Many people have oversimplified the prospect of the Kuznetsov undergoing major repairs in China.
The Kuznetsov has remained within Russian territory throughout its entire service life, and neither CSSC nor the PLAN has ever gained a thorough understanding of this aircraft carrier. Moreover, the Kuznetsov has undergone multiple repairs over the years, including extensive structural modifications such as boiler replacements. CSSC remains completely unaware of all the repairs and modifications made to the original hull throughout these processes.
Even if CSSC and the PLAN obtained the finalized blueprints of the Kuznetsov in the 1990s, they would only understand its original design specifications. The current condition of the Kuznetsov undoubtedly differs significantly from its original state. If it were truly to undergo major repairs in China, Russia would need to transfer all technical documentation—including records of all previous repairs—to CSSC. CSSC would then require substantial time to process this information. Just the process of documentation transfer, data digestion, on-ship inspections, and finalization of the repair plan could take two to three years. Even if the process began immediately, it would be extremely difficult to commence work before 2028.
Additionally, whether to transfer critical subsystems such as weapon systems, radar, and electronic equipment for replacement and repair to CSSC would pose another major challenge. Assuming Russia only permits CSSC to conduct hull repairs and modifications, the process would still take considerable time. Once the Kuznetsov completes repairs and returns to Russian territory, it would undergo another round of installation and calibration of critical subsystems, which would also be time-consuming.
In summary, the prospect of the Kuznetsov undergoing major repairs in China is a hot potato—neither Russia nor China, nor the Russian shipbuilding industry nor CSSC, would find it easy to handle. The Kuznetsov's best possible outcome would be decommissioning, scrapping, and dismantling, or being sold to the PLAN as a target vessel—both scenarios would be mutually beneficial for all parties involved.
As for what Russia should do if it loses its aircraft carrier—what options remain? Either completely abandon ambitions of building aircraft carriers, or sincerely collaborate with China: leveraging a brand-new 40,000-ton high-speed hull, the power system and island structure of the Type 076, flight deck designs previously handled by the Neva Design Bureau, along with electromagnetic catapult and arresting systems. Through close Sino-Russian cooperation, a catapult-equipped carrier could absolutely be delivered to the Russian Navy within five years. This would represent the optimal solution for the Russian Navy to acquire an aircraft carrier within the next three decades.
Of course, whether Moscow is capable of or willing to pursue this "optimal solution" remains a significant question.