As I said in this post;
Turkey Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
Turkey Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
There are some question marks regarding the sale of CAATSA, F-35s, and jet engines from the perspective of American law. Let's examine the legal processes step by step together.
1) Lifting of CAATSA sanctions. Authorizing body: The U.S. President. Under section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), sanctions are lifted via the President's written notification. It's sufficient for the written notification to include justifications such as "in the national interests of the United States" or "a more appropriate means to achieve the purposes of this Act." At this point, Congress could pass a resolution of disapproval against Trump's decision under section 216 of the CAATSA Act, via a motion from the majority or minority leaders. Only these two representatives can introduce such a motion—not just any representative. The process for its approval is detailed in the law—but it's of little consequence unless introduced. However, as I mentioned, this would require initiating an extra process. Trump's decision to lift sanctions isn't automatically submitted to Congress for approval. The approval of the opposing motion is more burdensome than other legal processes—at least in the submission stage.
2) F-35 procurement. Section 1245 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), through a statutory provision, restricts the sale of F-35s to Turkey. For such a sale to occur, the Secretaries of Defense and State must submit a notification to Congress within a specified timeframe, with supporting documents, certifying that Turkey no longer "possesses" the S-400—using "possess"—that a guarantee has been provided that it will not possess it in the future, and that no defense systems have been acquired from Russia since 2019. Although this law appears to be a clear legal barrier; how the U.S. government interprets the word "possess" could be entirely variable. If the Trump administration wants, it could bypass this legal barrier through interpretation, as has been done many times before.
3) Jet engine sales. For the sale of such weapons equipment, notification to Congress is required within specified periods under section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). For Congress to block this, it would need to pass an extra law. It's a lengthy process. Is there a congressional majority willing to deal with this for jet engines? I doubt it. Even if there were, Trump would veto it; the number of representatives needed to override would rise to 2/3.
In conclusion: Expecting Trump—who doesn't even adhere to explicit provisions in the Constitution—to strictly follow vague and technically complex legal processes runs counter to the normal flow of Trump America. If the Trump administration wants, I believe it can circumvent any legal barriers with the necessary legal creativity. If Congress wants to impose a serious barrier against Turkey, it would need Democrats and Republicans to organize and quickly implement the processes outlined above. But before the November 2026 midterms, it would be absurd for Republicans to spend time overturning one of Trump's decisions. The pro-Israel faction among Democrats is very angry—but left-wing representatives are unlikely to buy the argument that Turkey shouldn't acquire weapons due to its Israel policy. In fact, this could backfire. Since Turkey lacks lobbying power, it's not possible to widen this divide among Democrats—but if this debate opens up, it could grow on its own. In my view, aside from a few names in Congress controlled by the Israel lobby, there aren't many people who will take this issue to heart and see it through. But even so, it's essential to know about these potential barriers.

