New (not totally) sailless SSN (09X?) thread

[AndrewS]

I think it's fair to assume that for a sub this large with design feature indicating desire for quite high cruising speed that you would need a pretty large reactor - my guess in 200MWt range. I don't see how a 75MWt reactor would be sufficient. Also, I continue to believe you need a large battery pack to support peak power requirement.

I'm just looking at the Seawolf specs: 35 knots with 43MW propulsion from a 220MWt reactor.

You could have a submarine which is faster, like the Alfa with a top speed of 41 knots.
But at that speed, it was so noisy it was blind?

That extra 6 knots of speed doesn't seem like a good tradeoff, in addition to the additional weight and complexity

 

[AndrewS]

This is pretty interesting, perhaps it is now possible or even realistic for PLAN to catch up to USN in SSN numbers by the early 2030s. AFAIK combined Chinese production capability of SSN could theoretically reach ~8 boats per year (6x in Bohai and 2x at JN). Though I doubt that this rate would be reached anytime soon, assuming JN keeps producing more SSNs from now on we could somewhat realistically expect ~5 boats (?) per year for this 5YP with production likely increasing a bit for the next 5YP when 09X/09V becomes more mature.

Well, I presume that includes two SSBN/SSGNs per year with a 24 month assembly time?
So that would be annual capacity of [8 SSN + 2 SSBN/SSGN]

Personally, I don't think it would reach 8 SSNs per year and would be between 4-6 per year. If you model these ranges, after 10 years, it's 40/60/80 boats

When you compare that to 50 US SSNs - the difference between 60 or 80 additional Chinese SSNs doesn't result in a big change to the overall strategic balance.

According to current data PLAN has to date launched 11 09IIIBs, 1 09V, 1 09X and 1 Huludao mystery submarine which adds up to 14 "proper" SSNs total, USN as of right now has 49 SSNs total which includes 3 Seawolf, 22 774 and 24 688i. IMO USN SSN number is likely to drop to the low 40s during the 2030s due to aging 688is needing to be replaced while 774 production rate is too slow to replace boat by boat. Anyhow at current production rate (5 boats per year) it is possible for PLAN to reach a similar number in around 6 years, so maybe USN supremacy is coming to an end far sooner than most expects?

There's also the possibility that they slow down or take a break from SSN production, and focus on 4-5 SSBNs next.
That would take about 2? years if they completely ceased new SSN production.

So this would allow for the Type-095 and Type-09X to be tested, and then they can make a decision on how many of each to produce.

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I recall some years ago the rumour that they were ramping up to six submarines per year.

 

[elevator]

It also only has to be concerned with 1 region whereas USN boats are spread globally.

I always hear this argument, but I think it gets overstated.

In an actual existential US-China war, I highly doubt the USN would continue treating submarine deployments like peacetime global force management. If the Pacific theater truly becomes decisive, then logically the overwhelming majority of deployable SSNs would be surged there.

The same logic applies to every other branch as well. In a true existential conflict, for example, the USAF would also heavily concentrate its most capable assets into the primary theater rather than maintaining normal peacetime global distribution.

The US obviously cannot teleport boats out of maintenance or instantly abandon all strategic responsibilities elsewhere, but I don’t think “the USN is globally spread out” should be treated as some permanent constraint in a wartime scenario. Historically, major powers concentrate forces into the primary theater when the stakes are existential.

So I think the more meaningful advantages for PLAN are geography, shorter logistics, proximity to bases/MPAs/escorts, and potentially higher fleet availability from newer boats — not simply that the US has worldwide commitments.

 

[latenlazy]

I always hear this argument, but I think it gets overstated.

In an actual existential US-China war, I highly doubt the USN would continue treating submarine deployments like peacetime global force management. If the Pacific theater truly becomes decisive, then logically the overwhelming majority of deployable SSNs would be surged there.

The same logic applies to every other branch as well. In a true existential conflict, for example, the USAF would also heavily concentrate its most capable assets into the primary theater rather than maintaining normal peacetime global distribution.

If it’s not logistically bottlenecked to support such deployments. Which it currently is, and which it will likely be in even worse fashion if the US cannot protect its bases from persistent A2AD strikes.

 

[elevator]

If it’s not logistically bottlenecked to support such deployments.

As I said, “the US obviously cannot teleport boats out of maintenance.” In other words, any deployable SSN in an existential US–China war would almost certainly be concentrated into the primary theater rather than left scattered around the globe for peacetime-style presence missions.

The same logic applies across the entire US military, not just the USN.

That is why I disagree with the “global commitments” or “spread out” argument. From the perspective of a Chinese war planner, it would be a huge mistake to assume that the US would still keep its forces globally dispersed during an existential conflict. In a decisive war, the expectation should be that the US would concentrate the overwhelming majority of its deployable combat power into the primary theater.

 

[Michaelsinodef]

As I said, “the US obviously cannot teleport boats out of maintenance.” In other words, any deployable SSN in an existential US–China war would almost certainly be concentrated into the primary theater rather than left scattered around the globe for peacetime-style presence missions.

The same logic applies across the entire US military, not just the USN.

That is why I disagree with the “global commitments” or “spread out” argument. From the perspective of a Chinese war planner, it would be a huge mistake to assume that the US would still keep its forces globally dispersed during an existential conflict. In a decisive war, the expectation should be that the US would concentrate the overwhelming majority of its deployable combat power into the primary theater.

The time to get to the battlefield from the global deployments/positions is quite high though.

And not being able to be part of the opening 1-2 weeks is already incredibly damaging, like very incredibly damaging.
Had to repeat it twice

 

[elevator]

The time to get to the battlefield from the global deployments/positions is quite high though.

Yes, but if I were a Chinese war planner, I would not base my plans on that. In this kind of scenario, one should always plan against the worst-case scenario rather than the most convenient one.

I’ll stop here since this is drifting off topic.

 

[latenlazy]

As I said, “the US obviously cannot teleport boats out of maintenance.” In other words, any deployable SSN in an existential US–China war would almost certainly be concentrated into the primary theater rather than left scattered around the globe for peacetime-style presence missions.

The same logic applies across the entire US military, not just the USN.

That is why I disagree with the “global commitments” or “spread out” argument. From the perspective of a Chinese war planner, it would be a huge mistake to assume that the US would still keep its forces globally dispersed during an existential conflict. In a decisive war, the expectation should be that the US would concentrate the overwhelming majority of its deployable combat power into the primary theater.

I didn’t mean the maintenance tail of submarines in dry dock. I meant the operational support tail. If you want to deploy 40 submarines into a theater for more than just a touch and go operation that theater needs to have sufficient support infrastructure to allow that many submarines to operate at a regular clip.

 

[montyp165]

Yes, but if I were a Chinese war planner, I would not base my plans on that. In this kind of scenario, one should always plan against the worst-case scenario rather than the most convenient one.

I’ll stop here since this is drifting off topic.

The fundamental expected requirement from the PLA side would be to be strong enough to confront 99% of US deployable forces in the Pacific and still win decisively in an existential clash, which is why any other assumption would be faulty to begin with.

 

[AndrewS]

I didn’t mean the maintenance tail of submarines in dry dock. I meant the operational support tail. If you want to deploy 40 submarines into a theater for more than just a touch and go operation that theater needs to have sufficient support infrastructure to allow that many submarines to operate at a regular clip.

Virginia SSNs need minimal deployment support.

The worst case scenario is 9 days at 20 knots from Hawaii to China, and another 9 days for the return journey, out of 90 days endurance.