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Lethe

Lethe

Captain
CasualObserver said:
Maybe because, until recently, it wasn't a very desirable aircraft in terms of overall capabilities relative to the high cost it entails? Its engines are somewhat underpowered, and they could've done a better job with the radome size. However, it can haul outsized payloads, including a wider selection of them, which is admittedly a decent advantage compared to the Typhoon.
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I think the F3 standard which entered service in 2009 was the point at which Rafale became a compelling export prospect, further underlined by induction of RBE2 AESA radar (first for European aircraft) on production aircraft from 2013. Nobody should expect export customers to sign up for either developmental aircraft (i.e. Rafale in the 1990s) or those with limited multirole capabilities and still experiencing teething pains (Rafale in 00s). Yet I think those "confidence" factors should've dissipated by the late 00s at the latest, with the clear roadmap to F3 and beyond. The campaign in Libya undoubtedly underlined the capabilities of the aircraft, but Rafale F2s operated earlier in Afghanistan so it should not have been a clear step-change moment.

Neurosmith said:
While the IN may be pressed for time, it may also be beneficial to use a more-available interim in the meantime (MiG-29Ks) and divert much of the funding to the TEDBF program instead. The TEDBF program, if successful, would not only provide the IN/IAF with a Rafale-class fighter but also significantly leapfrog India's defense aviation industry in terms of technology and self-sufficiency.

The IAF/IN seems to have a problem with satisfying requirements with off-the-shelf solutions at the expense of long-term development. This current cycle would have the IAF/IN continue purchasing near-term equipment that will lose their technological edge in the coming years while their indigenous programs (AMCA/TEDBD/ORCA) continue to be placed on the backburner.
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I think that TEDBF is precisely why the Indian Navy requirement was cut in half from the 57 aircraft originally contemplated under the 2017 MRCBF RFI. At that point, the intent was evidently to replace existing MiG-29Ks with this new aircraft (Super Hornet or Rafale). The modified plan involves retaining MiG-29K in service alongside fewer Rafales while TEDBF gestates to replace the former. The unspoken annex to this plan is that if TEDBF fails to deliver, Dassault will be more than happy to step in with a second batch of Rafales for IN.

There is clearly tension between IAF/IN inventory objectives and broader GoI objectives re: budgets, strategic autonomy, domestic industrial development. Neither can be entirely absolved from their role in the general morass that is the Indian defence-industrial sector. Yet can you blame IN for not wanting to put all their eggs in the TEDBF basket?
 
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Lethe

Lethe

Captain
zyklon said:
Will the outcome of
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perhaps convince the Indian authorities of the need to expedite and/or enlarge their order of Dassault Rafales?
Though likewise, should the IAF's extant Rafales perform poorly, will this new order get scrapped for something else?!
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Even before these latest tensions between India and Pakistan, I linked a rumour that India is looking at a second small-scale batch of Rafales for IAF as a detour around the MRFA morass. The budgetary sums required for large-scale acquisition of foreign platforms are unpalatable both in domestic political terms (i.e. the trade-off space within the budget in light of all other political demands) and also in respect of long-term objectives re: strategic autonomy. Nonetheless there is persistent clamouring from the services for more capability now or at least soon. These actual (36 Rafales for IAF, 26 for IN) and hypothetical (~40 additional Rafales for IAF) small-scale acquisitions therefore function as a pressure relief valve that allows GoI to temporarily resolve the tensions in the system, while hoping that the promised land of Atmanirbhar Bharat lies just around the corner.

If IAF/IN were able to call the shots and ride roughshod over concerns about budgets, domestic industry programs and objectives, etc. they would almost certainly have progressed with MMRCA and collectively be into the triple digits on Rafale by now, with production continuing on a domestic assembly line. The Indian services appear to be very satisfied with their experiences with French aircraft. While this relationship goes back many decades, it appears to have been supercharged by the Kargil conflict in 1999 where Mirage 2000 assumed the starring role on the Indian side, and particularly the cooperation IAF received from Dassault during that conflict to integrate the Israeli Litening pod and Paveway munitions at short notice.
 
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Neurosmith

Neurosmith

Junior Member
Registered Member
Lethe said:
I think that TEDBF is precisely why the Indian Navy requirement was cut in half from the 57 aircraft originally contemplated under the 2017 MRCBF RFI. At that point, the intent was evidently to replace existing MiG-29Ks with this new aircraft (Super Hornet or Rafale). The modified plan involves retaining MiG-29K in service alongside fewer Rafales while TEDBF gestates to replace the former. The unspoken annex to this plan is that if TEDBF fails to deliver, Dassault will be more than happy to step in with a second batch of Rafales for IN.

There is clearly tension between IAF/IN force structure objectives and broader GoI objectives re: budgets, strategic autonomy, industrial development, etc. Neither can be entirely absolved. Yet can you blame IN for having less than complete confidence in TEDBF?
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Another option is to scrap the TEDBF altogether and go all-in on an expedited delivery of the AMCA - and hopefully - a naval variant.
 
A

AndrewJ

Junior Member
Registered Member
Lethe said:
Folks at Dassault and elsewhere in Paris might reasonably be wondering why these customers did not form an orderly queue commencing a decade earlier....
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Because the leadership of Dassault was not willing or not good at bribing clients a decade ago... :rolleyes:

They're getting familiar with that recent years, learning from practice.
 
Lethe

Lethe

Captain
Neurosmith said:
Another option is to scrap the TEDBF altogether and go all-in on an expedited delivery of the AMCA - and hopefully - a naval variant.
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In the abstract that seems the sensible and even obvious path: build the next-generation medium fighter for both land-based and carrier-based operation, just as Rafale was designed for (with modest differences between variants).

Unfortunately, it doesn't seem that carrier-compatibility was ever a design consideration for AMCA.

TEDBF is of much more recent genesis, emerging from the failure of the naval LCA program. The precise reasons why IN declined to proceed with that aircraft after giving it considerably backing for many years have not been disclosed, but it is rumoured that the minimum approach speed was too high despite the aerodynamic modifications incorporated into that variant. Also, LCA's basic weight control issues become even more challenging when adaptations for carrier-based operation increase weight still further. It is likely that IN was looking at an aircraft that offered marginal utility (in terms of range/payload combinations) whilst simultaneously being a marginal proposition in terms of take-off and landing characteristics, and evidently they were not satisfied that LCA Mk. 2 would shift the needle sufficiently. Hence the brief with TEDBF becomes to take the considerable learnings from the naval LCA experience, design a new aircraft with aerodynamic characteristics more suitable for carrier operation, and to make it large enough that, in the long-term, it can actually replace rather than complement the foreign aircraft currently in service.

At this point, IAF would undoubtedly strenuously resist any major rescoping of AMCA to incorporate carrier operations into the design. IN would also be less than enthusiastic about that prospect, having just emerged from the failure of naval LCA. One could certainly make a case for pushing such a merger through anyway, but my point is that it would require high-level intervention against considerable institutional opposition for little immediate return. Such leadership appears to be in short supply. If you squint you can look at the reduced technical ambition of TEDBF (no internal weapons bay or other rigorous VLO measures) as a kind of insurance policy against AMCA, but that is undermined by the two programs mostly being run by the same agencies and therefore likely vulnerable to similar flaws.

I do wonder what will happen with these projects as the budgetary requirements for each increase over time. Perhaps things will indeed come to a head at some point and hard decisions will have to be made, from a set of options less palatable than if they had been made earlier. Until then, India will no doubt continue to muddle through.
 
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