PLA Small arms

polati

Junior Member
Registered Member
Previous posts already moved to Ukranian war thread, continue the discussion there please.


And in what scenario do you see the PLAGF needing to hold ground in the next 2-3 decades? Is India going to be charging over the Himalayas, or the South Koreans pushing through NK and across the Yalu? Or Russia sending troops across Siberia and into Manchuria? China simply has no overland threats, so makes little sense to allocate precious resources to the PLAGF that could be better invested in the AF, Navy, or RF.

Don't you think its at least worth a tiny bit of investment? Just because you don't expect holding ground to be a possibility doesn't mean it won't happen. If your goal is to go on the offensive you also have to be prepared to hold that ground should the enemy launch a counteroffensive.
 

by78

General
Long time no see. ZH-05/QTS-11 makes an appearance at the Sino-Cambodia joint exercise "Golden Dragon 2025".

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Don't you think its at least worth a tiny bit of investment? Just because you don't expect holding ground to be a possibility doesn't mean it won't happen. If your goal is to go on the offensive you also have to be prepared to hold that ground should the enemy launch a counteroffensive.
To hold ground you need sufficient quantity of infantry and the ability to rapidly and accurately direct a sufficient volume of artillery, drone, and aerial firepower. Exchange of small arms fire plays a very marginal role. Infantry's main role is to stay alive and aid in directing indirect fires. ISR and the speed in which changes in battlefield conditions can be identified and capitalized on determines the outcome of modern ground combat.
 
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sabiothailand

Junior Member
Registered Member
A bit out of topic. But are C-Clamps really practical in general?

I don't really understand some people's obsession with it, it just looks uncomfortable.
 

polati

Junior Member
Registered Member
To hold ground you need sufficient quantity of infantry and the ability to rapidly and accurately direct a sufficient volume of artillery, drone, and aerial firepower. Exchange of small arms fire plays a very marginal role. Infantry's main role is to stay alive and aid in directing indirect fires. ISR and the speed in which changes in battlefield conditions can be identified and capitalized on determines the outcome of modern ground combat.
Exchange of small arms fire plays a much bigger role in urban combat especially than you'd expect. A big part of combined arms warfare is still the ability for infantry to effectively cover armored units, for example, clear houses, buildings, which simply can't be done by drones. Even if infantry doesn't do much of the killing, it's the backbone of the ground operation. So why are we neglecting infantry? Given better equipment, training, and logistics it can vastly improve the ground operation. Infantry is not just about shooting guns, all of what you just said is greatly improved with high quality infantry, not just a high quantity of them.
 
Exchange of small arms fire plays a much bigger role in urban combat especially than you'd expect. A big part of combined arms warfare is still the ability for infantry to effectively cover armored units, for example, clear houses, buildings, which simply can't be done by drones. Even if infantry doesn't do much of the killing, it's the backbone of the ground operation. So why are we neglecting infantry? Given better equipment, training, and logistics it can vastly improve the ground operation. Infantry is not just about shooting guns, all of what you just said is greatly improved with high quality infantry, not just a high quantity of them.
PLA is not an expeditionary force, it does not foresee any scenarios that necessitates it to invade a foreign nation or to become involved in a ground war outside of China's borders. The PLAGF is already more than sufficient for defending China's territorial integrity against any potential adversary. The true threat to China's security comes from the sea and the air, so naturally the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF will be prioritized above the PLAGF in terms of resource allocation. There's no matter of if, China's foreign policy is very clear on the matter of not being involved militarily in the affairs of other sovereign nations. With regards to the PLAGF itself, China's defense strategy is to defeat any invasion via maneuver warfare in the frontier areas away from Chinese population centers, so urban combat and infantry arms are low priority within the PLAGF. Highest priorities for PLAGF are digitization and maintaining the capability to conduct network centric warfare in contested EW environments.
 

polati

Junior Member
Registered Member
PLA is not an expeditionary force, it does not foresee any scenarios that necessitates it to invade a foreign nation or to become involved in a ground war outside of China's borders. The PLAGF is already more than sufficient for defending China's territorial integrity against any potential adversary. The true threat to China's security comes from the sea and the air, so naturally the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF will be prioritized above the PLAGF in terms of resource allocation. There's no matter of if, China's foreign policy is very clear on the matter of not being involved militarily in the affairs of other sovereign nations. With regards to the PLAGF itself, China's defense strategy is to defeat any invasion via maneuver warfare in the frontier areas away from Chinese population centers, so urban combat and infantry arms are low priority within the PLAGF. Highest priorities for PLAGF are digitization and maintaining the capability to conduct network centric warfare in contested EW environments.
You are not correctly addressing the issue here. It is not a debate that the PLAGF is lower-priority than the PLAN or PLAAF, that has long been settled. The issue here is that your thinking relies on the assumption that the current foreign policy seemingly will dictate exactly what happens in the future and exactly the type of military strategy and tactics that will occur in a future war. How are you so sure that maneuver warfare will immediately bring about a quick victory? Have you considered the possibility of it devolving into something similar to the Ukraine war? Just because you expect to fight your way doesn't mean the fight will be fought your way.

"I believe our doctrine will work perfectly and I will never find myself in a situation where urban combat is a possibility, therefore I feel no need to improve our infantry capabilities because that won't happen"

Even if what you said was correct, which it logically isn't, digitization and network centric warfare can equally be improved by improving the quality of the infantry. EW, ground surveillance, every radio, communication tablet, integrated night vision device, thermals, distributed drone assets etc etc all serves towards achieving the current goals of the PLAGF. If your infantry cannot see the enemy properly at night, they can't direct fire on those enemies. And in order to achieve this, much improved training and equipment upgrades are needed.
 
You are not correctly addressing the issue here. It is not a debate that the PLAGF is lower-priority than the PLAN or PLAAF, that has long been settled. The issue here is that your thinking relies on the assumption that the current foreign policy seemingly will dictate exactly what happens in the future and exactly the type of military strategy and tactics that will occur in a future war. How are you so sure that maneuver warfare will immediately bring about a quick victory? Have you considered the possibility of it devolving into something similar to the Ukraine war? Just because you expect to fight your way doesn't mean the fight will be fought your way.

"I believe our doctrine will work perfectly and I will never find myself in a situation where urban combat is a possibility, therefore I feel no need to improve our infantry capabilities because that won't happen"

Even if what you said was correct, which it logically isn't, digitization and network centric warfare can equally be improved by improving the quality of the infantry. EW, ground surveillance, every radio, communication tablet, integrated night vision device, thermals, distributed drone assets etc etc all serves towards achieving the current goals of the PLAGF. If your infantry cannot see the enemy properly at night, they can't direct fire on those enemies. And in order to achieve this, much improved training and equipment upgrades are needed.
The PLA's procurement priorities indicates what the PLA believes to be the likely conflict scenarios that it will find itself involved in. The PLA knows what its doing far better than you or I. Conventional ground combat, whether as part of an invasion of foreign territory or in defense of a foreign ground invasion are considered very low probability events in the foreseeable future. If China's security environment or geopolitical situation changes, upgrading infantry kits is something that can be done in short order. After all, China is the largest producer of night vision equipment, communication systems, and electronics in the world.
 
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