My guess, the one with the 2 counts all have hatches near them so can be manually reloaded. The tank one is farther away from the armoured crew compartment, so less likely scenario for reloads and therefore carries more.
PLA Next Generation Main Battle Tank
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Why would you want it to when you can have drones do the job? If you have this great information advantage and entirely attritable unmanned platform, why would you not take advantage of this?
If you can destroy enemy vehicles without them seeing you, that’s the best case scenario.
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It's a million-ish mobilized force in an area 1/3 of eastern Ukraine conflict, in huge variety of landscapes, including some never truly tried in warfare before (dense scyscraper business and residential districts). Of course they will.
And PLA's job is to systematically prevent(to best degree possible) and overcome it.
To make it not positional, you have to break into open, preventing attritional grind and/or predictable exchange of ground for attrition and time. It is done by armor. Otherwise, l'artillerie conquiert, l'infanterie occupe, at a snail pace.
Like what's the point of arguing, amphibious PLA formations are fully mechanized and rely on heavy armor for exploitation. I'm wrong person to ask here, better directly inquire 八一 building.
you probably want to read over what patch wrote about Taiwan invasion scenario. What you are talking about here doesn’t make sense at all for PLA provided them have air dominance.
Single unmanned platforms or light reconnaissance vehicles lack the ability to engage in complex combat environments. The battlefield is never simple.
An independent combat unit with armor that resists most direct-fire ammunition, a 105mm cannon, and a variety of information sensors, capable of high-speed traversal of various terrains, can be easily deployed by commanders to any combat environment, independently confronting an infantry company or cooperating with any combat unit to strike any target.
I did and do with great interest.
With respect to you personally, as a tech observer and popularizer, I think we can agree that we have different views on modern state of ground warfare, and warfare at large.
Maybe my views aren't a good match for what we are to expect in late 2020s, but this isn't how i see things, and to my knowledge, isn't the way staff work is performed at.
Neither from point of view of where warfare as craft stands, nor from the point of view where PLA in it's entirety - not it's advanced elements, - does.
There are advanced visions, which, at a certain pace, twisted, transform into reality. There is reality of warfare as science/art, which just doesn't quite align with vision technology world. There is economic aspect, where China changes at breathtaking pace - but this doesn't change entire nation on a whim. New ZTXs will indeed operate in parallel with type 59s in (rear, sure, but)line formations, as J-20A, apparently, just barely intersected with J-7s in last units. And then there's reality of armed forces as a social institution, where career military officers, doing their calm service some time all the way from late cultural revolution, encounter modern world.
For example, when there's not enough ready drones to disable that abrams, when you run into them in a meeting engagement/ambush (i.e. column runs into them).
First, you have to even survive the engagement, which unfolds immediately. Then, if you can't resolve action as a meeting engagement (i.e. with immediately available onboard armament), regroup, deploy and dislodge that position - enemy already achieved his goal.
Main currency in any breakthrough is time.
If you don't do meeting engagements - that's fine, but then, drones or no, it's likely to be a grinding positional fight, where opponent has time to prepare and react.
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Firstly, Ukraine’s land area is 600k km2 and Taiwan’s is 36k km2. That is not 1/3rd the land area, but 1/17th. Secondly the actual land area of concern for Taiwan in an invasion is much smaller than 36k km2. Only maybe 1/4th of the island is populated, and nearly all that populated area is flat terrain directly next to the coast facing mainland China. 3/4th of the landscape is high grade mountainous terrain that isn’t populated and not amendable to tanks anyways. It doesn’t matter how many ground forces Taiwan has when the inherent geography forces the ROCA to funnel its massed infantry in very specific spots if they want to defend the territory that matters, which is not in fact the whole island.
This exposes them to suppression and attrition by air. In an ideal scenario where PLA air power has swept clear of the landing zones and most likely defensive outposts, mechanized amphibious assault groups are still necessary precaution for any resistance that might break through, and to form a secure beachhead to begin massing forces as quickly as possible to press advantage. This is just basic good form if your goal is to try to attain an overwhelming victory to end the conflict as quickly as possible. The point of the amphibious landing and ground forces here isn’t to take the lead in the attrition fight, but to take and hold positions after area has already been cleared. The main point here is that the PLA isn’t depending on ground maneuver for its primary offensive push.
Even if the ROCA retreats to try to reform defensive lines further back or in urban areas, ceding the coast means ceding the ports, and ceding the ports means ceding supply lines for an island that is already dependent on sea traffic for 90% of its energy and 70% of its food. An urban retreat just means the roads to sustain ROCA supply lines get cut. If the ROCA wants to retreat all the way into the mountains they can enjoy trying to stay relevant and fed as they’re starved out while populated areas get fortified against their re-entry. You are fetishizing attritional ground fighting while sidestepping the much broader and better strategic options China has against Taiwan given the PLA’s current capabilities.
You should study the map closer and think through what kinds of fighting will actually happen and where on the map they will actually happen in if you want to sound like you know what you’re talking about. And if you don’t bother to get even these basic details right you are indeed the wrong person to ask.
To your knowledge, outside of amphibious landing training, what exactly about the PLA’s training for Taiwan scenarios have you observed that would suggest to you they plan to primarily prosecute this war by ground maneuver? This is an important question if you’re going to make references to “the way staff work is performed” since for the last 30 years the vast vast majority of investments the PLA has made specifically to prosecute a war with Taiwan has not been on ground maneuver capabilities but on the air sea fight.
You talk as if PLA ground forces have to contend with the ROCA while the ROCA can just shrug and ignore the PLA’s air power. This is one of the problems with trying to analogize China with Russia. How Russia employed air power in its war with Ukraine is not how China is training to employ air power in Taiwan. Russia’s air employment doctrine is severely underdeveloped relative to China’s, so what Taiwan faces here is not determinable by observing how fighting looks between Ukraine and Russia. China’s able to field far more persistent and denser air cover against a much smaller area against Taiwan than Russia will ever be able to do against Ukraine.
Ukraine also has access to unassailable supply lines because it’s connected directly to Western Europe, a flank that Russia has no way of reaching. The ROCA’s ability to “prepare and react” is meanwhile dependent on securing supply lines by port, ports that will be immediately lost to them if they lose the landing fight. Once again please study the specifics of the China Taiwan scenario rather than draw poorly studied analogies.
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It's a 10 cylinder engine and apparently it's also a family of engine using the same tech which is currently used in many vehicles. I suspect the entire new lineup of vehicle feature engines from this family.
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Taiwan can field Abrams in a limited capacity because they are on defense. They don't need to move their tanks across water and undeveloped terrain unlike China. They will most likely be fighting close to developed roads and infrastructure. But yeah I agree that Taiwan in the exception here but even their presence will be very limited. To be honest. I think most of Taiwan acquisitions aren't related to anything that was well thought out as opposed to just US dumping old stuff for triple the price.
