlements like Lyman, we know how long the Ukrainians held out in Mariupol.

Either the current situation for Russia is so bad that they didn't feel they defend the city or they are still operating on a policy of avoiding a large scale confrontation with Ukrainians. Neither one is a good for Russia right now.
You have to look at this from a strategic point of view, what is the goal of Russia.

1. We are seeing the Ukrainians switching from a purely defensive stance to going on the attack on many fronts after Severodonetsk. In the north, they were successful. In fact, I think the kill ratios have come down compared to the defensive fronts where the Ukrainians were getting pummeled with artillery for weeks before the Russians try to take the place. The attack on the North represented the best trade in kill ratio with the exception that Ukraine has lost a lot of armor and tanks in the attack. However, given that the Russians have fortified their lines, this trade seems no longer available. The Ukrainians are talking about an attack from Zaporizhzhia, we will see if they are able to have anywhere near the success as the attack from the North.

2. In Kherson, attacks from Ukraine were all repelled with heavy losses for the Ukrainian. Here, Ukraine lost both men and armor. I don't buy the argument that the Russians were not able to supply their troops. Earlier in the year, before mud season, the Russians were able to support both their troops and a sizeable civilian population.

If the Russians just wanted to occupy the East side of the Dnipro, they would just blow up all the bridges along the river and all the fighting East of the Dnipro will come quickly to a grinding halt. However, you will end up with a Ukraine on the West of the Dnipro which will get armed by NATO and a number of years from now, will see the conflict reignited. While the Russians are paying the price of sanctions which may not come off for years to come, they need to get to a place where Ukraine is unable to post a threat to East Ukraine even if they wanted to fight again. This means a long grinding war to

1. Take out the Ukrainian military.
2. Depopulate Western Ukraine
3. Bring pain to NATO during the time when Russia is fighting this war.
4. Wait to see if things change in the fickle Democracy in the West.

The Ukrainian military is quite huge, so to truly remove them you need a lot of time and you need to have a favorable exchange ratio both in men and equipment. This is why Russia retreated to the East of the Dnipro in Kherson. Much better supply lines means you will have a much better kill ratio even if Ukraine attack in large numbers. You are also making the Ukrainians fight with a long and uncertain supply line. It is also the reason after Lysychansk, the Russians have not made much progress in conquering the cities. Their focus is to take out the Ukrainian military with very favorable kill ratio. Taking the cities must be subservient to this goal. If a city is a hard nut to crack, they will do everything to cut them off instead of charging in. If we see this war as a multi-year endeavor, with the first priority in taking out the Ukrainian military, we will be less critical of the lack of territorial progress.

Some were comparing Ukraine to Vietnam and say that Ukraine has virtually inexhaustible manpower based on the population size. I think there are flaws to this logic.

1. Along with men, you also lose equipment. Unless the West is willing to supply Ukraine with M1s and F-16s, we are running out of Soviet era tanks to send Ukraine. We can see this in the recent attacks Ukraine did. A group of people on foot around a single tank, riding in technicals and other civilian vehicles. In particular, the Ukrainians seems to be running out of tanks and cannons. We see that even when there is a city to hide in, the fight need to have a lot of armor as today, people no longer just charge into the cities. It is mainly about cutting the city off from reinforcement which happens outside the protection of the cities. I just don't see the U.S. wanting to send the M1 and F-16's. That is because our MIC will want to retain the image of invincibility for their hardware. If an M1 can just as easily be taken out by a cannon as a T62, that image will be tarnished and we can't have that.

2. As more and more cities like Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv are taken, along with the population already in the five provinces, Ukraine has lost a big portion of their population. The refugees are mainly younger people, so they have lost a great deal of people in the right age to be in the military and will continue to drain people due to refugees in the future. Indeed, we are seeing that in the latest mobilization, Ukraine is only going to mobilize 100K people when Russia is mobilizing 300K. In addition, they are mobilizing women, which is a desperate move. Also we are seeing in many areas of fighting today, they are increasingly relying on mercenaries from abroad. All these are signs pointing to exhaustion of manpower for Ukraine. Russia has the option later of much more mobilization. Things will get a lot worse in a couple of years.

