PLA AEW&C, SIGINT, EW and MPA thread

[Blitzo]

An interior image of the KJ-500 that participated in the joint exercise in Egypt.

I suppose showing the screens directly would be too much of a giveaway (though we've seen what the display modules look like in the past).

What's more interesting is that it seems the PLAAF overall has transitioned mostly to green jumpsuits for everyone -- pilots, but also AEW&C crew and other roles, which at least looks less aesthetically jarring than the blue they used to have.

 

[by78]

KJ-700H spotted again.

 

[Tomboy]

Not a EW, Intelligence nor AEWC aircraft or even a military aircraft but it's a civilian Y-12 photography aircraft seen over Beijing probably for the VJ parade. Pretty cool nonetheless IMO

 

[by78]

A new export AEW&C aircraft unveiled at the 11th World Radar Expo. It looks to have a rotating array and a nose resembling that of the KJ-700.

 

[Tomboy]

A new export AEW&C aircraft. It looks to have a rotating array and a nose resembling that of the KJ-700.

What if this is just upgraded ZDK-03, supposedly they were sent back for MLU

 

[GZDRefugee]

Can someone else good at computer science verify my understanding of how AESA seekers defeat EW countermeasures?

1. AESA radar can emit on multiple frequencies
2. Jamming intends to confuse seekers by overpowering returns with noise

But here lies the problem.

1. The seeker can emit on a randomized sequence of frequencies (potentially multiple frequencies simultaneously) which is virtually impossible to predict
2. The jammer can emit across the entire spectrum but this requires significant power
3. Even the brute force jamming approach can be defeated by home-on-emission if the seeker detects frequencies that it's not emitting itself

All in all, the seeker is at a significant advantage in power and computational efficiency. Doesn't this mean that defensive EW is basically dead?

 

[siegecrossbow]

Can someone else good at computer science verify my understanding of how AESA seekers defeat EW countermeasures?

1. AESA radar can emit on multiple frequencies
2. Jamming intends to confuse seekers by overpowering returns with noise

But here lies the problem.

1. The seeker can emit on a randomized sequence of frequencies (potentially multiple frequencies simultaneously) which is virtually impossible to predict
2. The jammer can emit across the entire spectrum but this requires significant power
3. Even the brute force jamming approach can be defeated by home-on-emission if the seeker detects frequencies that it's not emitting itself

All in all, the seeker is at a significant advantage in power and computational efficiency. Doesn't this mean that defensive EW is basically dead?

Not sure computer science is the right field there. You probably need digital signal processing experts. Having taken entry level course on the subject as an undergrad I can assure you that the knowledge base is extremely different between the two fields.

 

[by78]

KJ-3000 spotted.

EDIT: That's an old image from last year.

 

[GZDRefugee]

Not sure computer science is the right field there. You probably need digital signal processing experts. Having taken entry level course on the subject as an undergrad I can assure you that the knowledge base is extremely different between the two fields.

I'm actually seeing a lot of overlap between whatever field this is with cybersecurity and cryptographic computation. The encryptor vs decryptor dynamic is comparable almost beat for beat.

 

[Tomboy]

KJ-3000 spotted.

Is this new cause I see some people mentioning that it was from last year