3. NCOs are depleted at a rate that is not replaceable. It normally take years to train one. You can't just promote someone to this position after six months training. Without well trained NCOs, the unit is not effective.

We can see that in two to three years, Ukraine will get to a point where,

1. they lost all the fortifications that took years to build like in Donbass.
2. They no longer have cannons and armor to fight a proper mechanized war.
3. They have lost most of their well trained NCOs.

It will become more of a one sided slaughter at that point.

The Russians can at least attempt to cut all the bridges along the Dnipro and finish the Eastern Ukraine war in the last few months. That they have not done so thus far must be for a good reason. We can sit here and say Putin is a dump shit, but we don't appreciate all the angles and considerations that he must think through.
 

baykalov

Senior Member
Registered Member
I came across this comment. What do you think of this version, and I quote:

Thought for the Day: November 13th, 2022. The Operational Goad.

Over the last several months of this war, since early September but really since the period immediately following the fall of Lisichansk in early July, we have seen the Russians suffer a series of operational reverses that have all somehow resulted in the Ukrainians taking extremely heavy losses. Anyone who knows anything about war knows that this is generally the opposite of how the ledger looks after a successful offensive.

To lay out the timeline:

Early July - Russia seizes Lisichansk, pushes to the border of Lugansk Oblast south of the Seversky Donets and then ceases serious offensive action with regular troops.

Late July - Ukraine's OC-South begins a counteroffensive in Kherson. They are defeated with heavy losses and cease serious attacks by the end of August.

Early September - Ukraine launches an offensive east of Kharkov, breaking through an extremely thin Russian line and forcing Russian troops to withdraw from Izyum.

Mid-September - Buoyed by their success in Kharkov, Ukrainian forces launch a general offensive across the line of contact. They are defeated with massive casualties.

Early October - The Kharkov Counteroffensive bogs down due to heavy losses just east of Krasny Liman. Desultory attacks continue, achieving nothing.

Mid-October - A Ukrainian attack from Krivoy Rog achieves unexpected success and Russian troops fall back to Dudchany from northeast Kherson Oblast.

Late October - Smelling blood, Ukrainian troops ramp up attacks in Kherson. They make no gains and are defeated with heavy losses.

Early November - Russia withdraws troops from their bridgehead in Kherson north of the Dniper. Ukraine's OC-South is too battered to even attempt pursuit.

Now - Buoyed again by the Russian withdrawal from Kherson, Ukraine launches a new wave of attacks across the line. They are noticeably weak and achieve nothing.

There's a saying: "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." A pattern emerges from the last four months of fighting. As soon as one Ukrainian offensive culminated, the Russians gave up ground elsewhere - often quite significant ground, but always without any serious losses on their side. This led to Ukrainian morale skyrocketing and renewed offensive efforts in the belief that the Russians were on the verge of operational collapse. These renewed offensives would then fail with massive losses, and the cycle would repeat.

I believe this may be intentional on the part of the Russians. Between mobilization efforts and Western aid, by the summer Ukraine had amassed a huge and fairly well-equipped army that would have been difficult for the Russians to overcome offensively without enormous, and extremely costly, mobilization efforts of their own. This pool of manpower and equipment, however, is finite - and the Russians know this very well. Ukraine has no significant military industry left intact and Western difficulties with military production need no discussion at this point. Similarly, the Ukrainian leadership is eager to attack and take back lost territory. The Russian decision was thus quite straightforward: they would go on the defensive and let the enemy come to them. The Ukrainians obliged. And any time it looked like Ukraine had had enough, the Russians would throw them a bone to get them to keep attacking.

Others have noted that the Russian General Staff prizes efficiency - this is, simply put, the most efficient way to defeat Ukraine. Goad them into dissipating their army - which, if the Ukrainians were acting rationally, would be treated as the priceless and irreplaceable asset that it is - in a series of disastrous counteroffensives. Then mop up what's left at a considerably lower cost and effort than would otherwise be required. As for the last bit, the winter campaign season approaches just as Russia's mobilized troops finish their training.

To make a boxing analogy, this is rope-a-dope over months and a thousand kilometers of front line. And Drago's getting ready to come off the ropes.
 
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